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Policy Issues in Agricultural Conflicts Resolution: Evaluating the Socio-Economic Implications of Insecurity and Displacements within African States of Nigeria and Ethiopia

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Abstract

Socio-economic impact of displacement arising from insecurity and investment in land has been considered, with the discovery of far-reaching consequences incidental to the two issues. What is the role of public policy in prevention of these dire consequences and how has that role been deployed in the two African countries considered? The study found that seeming agricultural conflicts in Nigeria are only a ploy to bigger unexpressed schemes or ethno-cultural agenda. This account for the reasons why public policy have not been able to provide permanent solutions.

Conversely in Ethiopia, public policy has been effectively used to promote citizen wellbeing and its attendant prosperity in terms of benefits from government regulated investments in land. In the overall, the agro-economic situation arising from insecurity instigated displacements of citizens from their ancestral lands have not favored the Nigerian nation as the rising cases of internally displaced persons in the country has remained unimaginably high thus resulting acute shortage of food and nutritional products.

Keywords: Industrial Capitalism, Agricultural Land, Food Sovereignty, Communal Life, Ethno-Religious Sentiments, Citizen Safety, Crisis Entrepreneurs

1. Introduction

It is very instructive to note the intended contributions of the ECOWAP/CAADP Initiative that hinges on the: (i) satisfaction of food requirements, for the population (ii) contribute to the socio-economic development (iii) reduction of poverty level or index within the ECOWAS sub-region and (iv) resolve issues of resource inequality among member states (ECOWAS Commission Report, 2009). In order to operationalize these contributions, the report provided for the following pillars, namely:

1. management of water resources
2. management of shared natural resources
3. development of farms in sustainable manner
4. development of sales outlets, markets and value supply chains
5. detection, prevention of and management of food crisis
6. institution strengthening

The foregoing policy statements constitute the framework for agricultural development within the West African Region and these regional policy directions rely on national implementation strategies and resources, including manpower. As could be observed, these policies sometimes span over years of contact meetings, seminars, public hearings and conferences. Obvious to the outcomes of these meetings is the fact that most of the time core issues of interest between the communities of impact are not well presented, discussed and solutions provided for. Thus, at the stage of policy implementation, these issues surfaces and there are no specific procedures or containment provisions to arrest the resultant menace. The result is crisis that further degenerates to conflicts and security breaches.

This paper shall discuss policy making from the prism of executive power. This will enable a holistic view and understanding of the weaknesses of the regional, sub-regional and national policy making processes and how such weaknesses have emboldened communal *crisis entrepreneurs* who have consistently sustained various degrees of assault among native settlers on their lands. In view of this concern, the paper shall establish a link between executive powers and the strength of public policy. It will also create a nexus between policy direction and effectiveness, and the never-ending crisis in agricultural land

occupation. The entire effects of these concerns on the collective essence of the policy framework being the socio-economic conditions of the impacted societies, shall be x-rayed with the intent of positioning the argument within the effectiveness of agricultural land policy implementation.

Further, the paper shall also examine the components of *industrial capitalism* within the context of agricultural development and how it affects the socio-economic balance of the society. In this regard, the view of Farnham (1992) ^[8] would be significantly relied upon to establish the basis of modern societal development outside traditional agricultural economic inputs. The basis of these postulations would be maintained to the effect that the under-development witnessed in the areas of agricultural land conflicts are a testimony to the fact that the socio-economic implication of insecurity goes beyond the immediate environment of impact. The study will further narrow its test cases to the Middle Belt region of Nigeria and Adamitulu and Dugda District of East Showa Zone of Oromia region of Ethiopia.

Thus, while the Nigeria test case will consider the core causes of conflicts resulting insecurity in the Middle Belt States of Nigeria and their attendant socio-economic implications, the Ethiopia test case will concentrate on the impacts of commercial displacement of aborigines and settlers in response to investment in agricultural and allied industrial development initiatives. These two concerns would be tested against the effectiveness of public policy initiatives in addition to the impact of compelling forces on policy implementers. The overall impacts of these situations in the two considered societies will further be analyzed to enhance the position of this paper- that well intended public policy is crucial to the achievement of industrial capitalism. In this regard, public policy could be said to be an institutional proposition with defined components that are intended to solve relevant and concrete problems by using a conceptual plan or standard procedure for its implementation by actors named in the policy.

In respect of this study, the policy referred to are those of regional and sub-regional organizations that concerns agricultural development for the African continent. In regard to these regional policy framework, Farnham (1992) ^[8] pointed that, capitalist societies have been subsumed by industrial societies and they have become very specialized in the use of the tools of production; and this specifically imply that public policy must make adequate provision for such development. In this vein, the making of policy that is calculated to bring about stability and growth also rely on external issues of unbargained conflicts that might disrupt the flow of communal life. Further, the policy framework for ECOWAP implementation is intended to succeed through programs that are designed to encourage or promote food sovereignty by adopting strategic measures that enhance food value-chains, promotion of sub-regional or regional agricultural development and the elimination or the reduction of issues that make food production susceptible to crisis. Thus, the essence of these parameters is sustainability of agricultural production and food flow (ECOWAP Commission, 2009) ^[7].

2. Forced Access to Land Resources on the Basis of Ethno-Religious Sentiments

It should be noted that most parts of Africa have land tenure systems that recognize ethnic origin as the basis of ownership of land. This seeming consciousness becomes a

means of generational connection to land and also the basis for mobilizing their ethnic groups in contest for land acquisition and access to natural resources connected to land. In this regard, Genyi (2017) ^[9], observed that ethnicity and religious connections have become the basis of individual and communal identify which has also been presented as a platform that initiates the competition for land, waterways or other natural resources. Although, Nnoli (1978) agrees with this view point, the fact that the complex nature of the political atmosphere of most developing countries attest to its relevance in the search for solutions arising from such conflicts lends more credence to some of the basis for colonial era land acquisition, which resulted the dethronement of some tribal Chiefs and warriors. Although, colonial era land conquest is mainly for commercial purposes, some of the land grabbing proclivity that are fueled by ethno-religious sentiments extends beyond commercial purposes to permanent take over and occupation of the land, by displacing the aborigines and settlers that have occupied such lands.

Consequent on this drive to permanently occupy other people's land, the study has shown that the common vehicle that could be used for that purpose is ethno-religious sentiments which sometimes rely on thoughtless mundane persuasions that places no value on human life or human existence. It should be noted that in Nigeria, this menace has been the basis of most national activities beginning from pre-amalgamation era to current state of affairs. Accordingly, a lot of socio-political imbalances have not only been noticed, but has resulted lack of faith and support for public policies.

Further, ethnic and religious sentiments have also resulted politically stimulated crisis that degenerated to various forms of violence and social disorder. Genyi (2017) ^[9] averred that the foregoing complications are the context under which the Tiv farmers and Fulani herders have engaged each other since the early 1990s when the Tiv farmers decided to limit the extent of land available for grazing to the Fulani herders. This development sparked off varying degrees of conflicts which has ultimately claimed human lives and properties (Osaghae, 1998) ^[15]. It should be noted that while the Fulani herders are migratory in nature, in search of natural benefits for their cattle business, the Tivs are aborigines in control of the lands before the arrival of the Fulani herders. Thus, in all areas of conflict within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, it could be seen that there is availability of good soil and access to flowing drinking water for the herders and their cattle.

3. Identify of Conflict Actors: Contest or Conquest?

The actors and persons directly involved in these conflict situations are persons who lay claims of absolute ownership and control over the land without recourse to the farmers whose progenitors lived on that land and bequeathed same to them (Moti and Wegh, 2001) ^[14]. It should be noted that the Tiv, Jukun, Idoma, etc., who were early settlers of the Middle Belt region of Nigeria have developed means of sustenance by reason of agricultural businesses. However, climate change resulting inadequate rainfall, decline in soil fertility and many other associated factors have occasioned low crop yield. This condition affected the productivity of the local populace some of whom started migrating to city centers in search of other businesses and survival opportunities. Genyi (2017) ^[9] reported that while farmers

temporarily migrated to other areas, the Fulani herders in search of favourable grazing conditions moved southwards from the northern part of Nigeria. The result being the meeting of local populations of predominantly aged persons, young adults and children who survive by subsistent farming. According to Iro (1991) ^[12], the earlier Fulani herdsmen searched for possibilities of co-existence, good pasture and water, in addition to absence of tse-tse fly. These factors were responsible for their migration to the Middle Belt region where they sometimes allow their cattle to eat up crops of the local farmers and traditional means of settlement were deployed to resolve those issues.

In response to the foregoing, conflicts normally arise which are sometimes settled amicably by some forms of traditional peace making and compensation (Bolarinwa, Fapojuwo and Ayanda, 2012 and Genyi, 2017 ^[9]). However, the study finds that the Fulani herdsmen who have resisted every form of modern approach to animal husbandry such as ranching, have maintained mobility and migration as a production strategy (Iro, 1991 ^[12] and Genyi, 2017 ^[9]). These pastoralists upon arrival were permitted to settle down and were also allocated grazing areas by the land owners. Studies showed that in early times, these herders came with their families i.e. their wives and children and were allowed to peaceably settle down within the Middle Belt communities until the early 2000s when a set of very aggressive herders were noticed within these communities. These set of herders arrived without their wives and children, but were in illegal possession of very sophisticated fire arms. Genyi (2017) ^[9] reported that these set of herders were not interested in seeking for permission or requesting for grant of area to graze their cattle. In this regard, studies have shown that since they were battle ready, they sometimes are not bothered when their cattle eat up farmers' crops.

As should be noted, these set of herders are the conflict initiators and actors whose nefarious actions have resulted monumental damages to lives and properties (Olabode and Ajibade, 2014). In view of the foregoing, it is safe to posit that conflict actors could be said to have uninterruptedly succeeded on the basis of the weaknesses of public policies in respect of conflicts with communal and ethno-religious undertone. Consequently, the expressed view of Genyi (2017) ^[9] and Duru (2013) indicates the following:

These attacks intensified from the middle of 2013 when the major road from Makurdi to Naka, the headquarters of Gwer West local government, was blocked by Fulani armed men after ransacking more than 6 districts along the high way. For more than a year the road remained closed as armed Fulani herdsmen held sway. From 5-9 November 2013, heavily armed Fulani herdsmen attacked Ikepele, Okpopolo and other settlements in Agatu, another local government area, killing over 40 residents and ransacking entire villages. The attackers destroyed homesteads and farm lands displacing over 6,000 inhabitants (Duru, 2013 in Genyi, 2017).

The foregoing facts attest to the crux of the arguments in this study, and that is the reality of the gross weakness of public policy. If it were not so, how can an ethnic militia in a nation block the major road to a local government headquarter for over a year in the face of a government? Further, the facts expressed above are further supported by Genyi's observation that the State Security system was absent to protect the farmers, this assertion are as follows:

What was obvious was the absence of state protection for the farmers while the attacks lasted. The State Security personnel arrived long after the attacks had stopped - when the aggressors had disappeared. (Genyi, 2017:144) ^[9].

The foregoing views go to show that it is either the government is indirectly party to the attacks or significantly complacent on the basis of policy bottlenecks or administrative incapacitation. It is therefore safe to posit that the attacks on the Benue State communities within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria are well co-ordinated by trained Fulani militia who by all standards cannot be said to be the normal pastoralists or herders. This position is again illustrated in the established view of Genyi (2017:144) ^[9] that:

The climax of the Fulani invasion and attacks on Benue farmers was witnessed at Uikpam, Tse-Akenyi Torkula village, the Tiv paramount ruler's ancestral home in Guma and the ransacking of Ayilamo semi urban settlement in Logo local government area. The attacks on Uikpam village left more than 30 people dead while the entire village was burnt down. The Fulani invaders had retreated and camped after the attacks near Gbajimba, along the coast of River Katsina-Ala ready to resume attacks on the remaining residents. On 18 March 2014, the reality of the conflict finally hit the government at state and federal levels when the Governor of Benue state ran into the herders' ambush in an unforgettable manner. This attack confirmed the extent to which the nomadic pastoralists Fulani were well armed and prepared to engage the Tiv farmers in the contestation for land-based resources.

Although the fighters were viewed by previous writers as herdsmen who were in contestation with the aborigine farmers for land and water to graze their cattle; the criminal brigandage employed by them suggests that they were Fulani militia who were not in contestation for grazing land but used grazing as a pretense for land conquest and take over. This is very evident in the manner of attacks which kills the owners of the land, chase away the wounded survivors, burn down the entire villages in various districts and occupy their ancestral lands. In this regard, CAN (2018) ^[4] published an update indicating a total 47 sets of separate attacks from February 2013 to January, 2018 resulting the killings and dispossession of land by Fulani herdsmen and militia. In view of these assaults and land takeover as reported by CAN, it could be concluded that these attacks are deliberate actions of ethnic cleansing; especially where attention to the fact that the killings in Ekwo-Okpanchenyi Community of Agatu on the 13th of May, 2014 left about 200 houses razed down killing 47 indigenes. The fact that this dastardly act was done by a militia of about 230-armed fighting Fulani men indicate that the conflict has gone beyond contestation for grazing land and has become a conquest for permanent takeover and ownership of land.

In the overall, it should be pointed that the conquest and land takeover approach of the Fulani herdsmen have brought about insecurity and total displacement of the natives from their ancestral lands. In turn, these violent efforts have resulted socio-economic imbalances in Nigeria as the natives who ran away from their ancestral lands have resettled in other places as internally displaced persons and refugees, just to start life afresh. The economic impact of these attacks is that these peasant farmers whose efforts contribute to national food and agricultural value-chains are no longer productive, thus the overall effect is shortage of

food, high cost of food and forceful depopulation of the indigenous people of the Middle Belt region of Nigeria.

4. The Weakness of Public Policy and the Fueling of Crisis and Under Development

This paper has argued that public policy is at the heart of societal development and it is achievable on the balance of socio-economic stability. However, where public policy implementation is weak or unproductive, then social decay and degeneration to chaotic conditions is eminent. This imply that when top government functionaries and agents take sides at the initial stage of communal or ethno-religious crisis or downplay the negative potentials of such conflicts, its lackadaisical nature or approach must certainly result deep cycles of conflicts, entrenched poverty and gross underdevelopment.

The foregoing views are predicated on the inability and weakness of all regional cooperation instruments that calls for integrated agricultural development among the nations in the region. These documents from regional bodies leave the issues of security to the national governments in the region, who themselves are sometimes interested and indirect parties to the crisis; or they are complacent in providing solutions due to political or other mundane dispositions and proclivities. This argument is due to the fact that most agriculturally based conflicts can be resolved by public policies and effective policy implementation strategies; but when those that are to implement those policies are complacent, then the conflict escalates to unquantifiable conflagration of national resources and values. For instance, the findings of Iro (1994) and Ingawa, Ega and Erhabor (1999) ^[10] indicate that the intervention of government in recognizing the rights of herders to pastoral lands and water were untimely and subsequent efforts of addressing the issues by the use of public policy have been very insignificant.

In support of this view, it is a fact that after the 1965 passage of the Grazing Reserve Law, which public policy instrument was to afford the herders some protection while carrying on their business. This law was to prevent any form of intimidation that could result deprivation of statutory access to green pastures and water for the herders (Uzundu, 2013) ^[18]. It was reported that this law did not have any serious implementation blueprint or policy of action, for which over a period of time the defined grazing routes were taken over by native farmers and property developers who blocked the grazing routes and access to the water resources. In 1976 another effort was made to resurvey the lands for grazing and upon completion, 2.3 million hectares were statutorily gazette or established for grazing. This represented 2% of total area mapped out and as such was very insufficient out of over 30 million hectares that was reserved from the 300 mapped out areas that were surveyed, nationwide. As public records show, only 600,000 hectares covering 45 areas were gazette out of the 300 areas; and only 225,000 hectares covering eight reserves were fully established by the Federal Government as areas mapped out and reserved for grazing (Uzundu, 2013) ^[18]. Consequently, Iro (1994) observed that many of these underdeveloped grazing reserved areas have been encroached upon and have practically disappeared. This study thus holds that the Fulani herdsmen still holds on to these reserved grazing routes irrespective of the fact that social and living conditions have changed their natural characteristics and public policy has

significantly failed to address these sociological changes.

The foregoing analysis of the weakness of public policy is thus the basis of endless farmers and herders' clashes in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. The implication of this argument is that if public policy were to be effective, the reserved grazing areas would have confined the pastoralists to those areas and their herds would not come in contact with farmlands. Secondly, failure of public policy also imply that the government would have introduced and enforced more modern means of beef production as applicable in advanced societies, where ranching and standard beef production factories are practiced. This could have forced investors to deploy modern means of meat production which will in turn would transform the mobile nature of the pastoralists; because they would be trained in ranching practices and made to work in the ranches and an avalanche of diary production value-chains.

Further, and in the foregoing regard, the argument of the primitive school of thought that mobility with the herds is a traditional way of life of the Fulani which also identify them, will no longer hold as the government could use public policy to criminalize the movement of cattle by foot.

5. Associated Causes of Agricultural Based Conflicts and Attendant Insecurities

The study has considered the major causes of agricultural based crisis and the resultant insecurities. However, there are other associated causes that field study and assessment has uncovered. These associated issues are major causes of insecurity which resultant consequence is economic devastation of the nation and the region at large. The impact of this is seen in the level of underdevelopment. The following associated causes will give better insight into the origins of insecurity in areas around Africa where traditional means of cattle rearing are still practiced.

- i) **Climatic Conditions:** In Nigeria, as in most places in Africa where traditional pastoralist still move with their herds, the dry season completely removes the possibility of green pasture and water in the northern part of the country, apart from irrigated areas; thus, forcing the herders to move southwards and settle along the Rivers Niger and Benue, where there is water and green pasture all year round. This move creates competition for natural resources of green pasture and water, as the herds during drinking of water are noticed to excrete into the waters. This contaminates the waters. Meanwhile, the local communities also drink from this water, since in most cases governments have not provided them with alternative sources of clean drinkable water. This is a major cause of conflict between the herders and their host farmers. The result is damage to lives and properties and general insecurity (Atelhe and Chukwuma, 2014) ^[1].
- ii) **Government Urbanization Programs:** The study also found that programs of government aimed at urbanization and rural infrastructural development have significantly reduced available land for farming and grazing, thus increasing the farmer-herder tensions. For instance, if the government without adequate study of the issues and making effective plans, decides to set up an industrial park within a location where farmers and herders operate; this project would require massive

lands for road construction, irrigation, dam, channeled water course, etc. The effect of this industrialization of rural community is that the land size available for farming and grazing would be reduced and thus become a potential factor for contestation and conflicts between the farmers and herders, and a cause for insecurity.

iii) **Forceful Trespass and Occupation of Farming Land:**

Field Study of Nyiga Gogo axis of Merkyen village in Gwer West Local Government Area and Terser Tyondon in Uvir Village of Guma Local Government Area of Benue State, Middle Belt region of Nigeria indicate that in recent times, beginning from the early 2000s when an aggressive set of herders started pushing through with sophisticated weapons and firearms, it became the experience of the host communities that these set of Fulani herders (unlike the previously peaceful herdsman) can kill at the slightest provocation. This fear of the local farmers made the herdsman to occupy farmlands in these villages unchallenged. The impact of this trend is the reduction in farming activities, thus eroding any socio-economic gain of the past. In the long run, this forced entry without the usual traditional negotiation and permission of land owners became a potential basis for insecurity in the region.

iv) **Sexual Harassment of the Native Women:**

This crime is a silent but major cause of conflict and insecurity. It has been noted that herdsman previously travelled with their families, however as pointed by Genyi (2017)^[9] and Iro (1994), the present set of herdsman no longer move in company of their families. This increases the chances of sexual starvation on the side of the herdsman. This sexual urge thus makes any woman seen alone by the herders a potential rape victim. Studies have shown that if these women resist the forceful sexual attack of these predator herders they are likely to be injured or even killed. Genyi (2017)^[9] reported that in a particular incident one Mrs. Mkurem Igbawua of Baa village in 2014 died after she was raped by a Fulani herder in her farm. In some cases, unwanted pregnancies have resulted from these nefarious activities and a lot of such rape incidences are not reported by the women for fear of stigmatization and attendant social disadvantages. In the overall, when they are reported, the psychological impact of these rapes on the victims and their families becomes a communal challenge that could result a reprisal attack and the cycle of violence continues. Over a period of time this becomes the basis for insecurity in the area.

v) **The Criminality of Local Vigilante:**

This aspect of the remote causes of insecurity are often not reported. Cases abound where herdsman are chased away by community vigilante groups who also seize their cattle and threaten them with death. Sometimes the herdsman are killed and their herds stolen. It should be noted that the actual owners of these cattle are usually men of adequate means who could deploy any measure in revenge for their stolen cattle. In other cases, these vigilante groups collect huge sums of money from the herders in pretense of granting them community rights to graze in their lands, only for new groups of vigilante

to emerge in request of the same royalty or financial demand. This conflicting situation often makes for revenge by the Fulani pastoralist against what they perceive as extortion by criminal gangs parading as community vigilante.

vi) **Extortional Grant of Local Grazing Permit:**

The field study for this work have shown that in some instances herders present themselves to local Chiefs of the host communities, who in turn assure them of protection and permission to graze in their domain on payment of certain royalties. In the understanding of these herdsman, the royalty or grant payment demanded from them accords them unlimited rights to pasture, water, grazing on grass, bushes and even crops. Consequently, to the herdsman, upon payment of the royalty to the Chief, a right to land has been given to them that they are entitled to defend, by whatever means at their disposal. This menace has been seen to be the fundamental basis of conflicts between local farmers and the herders. In a particular case, Genyi (2017)^[9] reported that in the Agasha incident, five Fulani herdsman were killed after they had paid royalty to a local Chief and granted permission to graze. However, while grazing their cattle, issues of trespass to farmland aroused and the herdsman were overpowered and killed. In the reasoning of the herdsman (as one of their leaders responded in an interview), they believed that the fulfillment of the traditional rites also gives them right to the use of the land in any way that they chose; meaning that total ownership of the allocated land is connoted and inferred by reason of the fulfilment of the traditional formality. This is the main reason why conflicts have continued unabated, in some of these farming communities within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria.

In view of the foregoing, there are socio-economic drawbacks of these conflicts, which includes food shortages, when farmers are forced to abandon their homes and farms and relocate to other areas where they lack access to land to continue their farm work. Such disruption of life also brings about destruction to available public infrastructure, such as schools, banks, churches, individual homes, government institutions and facilities, police stations, etc. Some of these public infrastructures are converted to refugee camps and available public utilities in such areas become over stretched and dilapidated.

Further, as observed in the study, the rampaging Fulani herdsman in the attack on communities in the Guma Local Government Area of Benue State, also destroyed the Police Station and the Guma Local Government Secretariat. This believes that the attack on public facility was to revenge on government weaknesses in not providing adequate protection to the citizenry. It could therefore be seen that in all of these attacks the central reason was to kill the farmers and dispossess them of their lands, and occupy same as new owners. The study finds that this can only happen where public policy for citizen safety is either unavailable or weak. In addition, field study shows that the Fulani herdsman had nothing to lose in all of these attacks as the only valuable thing to them are their cattle which they normally move to faraway places before they launch the attacks.

6. Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Impacts of LSAI Associated Displacements in Oromia Region of Ethiopia

Having considered the devastating impacts of communal displacements arising from insecurity on the socio-economic lifeline of African Societies using Nigeria's Middle Belt region as a case study, it is imperative to state that the study also consider the impact of communal displacement arising from public or private sector investments in communal lands, as observed in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. According to published records from Ethiopian Federal Government Database of Land Expropriation (EIC, 2018), Oromia region was noticed to have accounted for 26% of the highest land transfer under Large-Scale Agricultural Investments (LSAIs) initiative of the Ethiopian Federal Government.

In the forgoing regard, it should be noted that the Ethiopian Constitution provides that lands are a "common property of nations, nationalities and people of Ethiopia" (FDRE Constitution, 1995) ^[6]. The Ethiopian Constitution further affirm that both farmers and animal herders have indefinite rights to use the lands that they occupy. The implication of this constitutional provision is that both farmers and herders have equal access and right to the use of land provided that upon government indicated interest in any section of the land, the rights of citizens in occupation of such lands extinguishes and compensations are paid by the government to the farmers or herders in accordance with the Ethiopian Council of Ministers Regulation No 135/2007-Payment of Compensation for Property Situated on landholding expropriated for public purposes (Ethiopian Council of Ministers Regulations, 2007) ^[5].

Consequently, compensation in monetary terms is intended to assuage the pains of deprivation and displacement from their occupied lands. Thus, compensation is defined as a measure that is designed and implemented to take care of incidental losses, risks and impacts on people on account of the displacement occasioned by the LSAIs (IFC, 2012) ^[11]. Consequently, in Ethiopia, land compensation rates are applied to different resources within the context of their characteristics which are defined as, perennial crops, annual crops, roots or tuber crops, etc. and codified in the appropriate Government gazette.

Further, additional benefits for the natives arising from LSAI activities in Ethiopia are as follows:

1. contribute to technology advancement and transfer
2. provide jobs and various employment opportunities
3. provide and improve access to services that benefits the displaced natives

Thus, the policy of government in this regard requires that the LSAIs are not responsible for any cash compensation. These compensations are paid by the government to the displaced farmers or people. This means that the displaced communities are required to use the cash compensation provided by government and other forms of corporate social responsibility support to rebuild their lives and livelihood and boost up their incomes and assets. As noticed from studies, the impact of the LSAI investments beyond displacement of the communities indicate that despite cash-compensation payments, the economies of the communities and households that have been displaced, continue to decline in farm related income and non-farm related sources of income in comparison with their income levels before the

displacement (Rahmato, 2011) ^[17]. Further, this inability to achieve better life on account LSAIs in land, has been attributed to high levels of illiteracy and lack of employable skills required to secure better job engagements on the occasion of loss of land and its incidental resources (Bekele, 2016) ^[3].

7. Comparative Analysis of the Effect of Human Displacement based on Insecurity and LSAIs Initiatives

This discussion deals with the two regions of the African States x-rayed in the Study. As a comparative study of the two regions i.e., the Middle Belt region of Nigeria and the Oromia region of Ethiopia, it could be said that while in both cases the farmers and herders have been known to cohabit over a long period of time spanning over 50 years in both cases, this has happened under different circumstances, as determined by official public policies and laws of the individual nation states.

- 1) Thus, while the Nigerian Constitution vest urban lands on the governors of the State, it left rural lands to the natives and aborigines of the various communities. This ownership thus become a subject of contest where grantee herders after very long occupation decides to asserts some ownership rights over such lands and this results conflicts and various degrees of insecurity. Converse to the foregoing, under the Ethiopian Constitution all lands belong to the Federal Government, but Ethiopian citizens are allowed to use it until government indicate interest to use same and that point, the right or access of the citizens to the land extinguishes. Under this land tenure system, both herders and farmers have equal rights and equal access to land, this means that both can cohabit without any expecting or demanding any form or royalty from the other. The economic implication of this policy of the Ethiopian Government (which is protected by the Constitution) is that the farmers and herders can both make progress without encroachment or trespass to each other's land.
- 2) On the issue of communal displacement, it should be pointed that while the experience of the Middle Belt region of Nigeria is that of displacement of the natives due to violence and insecurity from Fulani herders, the displacement observed in Ethiopia is as a result of government supervised or regulated investments in land. In the Ethiopian case, violence and insecurity are not recorded since, the policy of Government as enshrined in the nation's Constitution does not permit the natives to approach the LSAIs for any monetary compensation except demanding for corporate social responsibility benefits (from the LSAIs as provided in their agreement with Government). However, studies have shown that the LSAIs have often failed to keep faith with these obligations, but there is no record that non-performance has resulted any form of violent attacks that has resulted displacements. On the Nigerian side, the study has shown that whole villages and districts have been sacked with houses destroyed and thousands of persons killed. Studies have also shown that the Fulani herders from the early 2000s have brought in trained fighters whose sole purpose was to sack the natives and take over their lands. As the Benue,

Taraba Nasarawa and Plateau States experiences have shown, the Fulani herders have approached the issues with the mindset of conquest and permanent occupation; this account for why they raise houses to the ground and change the characteristics of the land and sometimes change the name by which the land is known.

- 3) On the issue of economic impact, it could be seen that in the region of Oromia in Ethiopia, the displacement arising from public use of the land attracts compensation from the government after assessment of the farm holdership or the benefits accruable to the herder in the use of the land. In this case, the economy of the household or community could be said to be better off in the short and long run if the funds are well invested. The same cannot be said of the Nigeria Middle Belt region where economic woes besiege the inhabitants who are forced to flee for the safety their lives when they see the gruesome murder of their relatives and wanton destruction of their livelihoods. Thus, the socio-economic impact of these violence on the Middle Belt region of Nigeria affects the whole nation, as it is a common fact, that the region is the major producer of food for the entire nation. Thus, an attack on any part of this region affects the entire socio-economic fortunes of the Nigerian nation.

Further, a clearer indication of the socio-economic woes of Nigeria arising from this senseless violence is more clearly affirmed in the works of Mailafia (2021) ^[13] at page 65, which states thus:

“From the viewpoint of basic economic theory, violent conflict is highly disruptive of normal economic activities. Forced migrations and internal displacements of people further dampens economic activities. Peasants that have been forced out of their ancestral homes, can hardly engage in farming activities. This phenomenon has particularly been true of North East and large chunk of the Middle Belt, particularly, Benue, Southern Kaduna, and more recently, Niger State.

Linked to the erosion of consumer confidence. Dampening of economic activities depress the economy in general and contribute to the erosion of consumer confidence. People try to conserve the little they have in the context of rising uncertainty and anxiety about the future. This dampening of consumer confidence, reinforces the vicious cycle of a downward economic spiral, which leads to deepening poverty and misery.

There is also the reality of decreasing capital flows, both in form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investments. Violent conflict gives a poor external image of the country, thereby discouraging investors. Capital needs a stable and secure environment. Where there is violence, conflict and instability, capital often develops wings and flies away to safety”.

- 4) On the issue of effectiveness of public policy for both countries; it could be seen that public policies were better implemented in Ethiopia than in Nigeria. The evidence of this fact is seen in the manner of handling issues of farmers' displacement, while in Ethiopia, displaced persons are compensated for loss of land and opportunity. In Nigeria, people are displaced by others

from their ancestral land with government doing little or nothing about it. In this regard, Genyi (2017) ^[9] reported that in one of the herders and farmers clash, that resulted many lives of native persons, the Fulani herdsmen blocked a major access road for over a year with government doing nothing about it. Thus, policy failure in Nigeria is a primary reason for loss of lives and general insecurity.

8. Conclusion

The issues of conversation in this study borders on the effectiveness of public policy in the attempt to address concerns that directly hinge on insecurity and displacement arising from farmers and Fulani herders conflicts in Nigeria and displacements arising from government authorized investment in land in Ethiopia. The negative attributes and consequences of the herders' / famers conflicts have been duly considered on the basis of dissecting the direct and remote causes of such conflicts that are equally relevant and potential or latent causes of such violence.

The core factors of these conflicts and their impact on the socio-cultural consciousness have been discussed to show the areas of divergence between displacement arising from insecurity as in Nigeria Middle Belt region or displacement occasioned by investment in land as observed in the Oromia region of Ethiopia.

Thus, in both cases, the roles of national policy were brought to the fore to the extent that the weaknesses of policy formulation and non-implementation results in the death of citizens as in Nigeria, while that of Ethiopia is stronger during implementation and thus promote prosperity of the citizens.

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