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## **An Analysis of Political Violence on Democratic Governance in Lusaka: Case-Study**

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### **Abstract**

This study is an analysis of political violence on democratic governance. In addition, it evaluates the effectiveness of the management of electoral processes in Zambia by the Conflict Management Committees. The objectives of this study were to assess the effects of violence on governance in Zambia, to determine the participation levels of citizens especially youths in politics, to ascertain the causes of and effects of political violence on voters and lastly to establish the role of the government in mitigating political violence. A case study research design was used in this study. Structured questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions and In-depth Interview from Key Informants were the main instrument for data collection. Both qualitative and quantitative data were processed using Stata and Excel

software for analysis. The study found that the strategy used by the committees, ECZ and the police in resolving electoral conflicts was mediation. Lack of a legal framework was cited as a major setback in the management of the phenomena and in the enforcement of the Electoral Act. To this effect, the study has established strategies of improving the performance of committees. The strategies are: increasing educational awareness activities, increasing access to committees and other institution that manage election and importantly, strengthen the legal mandate. Based on the findings, the study recommended to ECZ among other things that a legal framework be attached to support the operations of CMCs and that political parties should address electoral violence.

**Keywords:** Democratic Governance, Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), CMCs

### **1. Introduction**

Civil war is a relatively rare spectacle, though the risk factors for war are not as stated in Walter (2009), "existing studies cannot explain variation in the outbreak of violence across countries that are at similar risk of civil war." She continues to argue that, "By viewing the decision to fight as part of a larger bargaining process and not as an isolated event, scholars explains why violence is more likely in some countries."

The events in the Arab Spring demonstrate the accuracy of Walter's statements and its impacts and economic phenomena's together with governance. Protests occurred, to some degree, in more than a dozen countries across Northern Africa and the Middle East. Existing macroeconomic conditions were similar in many of these countries, as was the way in which the mass movements against their ruling regimes started. However, the sequence of events following the protests varied, as did the expectations these regimes had established for how they would respond to protest. In the end, some regimes stayed in place with little change, some toppled peacefully, and others violently, and some still remain embroiled in civil war.

By incorporating protest into a model of conflict, in the processing of addressing Walter's comments directly. With protest as an option, used to signal the strength of potential rebel groups to the government, conflict occurs only when the signal conveys inaccurate information. This set up leads to novel conclusions. As with many models, dissent is driven by economic conditions. However, the form it takes is driven by expected strategic interactions, specifically expectations of repression, and non-economic determinants of the viability of conflict. This implies that similar macroeconomic conditions could lead to different outcomes. Additionally, modelling repression as a cost to protest allows us to examine when it is an effective tool to subdue dissent. However, arguments are that governments may not be capable of quickly lowering the expected level of repression, which can lead to conflict even when both parties would prefer to avoid it; because they are too high an expected

level of repression can cause violent dissent to occur. The counterintuitive, non-monotonic relationship between protest and escalation to conflict, are the likelihood of conflict initially increases in protest size, then drops to zero once protest size surpasses a threshold.

The world depicted in the following model is one where two groups in society, the government and the rebels, must agree to split available resources. At the beginning of the interaction, policy determines the allocation of resources to each group. After seeing the allocation the rebels decide to use dissent, and whether or not that dissent will be violent. Protest is used by dissidents to learn about their own strength, while simultaneously sending an imperfect signal of that strength to the government. It is chosen when the cost, or the expected level of repression, is relatively low. On the other hand, if the rebels are fairly confident of their own strength and the expected level of repression is relatively high, they may choose to use violent dissent immediately, as this may also apply to countries with more political movements and different objectives of wanting to rule a certain country, mostly political violence transcends. After protest, the rebels learn their type precisely, whereas the government only observes a noisy signal, e.g. protest, which is likely to be larger if the rebels are strong. After observing the signal, the government is then able to adjust the policy in an attempt to appease the rebel group, or quell the rebellion.

Various conditions in the model can predict peace, immediate conflict, or protest that either escalates into conflict or results in a peaceful bargain. Immediate conflict occurs in response to governments that are expected to vigorously suppress protest, making the cost of protest too high for rebel groups to use. Protest occurs whenever the exogenously set policy is unfavourable to the rebels or either political groups that does not subscribe to the ruling party and the threat of repression is low. Following protest the interaction ends or escalation occurs. Escalation to conflict occurs after protest only if the government makes too small a concession to other group that was in fact strong. Peace may follow protest in one of two ways: a successful protest, where the protests themselves garner major concessions, or a failed protest by a weak rebel group, where the rebels rationally accept minor concessions.

Previous research has documented a common pattern between violent and non-violent dissent, periods of violent dissent are often preceded by periods of non-violent dissent (Gurr, 2000). To examine the model's predictions describing the relationship between violent and non-violent dissent, combination of two datasets was complementary used in measures of political dissent. The first was the Peace Research Institute at Oslo's (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), which used to measure civil conflict; the second was the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), from which they derived measures of protest. These data covered 42 African countries from 1990-2012.

The data provided a unique opportunity to examine the full spectrum of political dissent, and the determinants of escalation. At first glance the data showed non-violent dissent is a predictor of violent dissent. The main component of the analysis which followed was exploring the conditions that make protest more likely to de-escalate, escalate, or garner concessions. The findings and support for the main hypotheses. Firstly, the observation of a non-

monotonic relationship between protest size and conflict escalation, where the largest protests that was observed in the data did not escalate. Second, the findings were predicted that linear relationship between protest size, and the probability of a concession, measured as an increases in civil liberties or political rights using Freedom House data.

Finally, the expansion of models that allowed the government to set the level of repression strategically. Arguments were that the baseline model, with repression taken as exogenous, may be appropriate if the government has a long history of being highly repressive, or cannot credibly commit to lower levels of repression. Indigenising repression, under the assumption the government could not commit, leads to a similar set of results, and we find that the cost associated with conflict becomes the main determinant of the type of dissent (protest or conflict) the rebel group will use in the first period.

### 1.1 Statement of the Problem

As political competition in Zambia becomes stiffer, corruption, ethnic politics and political violence have explicitly become part and plot of the political atmosphere. The previous part government, the patriotic front (PF) had especially found pragmatic ways to apply triple strategy for it political straggle which includes; corruption strategy, mobilization strategy and political violence strategy. The past three presidential elections (2011, 2015 and 2016) have witnessed many incidents that have threatened the country's democracy. These include uncontrolled violence, hate speech based on tribe and corruption behaviour by political contestants. Although these vices have been practiced in the past they have become overt since the PF assumed office in 2011.

Political violence is seen an emerging issue with a number of cases recorded. In addition, reports show that the youths are the mostly involved in political violence throughout Zambia. The harmful potential of Zambia's so-called "youth cadres" was illustrated during local by-elections in Rufunsa. In circumstances that were unclear, a member of the ruling Patriotic Front's (PF) youth cadre was gruesomely murdered, prompting an exchange of accusations (Namakando, 2016). Political violence appears to be part and parcel of the Zambian politics. However, there is little information on the effects of political violence on democratic governance. This paper asserts new knowledge political violence has on democratic governance.

### 1.2 General Objective

1. To assess the effects of violence on governance in Zambia.

#### 1.2.1 Specific Objectives

1. To determine the participation levels of citizens especially youths in politics.
2. To ascertain the causes of and effects of political violence on voters.
3. To establish the role of government in mitigating political violence.

### 1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the participation levels of citizens in politics? Especially youths.
2. What/How are the levels of political violence?
3. What are the effects of political violence on democratic

- on democratic governance?
4. What is the role of government in mitigating political violence?
  5. What are the effects of political violence on voters?

#### 1.4 Research Variables

- Participation level.
- Violence.
- Political violence strategies.

#### 1.5 Conceptual Framework

This study was guided by the Frustration-Aggression theory also known as the displacement theory which was proposed by Dollard and others in 1939 [13]. This theory was further developed by Miller, *et al* in 1941 and Berkowitz in 1969 (Berkowitz, 1989) [6]. It provides a macro approach to conflict and argues that aggression comes as a result of blocking or frustrating a person's effort to attain a goal. Furthermore, it is argued that human beings are predisposed to slide into deep, irrational hostility under certain definable conditions. Essentially, the Frustration-Aggression theory is an attempt to explain how and why some people or groups of people become violent or aggressive during certain situations.

This theory has been used for some time to explain violent behaviour in certain societies. Human behaviour, although biologically determined, is largely as a result of the influence of the environment, culture and socialization. Human beings, as goal oriented organisms, naturally become aggressive when they are prevented from achieving what they desire. This is what forms the core of the Frustration-Aggression theory. It is established that external stimuli induces frustration which in turn precipitates aggression, and aggressive action is directed to the source of frustration. An immediate choice especially when mechanisms put in place to reconcile such grievances seem to be lacking is resorting to violence. In the political sense, absence of the rule of law and justice, denial of human rights, lack of political representation for minority groups, ideological positions, unemployment, poverty and rise in food prices, lack of accountability, poor governance and weak judicial systems often lead to violence (World Bank, 2011). This is seen as a violation of human rights and may lead to tension, and eventually aggressive behaviour.

Contextualizing the above theory to electoral conflicts in Zambia, we can argue that frustrated electoral expectations amongst political players generate stress and violence. For example, if the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) members feel that the Heritage Party (HP) is the source of frustration, Heritage Party (HP) members become the target. As HP members try to retaliate, violence may break out when conflict is not handled carefully by CMCs. "Politics is a process of conflict where groups compete for authority and the control of scarce resources, there is necessary tension between interests. When political systems fail to manage conflicting interests, conflict may express itself violently (Eisema, 2012)." To this effect, this theory fitted well to the Zambian context and in this study to explain the root cause of electoral violence and thus, giving direction on how electoral violence can be managed effectively.

This perspective contributes empirical knowledge and points out critical issues of conflict management that need attention in terms of effective management of electoral conflicts. In

addition, this theory recognizes that the underlying causes of electoral conflicts need to be addressed if the phenomenon is to be effectively managed. As such, there is need to evaluate and assess management strategies that will consequently bring all electoral stakeholders on board to effectively manage the phenomenon, which is a worthwhile call for this study.

The most general theorisations often concern relationships with power. Violence is often conceived as the expression or extension of power, as in Carl von Clausewitz's classic dictum that war "is the continuation of political intercourse by other means" (Clausewitz [1832] 1976). Yet Hannah Arendt (1970) seminaly argued that violence is a negation of power, properly conceived. Of course, it can be argued that power has "two faces" (and maybe more) and that Clausewitz and Arendt are talking about deferent aspects of power, the "zero-sum" and "cooperative" respectively. Violence may be an expression of the antagonistic exercise of power, but work in opposition to its cooperative exercise. Clausewitz's axiom suggests that the most important type of socially organised violence is specifically connected to political power, but little reflection is needed to recognise that violence is possible within the context of all major power types) Thus Mann (1986, 1993) distinguishes four "sources" of macro-social power: economic, ideological (which subsumes cultural), political and military. To these, an addition of another which is more commonly exercised at a micro-level, namely familial (although in some cases monarchies, financial dynasties, etc. this may be tightly connected to the four macro-types which Mann identifies). It is evident that all the forms of power may be contexts of violence, as well as of cooperative social relations that contain violence. Yet it this is not equally true of all the types: military power is specifically concerned with the management of violence, and (if Clausewitz is right) political power has, in general, a tighter relationship with military power than have economic, ideological or (for that matter) familial power. Indeed Mann is unusual in recognising military power as a major type in its own right; more commonly it is subsumed within political power in this order of theory.

However these the types of power vary considerably in their forms and relationships through history indeed the distinction of "the economic" and "the political", etc., is a specifically modern idea. Likewise the relationships of these power types to violence also vary. The connection of politics and war, for example, was clearly tightened with the rise of the modern nation-state and its achievement, in some cases, of something like the monopoly of legitimate violence with which Max Weber ([1922] 1964) classically credited it; the relationship was deferent in earlier eras. Moreover this relationship had transformative implications for all the other types of violence: as the state came closer to being what Giddens (1985; following Weber) calls a "bordered power container", violence was "squeezed out" of economic relations, which came to be centred on what Karl Marx called the "dull compulsion" of the market mechanism. Indeed, in so far as Weber was right about the state's "monopoly", violence was subdued, or at least regulated, not only in economic but in cultural and familial relations. Modern nation states, after all, go so far in eschewing violence "internally" that in many cases they have renounced the right to execute citizens even for crimes like murder. Although none have so far renounced the right to

prosecute war, many smaller and weaker states, especially within the North Atlantic alliance and the European Union, have the fact that their war making capacities to alliances and more powerful states.

Political violence is the deliberate use of power and force to achieve political goals (World Health Organization (WHO), 2002). As outlined by the World Health Organization (2002), political violence is characterized by both physical and psychological acts aimed at injuring or intimidating populations. Examples include shootings or aerial bombardments; detentions; arrests and torture; and home demolitions (Basoglu, Livanou, & Crnobaric, 2005; Clark *et al.*, 2010; K. de Jong *et al.*, 2002; E. F. Dubow *et al.*). The WHO definition of political violence also includes deprivation, the deliberate denial of basic needs and human rights an examples include obstruction related to freedom of speech (e.g. activists who speak out against a regime being subject to torture (Robben, 2005)), and denial of access to food, education, sanitation, and healthcare (International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 1949; UNESCO, 2006; UNESCO: International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), 2012; United Nations Population Fund, 2007).

Particularly the dimensions of deprivation within political violence shows that, it is clear that political violence is intimately related to structural violence: the ways that structures of society (e.g. educational, legal, cultural, healthcare) insidiously act as “social machinery of oppression” (Farmer, 2006: 307) to regularly, systematically, and intentionally prohibit the realization of full human potential through unequal arrangements of social, economic, and political power (Farmer, *et al.*, 2004, 2006; Galtung, 1969). Indeed, it is overwhelmingly clear that structural violence often precipitates, coexists with, and is deployed as a regular tool within political violence. Structural inequalities based, for instance, on class, nationalities, or ethnic groups often lead to political uprisings and rebellions and then to the yielding of power through violent repressions that characterize political violence (Cairns, *et al.*, 1998; de Jong, 2010). In addition, it is usually the poorest and most disenfranchised that suffer the most within wars and conflicts as they are particularly targeted and or face oppression and violence within a multitude of overlapping experiences (see, for instance: Al Gasseer, 2004; Berg, 2009; Lykes, *et al.*, 2007; UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), 2005).

Furthermore, political violence in the forms of repression, torture, and forced exile is often levelled specifically towards those who pose the most threat to the prevailing and oppressive social order (Blum, 2005; Esparza, 2005; Robben, 2005). Despite their mutual influence, authors, including Galtung (1969), who is widely credited with developing the initial framework for structural violence (Farmer, 2004), have proposed a few key points of differentiation between structural and political violence: whereas structural, “indirect” violence is covert, static, and lacks a clear aggressor, “direct” violence (what Galtung terms “personal violence”, but would also include political violence) is overt, dynamic, and connects a discernable aggressor with the victim (Galtung, 1969; Vorobej, 2008; Winter and Leighton, 2001).

A considerable amount of research has examined how political violence is implicated in a variety of poor outcomes

related to mental health, including PTSD, depression, and anxiety (Punamaki, 1990, Summerfield, 2000). The WHO, for example, estimates that among one-third to one-half of people exposed to political violence will endure some type of mental distress, including PTSD, depression or anxiety (World Health Organization (WHO), 2001). In spite of these risks, however, we know that individuals and communities regularly manage the traumas of political violence as they demonstrate considerable resilience (Summerfield, 1999). Resilience the successful recovery from or adaptation to hardship (Agaibi, 2005; Masten, *et al.*, 1990) is not an anomaly, but rather, is a predictable reaction to stress for both individuals and collectives (Bonanno, 2004; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). While some individual traits may build resilience in the face of political violence (Betancourt and Khan, 2008; Masten, *et al.*, 2012; Sousa, *et al.*, 2013), resilience ultimately depends on the relationship between people and their social and political environments.

Individuals’ involvement in collectives, cohesive community networks, and democratic, responsive governmental systems are each central to health and well-being (Garbarino, 2011; Hobfoll *et al.*, 2007; Katz, 2001; Nowell and Boyd, 2010; Pfeiffer *et al.*, 2008; Ungar, 2011a; World Health Organization, 2008).

For populations affected by political violence, resources within the environment (e.g., schools, community institutions, opportunities for social and political engagement, responsive public systems, and governmental accountability for atrocities committed against civilian populations) appear to offer protection against the deleterious impacts of political violence on health (Berk, 1998, Farwell and Cole, 2001, Lykes *et al.*, 2007, Betancourt *et al.*, 2010, Melton and Sianko, 2010).

In spite of beliefs, however, about the potential for social and political contexts to build resilience, there is limited health scholarship on how political violence threatens the individual-environment relationship, which is known as core to well-being (Kemp *et al.*, 1997; Melton and Sianko, 2010). While it is increasingly recognized that political violence is a collective experience (Martín-Baró *et al.*, 1994, Summerfield, 2000, Nelson, 2003, Robben, 2005, Giacaman *et al.*, 2007c), beliefs show more about its influence on individuals than what is perceived about the ways it affects the larger groups, organizations, and government structures that underpin health and well-being.


However, particularly when we look across disciplines, there does exist some evidence about how political violence affects the dynamic relationships between individuals and the collective. This scholarship coincides with an increased attention to multilevel perspectives that transcend individual pathology through emphasizing social and political determinants of health (Krieger, 2001, 2008; Williams, 2002). Social ecological frameworks are particularly important for examinations of political violence because the violence simultaneously affects multiple domains related to individual and collective well-being (Hoffman & Kruczek, 2011; Martinez & Eiroa-Orosa, 2010), as it causes what Edelman, *et al.* (2003) refer to as the sociopolitical effects of political violence. Due to their comprehensive scope, multi-level frameworks enrich both scholarship on and intervention planning for political violence (Dubow *et al.*, 2009; Tol, 2010). Accordingly, this reviews were aimed at enhancing the literature on political violence by examining

and synthesizing prose from across multiple disciplines to improve understandings about the implications of political violence for collective well-being.

The term collective refers to three inter-related domains of functioning: individuals' ability to participate in social and political life; community functioning and social fabric; and governmental functioning and delivery of services to populations.

These three domains, which were built and clarified through the process of synthesizing the prose for the review, represents the central organizing framework.

In line with Bronfenbrenner's theories (1986), which referred to bidirectional relationships between domains of functioning as Meso-systems, this review also considers how political violence harms the relationship between areas of collective functioning. For instance, it considers how political violence might affect governmental functioning, which then weakens individuals' willingness to engage in political life and increases apathy.



The results of the utilization of political violence are often unpredictable and counterproductive. The demonstrative activities lead to a backlash in the form of "Law and Order" and many other Watergate types of espionage on private citizens. "Public protest in the United States for example is slow and unwieldy instrument of social change that sometimes inspires more obdurate resistance than favourable change." (Graham and Gurr, 1969: 817). Even though controlled and restrained political violence proves to be an effective strategy, the ethical question of how far one is willing to go in order to effect social change must be at least personally resolved.

In addition, Violence exacts a high cost on world development. In about 60 countries, over the last ten years, violence has significantly and directly reduced economic growth. It has hampered poverty reduction efforts and limited progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. About half of these 60 countries currently experience violent conflict or are in post-conflict transition. The other half experience high levels of violent crime, street violence, domestic violence, and other kinds of common violence across Africa. Common violence has often increased significantly in post conflict countries after large scale political motivated violence ends. Such cases include Somalia, Liberia, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Conversely, countries with high levels of common violence have shown

tendencies toward sporadic large-scale instability, for example Kenya (ethnic violence) and Brazil.

### 1.6 Significance of the Study

The study is imperative for the establishment of the impediments that exist where Zambia's governance administration is concerned. Furthermore, the study contributes to filling a knowledge gap concerning violence and its impact on determining Zambia's progress in democratic governance. This in turn has an effect on many other outcomes in the country.

### 1.7 Operational Definitions of Terms

IMF: International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization of 190 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.

GNP: Gross national product is the total value of all finished goods and services produced by a country's citizens in a given financial year, irrespective of their location.

SOCIAL CAPITAL: Social capital is a set of shared values that allows individuals to work together in a group to effectively achieve a common purpose. The idea is generally used to describe how members are able to band together in society to live harmoniously.

WORLD BAK: World Bank is an international organization dedicated to providing financing, advice, and research to developing nations to aid their economic advancement.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 Overview

This chapter presents relevant reviews of literature to the present study. It has attempted to explain and give account of some case studies that have been undertaken globally, regionally and nationally on the topic under research. It also reviews some of the researches carried out in the same field.

### 2.2 Political participation level

Under the global perspective of political participation phenomena, the modern empirical study of political participation began developing in tandem with the modern study of electoral behaviour using sample survey data. Election outcomes depend not only upon people's preferences but also upon which citizens choose to exercise their preference at the polls. Partially reflecting that link, many of these studies truncated political participation to electoral participation, that is, voter turnout and occasionally some campaign activities (see Voting: Turnout). Much empirical work was done in the United States, and much of that was connected to the Michigan Survey Research Centre, especially under the leadership of Warren Miller and Philip Converse. These investigators also collaborated with colleagues outside the United States, especially in Europe, producing further studies addressing participation, especially voting. Under the leadership of Stein Rokkan, Scandinavian scholars produced a substantial body of work on participation as part of their more extensive studies of political behaviour (see for example Rokkan 1970). These studies painted a clear socio demographic and psychological picture of voters (and occasionally of participants in campaigns).

In contrast to nonparticipants, participants in general had more money and education, were more interested in politics,

more partisan, more efficacious, more likely to be men, more involved in organizations, and more rooted in their community. Some, including Rokkan, also paid close attention to the relationship between political behaviour, including participation, and the citizen's position in the social cleavage structure.

Milbrath summarized the findings to date in 1965. He included political support as participation as well as electoral activities beyond voting. He promoted the influential organizing idea that participation lay on a hierarchical scale there was a ladder of activities, with the easiest at the bottom and the most difficult at the top. 'Persons who engage in the topmost behaviours are very likely to perform those lower in rank also' (Milbrath 1965, pp. 17–18). Given the emphasis on electoral activities and given the frame created by the Interest in democratic stability prompted cross-national projects that took political participation as an important variable. For Harry Eckstein, participation provided the link upwards from subordinates to subordinates (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, pp. 60–7). For Almond and Verba in *The Civic Center Culture* (1963), the participatory behaviour of citizens in a country was one important component in characterizing their political culture, but they were just as interested in attitudes and beliefs about hypothetical behaviour as in activity.

Nonetheless, the data, collected in 1959 and 1960 in five countries (the United States, Mexico, Italy, West Germany, and Great Britain) provided the first major database used for cross-national comparisons of political participation, especially beyond voting turnout. Some of these analyses contributed the important conclusions that persons involved in organizations participate more in politics and that societies with denser organizational structures exhibit higher levels of participation.

Within the decade (1966 to 1971) Verba was in the field again, with an international team of collaborators, studying political activity. Surveys were completed in the United States, Japan, Austria, the Netherlands, India, Nigeria, and the former Yugoslavia. Some of the first products of this research (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972) overturned the conception of participation as a hierarchy of electoral activities. Instead, participation was expanded to include no electoral activities and reconceptualised as modes of activity in any one or more of which individuals might specialize. Although often these are positively correlated, meaning that a participant in one is more likely to take part in others than a randomly selected person, many people nonetheless partake in one or some to the exclusion of other forms of participation. In particular, substantial numbers of people who avoided electoral politics did engage in nonpartisan participation, such as involvement with community groups.

As reported in Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba *et al.* (1978), as well as other publications from the project, wealth and education were reaffirmed as important predictors of participation. But the main theoretical point is that the strength of that relationship varies across societies as a function of the strength of other, 'group,' resources. Where these are strong, such as in countries with strong political cleavages tied to ascriptive characteristics, or with sociological or occupational segments with strong political leadership, the relationship of socioeconomic status (SES) to participation was relatively weak. Certain well-off segments of the population were 'inhibited' from participation while other, possibly disadvantaged, segments were 'mobilized,'

thereby together attenuating the relationship between SES and participation. While others had noted similar phenomena, the finding now had wide cross-national grounding. The Verbal and co-workers' studies deliberately ignored political protest, that is, participation in activities outside accepted conventional norms, including some that are illegal. This omission seemed unfortunate by the 1970s in light of the frequency of real-world protest. Out of the study of revolution and political violence (Revolution) came renewed interest in relative deprivation. But many protest activities are not violent (see Political Protest and Civil Disobedience).

In April 1994 South Africa's first non-racial multiparty election took place, marking an official end to the country's segregationist and authoritarian past. In its place was born a mix of constitutional, participatory and representative democracy (in that the people mandate the politicians to govern them through electing the politicians to power, instead of the people governing themselves), delivering universal franchise, formal equality before the law, avenues for citizen participation in governance, and statutory institutions supporting democracy. Moreover, its population looked to the promise of a better future, understanding that finally the majority's political and socio-economic needs would be met by a legitimate African National Congress (ANC)-led government. Following its sixth democratic elections on the 8 May 2019, South Africa arguably consolidated its status as a young democracy and thereby demonstrated how much it has achieved in refashioning the state in a more democratic way.

Yet, wide-ranging governance-related and socio-economic problems over the years are threatening this apparently successful democratic progress. Some of these problems have included corruption in public and corporate life, the Nkandla scandal, a perception that government is slow to deliver adequate socio-economic goods, cronyism and persistent massive inequality. These challenges and more, together with an increasing mismatch between citizen expectations and reality, have fuelled increasing public dissatisfaction (expressed in sustained incidences of unconventional political action, so-called 'service delivery' protests, or the more recently used term, 'community protests') and have led to a growing perception that South Africa's quality of democracy is wavering.

This growing consternation is significant in two ways. Either it is a sign that members of the public are exercising their right to question those that govern them and is therefore a healthy expression of active citizenship, or it is indicative of a population increasingly disillusioned and dissatisfied, in which case it is concerning, especially in terms of political legitimacy in South Africa (Graham 2015, p. 24).

Many political scholars agree that democracies flourish when citizens are willing to engage in the political system, whether it is through the ballot box, direct (legal) political action, civil society participation, involvement in social movements, taking part in public debate, electing representatives, joining political parties or attempting to influence political leaders (Morlino 2011; Schmitter 2004; Von Fintel & Ott 2017). Beetham, Byrne, Ngan and Weir (2002, p. 209) add that vigorous active citizenship is a necessary component of a healthy democracy and helps to make governments work in a more democratic way. It is generally understood that the more citizens actively

participate in the political process, the more aware they become of their rights and duties and the more they will feel obligated to abide by whatever decision is made.

The importance of participation in South Africa’s democratic model is informed by decades of apartheid during which the majority of the population was excluded from formal avenues of political participation. The ANC Freedom Charter’s decree that ‘The People Shall Govern, was emphasised in paragraph 5.2.6 of one of the first policy documents of the new South Africa, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994):

One of the primary expressions of public political participation in democratic South Africa has been through electoral participation (voting). Registration numbers over the past 25 years have increased for each consecutive election with a total of over 26 million for the 2019 (and sixth) democratic election.

**Table 1:** Republic of South Africa General Election Results, 1994-2019

Election year	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Registered voters	No voters’ roll	18 172 751	20 674 926	23 181 997	25 388 082	26 756 649
Voter turnout	19 726 610 (86.7%)	16 228 462 (89.3%)	15 863 558 (76.7%)	17 919 966 (77.3%)	18 654 771 (73.5%)	17 672 767 (65.99 %)
Valid votes cast	19 533 498	15 977 142	15 612 671	17 680 729	18 402 497	17 436 143

Information obtained from the Election Commission of South Africa website and compiled by the author

While this may seem encouraging on the surface, further unpacking of the data reveals results that are more complex and less encouraging. South Africa’s voting age population (VAP; those who are eligible to register to vote) has grown by over 13 million people from 22.7 million in 1994 to 35.8 million in 2019 (SchulzHerzenberg 2019, p. 49).

Despite this significant growth, the number of actual registered voters has declined relative to it. Of the 35.8 million people eligible to vote in 2019, only 74.5% registered to do so, leaving 9.8 million who chose not to register (the majority of these were younger than 30; see more on the youth vote below). While voter turnout (the percentages of the registered VAP that turned out to vote in elections) for national and provincial elections has been consistently quite high in the past, it dropped significantly by almost eight percentage points in the 2019 elections to 65.99%. This is especially concerning because as SchulzHerzenberg (2019.) contends, voter turnout is a crucial indicator of the ‘vitality and health’ of a democracy. High turnout is seen as a sign of an enthusiastic and politically involved electorate, while low turnout indicates the opposite.

South Africa’s comparatively lower turnout in the 2019 elections suggests a public not only unhappy with and even mistrustful of the political party choices on offer, but also increasingly apathetic towards participating in the country’s vertical accountability. Voter turnout in local government elections has been traditionally quite poor, although lower rates of participation in local government elections is a global phenomenon. In any event, voter turnout increased in

the 2016 local elections (58%) from 57.6% in the 2011 local elections, 48.5% in 2000 and 48.4% in 2006.

In Zambia the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs, governance and development is a right in itself and a crosscutting principle in a democratic society. Often participation is associated with elections, but public participation entails more than voting at regular intervals; it is also about being able to express your views freely about the society you live in; expressing your vision for development and democracy; ensuring the government provides avenues for everyone to be heard in matters of concern; and it is also about freedom of assembly and association for people which can help unite people and use the avenues available for participation in a meaningful and effective manner.

One way in which Zambians participate in public affairs is through elections. The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia provides for periodic elections to elect the President of the Republic of Zambia, Members of Parliament (MPs) and Local Representatives in Councils. Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, Zambia has had tripartite elections in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and a presidential by-election following the death of President Levy Mwanawasa in August 2008. The country also holds several parliamentary by-elections. However, the extent to which election outcomes reflect the freely expressed will of the voters has been mixed over the years (EISA, 2012).

The Electoral Act (No 12 of 2006) provides for a comprehensive process for elections to the Office of the President and to the National Assembly; to empower the Electoral Commission of Zambia in matters relating to elections and enable the Commission to make regulations providing for the registration of voters and for the manner of conducting elections; to provide for offences and penalties in connection with elections; to provide for the appointment of conflict management officers; to provide for election petitions and the hearing and determination of applications relating to elections to parliament; to repeal and replace the Electoral Act, 1991; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing. It is clear from the provisions above that the Electoral Act is very important as far as public participation in electing the President, the Members of Parliament and Council officers is concerned.

General elections showed slight improvement in election turnout. For instance, 53.65 percent of the 5,167,154 million registered voters turned out in the 2011 elections (www.ECZ.zm); this amounted to an increase of 8.25 percent over the 2008 Presidential By-Election. There was a noticeably strong turnout of young voters as well as a balanced turnout of both female and male voters in polling stations. Six out of the nine provinces recorded a voter turnout higher than 50 percent. The Copperbelt province recorded the highest voter turnout of 59.50 percent of 845,569 registered voters. The lowest voter turnout was recorded in the Central Province, with 46.87 percent of 482,013 registered voters. Although Lusaka has the second highest number of registered voters in Zambia, 52.05 percent turned out to vote in the 2011 elections. This percentage could be attributed to the tense security context that prevailed ahead of the elections (www.ECZ.ZM). Lastly the participation levels have shown higher than expected, the 2021 results shows the following.

Voter turnout	70.61%
Registered voters	7,023,499
Total votes cast	4,959,332
Votes rejected	126,569

### 2.3 Political Violence

Political violence affects electoral participation. Systematic studies of the impact of political violence on electoral participation show a negative association between the two. A cross-sectional study revealed that voters who have experienced threats of election violence at the polls were less likely to vote in African countries (Bratton, 2013, p. 129). A cross-national study also found the same globally (Norris, 2014, p. 143). In this case, it can be argued that political violence is used by the political parties to disadvantage competitors and prevent their supporters from turning out (Hafner-Burton *et al.*, 2014). Another cross-national study showed that “political violence negatively affects willingness to vote, but this effect differs by partisan attachment and specific electoral context” Burchard, (2015). However, it is important to note that in the same study, in cases where opposition supporters were exposed to political violence they were more willing to vote. Although not significant, in cases where the incumbent supporters were exposed to violence they were less likely to vote Burchard, (2015). Depending on the type of violence, strategic or incidental, the identity of the perpetrators and or the message that it is meant to convey to voters) and how it affects directly individuals, political violence can be used to mobilize or demobilize voters to vote (Travaglianti, 2014), to prevent them to turnout or to punish victors (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Burchard, 2015). In turn, this dampens elections and their integrity.

The quality of elections, in general, has an impact on electoral participation. “Elections work well when they can provide the main opportunity for most people to participate in politics” (Powell, 2000). Norris (2014) found that voter turnout tended to be high when there was electoral integrity that is, when votes were counted fairly, elections were fair, voters were offered genuine choice in the elections and journalists provided fair coverage of elections. It tended to be low when there was electoral malpractice, for example, rich people bought elections, television news favoured the governing party, voters were bribed, opposition candidates were prevented from running and voters were threatened with violence at the polls.

The scenario around elections in Africa is of great concern. As Bleck and van de Walle (2019) described it: “extensive intimidation of the opposition” and suspension of the opposition newspaper took place, respectively, in the 2016 Gambian and Zambian elections. Districts were gerrymandered in Zimbabwe ahead of the 2008 election (Cheeseman & Klaas, (2018) and candidates in Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana and Kenya were found to distribute largesse and buy votes (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018, pp. 61-92). Political violence and the rule of law have a mutual limiting effect. Thus, it goes without saying that the presence of political violence greatly diminishes the rule of law.

According to De Lavoro (2003), the rule of law is organized around eight primary factors. These are constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. The absence of any of these primary factors signifies the

breakdown in the rule of law whether in part or in whole. Political violence takes away one of the eight factors of the rule of law; fundamental rights, for instances of political violence, fundamental rights such as right to freedom of movement, right to self-determination, right to freedom of expression and right to freedom of thought are greatly hampered because people are coerced to decide or not to depending on the circumstances that surround them; violence. In the case of elections, people cannot move around freely to campaign or drum up support for fear of victimization. Equally, the masses are robbed of choices when a candidate is prevented from campaigning as a result of violence. An inhibition of the rule of law has far reaching consequences beyond elections or political participation; it can also affect investor confidence resulting in reduced foreign direct investment.

Political violence is also linked to reduced media freedoms. According to Chapel and Martino (2009),” freedom of the media is the principle that communication and expression through various media, including printed and electronic media, especially published material, should be considered a right to be exercised freely. Such freedom implies the absence of interference from an overreaching state; its preservation may be sought through constitution or other legal protection and security” The ability of journalists to report freely on matters of public interest is a crucial indicator of democracy. A free press can inform citizens of their leaders’ successes or failures, convey the people’s needs and desires to government bodies, and provide a platform for the open exchange of information and ideas. When media freedom is restricted, these vital functions break down, leading to poor decision-making and harmful outcomes for leaders and citizens alike.

The ability of the media to function effectively as a fourth estate is hooked firmly on the maximum cooperation it receives from the different entities within society at whose service it operates. However, recently, concerns have been raised in different African states about the spate of assault and intimidation against media practitioners, and this action appears to hinder the independence, growth, and development of the media. Using an inductive approach for qualitative data analysis and drawing on the provocation theory, some studies among them, Ozyasar (2013) and Simon (2014) explored the degree of assault and intimidation in media environments of a number of African states and found that attacks on the media were traced to three major sources, namely, supporters of political parties, security agencies, communities/individual citizens, and supporters of political parties. The article further argued that the communication interplay of the aforementioned entities is ideal for good governance and to a greater extent, a functioning public.

Political violence breeds voter apathy. “Voter apathy refers to a lack of interest in participating in elections by certain groups of voters” (Ellis, 2006, p15). Generally, it occurs when eligible voters do not vote in public elections through their own volition or not. Outside of election time, voters may seem disillusioned with the political process or politicians in general. In a country supposedly run by elected officials, disenchanted and inactive citizens can present problems. For example, when very few people vote, the politicians elected do not represent the beliefs and values of the general population. Voter apathy has been compared with a sort of political depression, where one feels helpless

and unable to influence important events. According to Guiterrez (2014), Statistical evidence shows that *violent* criminal activity, including political violence depresses *electoral turnout*. Voters living in *violent* contexts are less likely to participate in elections. This dampens the political atmosphere and generally takes away the credibility of an election as well as the legitimacy of the elected government. Political legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime. It refers to people's beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations. According to Weber, that a political regime is legitimate means that its participants have certain beliefs or faith ("Legitimitätsglaube") in regard to it: "the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige" (Weber, 1964, p382). With that, violence brings about apathy in political matters, which in turn, greatly diminish the legitimacy of an elected government. This situation is problematic to any governance system because the citizens must be willing participants in any governance process for the results to endure as they (the citizens) are the number one beneficiary of all government services and projects. When the citizens are on board, they guard infrastructure and developmental projects jealously. The opposite is also true. Infrastructure and projects can easily be sabotaged or vandalized when the government is not recognized and supported by the citizens. In addition, governments are legitimate only to the extent that they protect individual freedoms and handle perpetrators through the legal system; individual freedoms are not guaranteed when there is political violence hence the legitimacy of the government is greatly compromised.

Violence reduces investor confidence in a country's economy. Violence can increase risk perception of investors by increasing expectations about the potential for future outbreaks and instability. Political risk is transmitted to foreign investors in conflict-affected countries through three main channels: destruction of assets from violence; unavailability of inputs and adequate human resources; and sharp declines in domestic demand that lead to lasting impoverishment (Mueller *et al.*, 2016).

A number of studies have tried to quantify the effects of conflict on investment-related indicators, including stock market evaluations and housing prices. Overall, this the political risk of violence can directly influence expectations, asset prices, and investment, emphasising the economic importance of sustained peace. Evidence suggests that much of the economic impact of violent conflict comes from changes in expectations about future violence. Foreign investment inflows to countries during violent episodes or conflict are much lower than in post-conflict countries. Another empirical study explores how conflict affects stock market evaluations (Zussman *et al.*, 2006). Using data on Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the late 1980s, the researchers found that major escalations in violence led to significant declines in asset prices in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Similarly, rocket attacks by Hezbollah during the 2006 Second Lebanon War led to a 6–7% decline in house prices and rents in the most severely hit localities – and these effects persisted until 2012 (Elster, Zussman and Zussman 2016).

Violence can reduce trust in institutions of governance. Violence often has lasting effects on social trust and the

political environment in a society. Inequality between groups along ethnic or other lines is a major potential source of conflict. Political exclusion can perpetuate the unequal distribution of economic resources, which may further fuel instability and conflict. Inclusive political institutions and constraints on executive power can help to break the links between ethnic diversity, inequality, and conflict (Burgess *et al.*, 2015; Besley and Persson, 2011; Mueller and Tapsoba, 2016). These institutions can help prevent conflict because they prevent 'winner takes all' dynamics where a loss of political power leads to economic decline. Conversely, there is strong evidence of a link between conflict and weak political institutions. Chen *et al.*, (2008) find that, compared to similar countries, conflict-affected states are slower to develop their political systems. Countries with a history of internal conflict manage to collect a much smaller share of taxes relative to GDP. One study suggests a tax take that is 7% lower than countries without conflict (Besley and Persson, 2008). A related body of research focuses on societal trust and ethnic tensions. A study on civil conflict in Uganda in 2002–2004, for instance, suggests that intense conflict can disrupt trade and lead to a breakdown of inter-ethnic trust, particularly in areas with high ethnic fragmentation (Rohner *et al.*, 2013). Using satellite night-time light data as a proxy for economic activity, this research finds that fighting in these areas is associated with a large and significant fall in living conditions.

The causes of electoral conflicts are multiple and complex, and that an election can suffer both physical and non-physical forms of violence brought about by a whole array of factors. Some may be related to deep rooted asymmetries in power or based on identity, while others may be triggered by poor or structurally weak electoral management (Rummel, 1985). According to the International Peace Research Institute's Indices of Active Conflict (2010), Africa's current electoral conflicts stem from the fissures of ethnicity, regionalism and social marginalisation as well as the absence of democracy and good governance. Whether these are some of the causes of electoral conflicts in Zambia which need to be addressed by CMCs to effectively manage the phenomenon is what this study will establish.

While electoral reforms can serve to consolidate the processes of democracy, such reforms may also have the potential to create conditions for electoral conflicts. For example, in the Solomon Islands, the International IDEA (2011) argued that an international electoral reform effort raised expectations of new political dynamics for the country. However, when the subsequent election using the reformed system returned the incumbent to office, protesters appeared at the Parliament building and later set a shopping area ablaze. It is, therefore, clear that the relationship of reform and expectation is central to whether or not such reforms will result into electoral conflicts. In this regard, visible but ultimately unsubstantial political or electoral reforms can harm the perceived legitimacy of a regime and eventually lead to electoral conflicts. This is always the case when stakeholders are not consulted in decision making process. A call to finding effective ways of managing electoral conflicts is a cornerstone to each and every government where this trend is practiced, hence, the purpose of this study.

While election cycles themselves are not the root causes of conflict, they create space for political activity, and increase the stakes of political competition such that in

unconsolidated democracies, existing tensions may find violent expression. The risk of violence is particularly high when inappropriate electoral systems are chosen, or when elections are poorly managed. This is why this study was undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia. For example, in Lesotho 1993, a first-past-the-post electoral system produced a lopsided victory for the previously outlawed Basotho Congress Party (BCP). The BCP won all 65 seats in the National Assembly, and the previously ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) was denied representation in parliament despite winning a substantial minority of the vote. The resulting tensions led to an attempted coup in 1994. Similar tensions after the 1998 elections resulted in public unrest and eventual military intervention by regional powers (Eiseman 2012) [16]. The electoral system in Lesotho has since been changed to a mixed proportional system and electoral conflicts have since reduced. Proportional representation systems tend to produce more inclusive outcomes, and may therefore lower the risk of conflict occurrences. This calls for analysis of electoral violence by CMCs to determine the root causes of the phenomenon so that appropriate measures are taken to fight the phenomenon, hence, the purpose of this study to ascertain whether conflict analysis is done in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

According to UNDP (2009), the process of delimiting districts can spark electoral conflict and violence. In the Niger Delta (Nigeria), some tribes have claimed that the electoral districts in the region favour others. Protests occurred during the 2003 elections, with several people reported killed and 1,600 displaced (International IDEA, 2011). Kandeh (2008) contended that delimitation was in fact an identifiable and potentially conflictive in Sierra Leone as echoed by the various UN Peace building Commissions to that country. How delimitation may pose to be a challenge to CMCs in Zambia is what this study will establish.

Most African countries have made the announcement of the polling day a preserve of the head of state. It is argued that leaving the day to be determined by an individual (in this case the incumbent head of state) leaves the challengers vulnerable. As was the case with Zambia in 2011, conflict and pockets of violent acts were recorded in Lusaka and the Copper belt mainly by cadres from the then opposition PF as the then incumbent Rupiah Banda delayed to announce the Election Day. Tuccinardi (2011) argued that delays in announcing the day of the polls had the potential to turn the political anxieties into a violent situation. This is particularly true when members of the opposition perceive such delays as a political scheme aimed at disadvantaging them. This reflection of misunderstandings between the ruling party and the opposition political parties calls for sustainable measures to effectively address electoral conflicts, of which this study takes the centre stage in the evaluation of the effectiveness of CMCs in Zambia in managing electoral conflict.

If election rigging or fraud is let to scarlet, it sparks electoral conflict. According to Darnolf (2011), electoral fraud or rigging is most likely in the following phases; voter identification, registration and verification; during political campaigns; Election Day; during transportation of sensitive electoral materials, and during adjudication and certification of results. In the current context, Darnolf (2011) suggested that election rigging or fraud involved some degree of

deception (illegal voting and ballot box stuffing, false claims or denials), Coercion (vote buying, voter intimidation), damage or destruction (theft or destruction of election materials) and failures or refusals to act (hours of voting shortened without notice, polling station locations difficult to access, long lines at polling stations) caused by either EMB officials or representatives of both the opposition and ruling parties. Other forms of electoral fraud or rigging according to Tuccinardi (2011) included; preventing voters from filling out ballots, inaccurate campaign literature, forced withdrawal of opponent(s) through facilitation payments, and failures of due diligence by election officials. Also critical are vote buying; migratory or floating voters; voter "assistance" schemes; placing fictitious names on a voter register; marking absentee ballots and impersonating a person other than the voter. How rigging could be addressed by CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts is what this study intends to establish.

In Zambia the use of violence as a form of political mobilization is not unique to Zambia but has become more acute since the PF came into power. The immediate-past three presidential elections in Zambia (2011, 2015, and 2016) have witnessed many incidents of ethnic-based political violence, which not only threaten to erode the country's democratic gains but also fracture her social cohesion. During the 2011 elections, for instance, political violence, hate speech, and incendiary pronouncements by political candidates were unprecedented (Mukunto, 2019). The main parties (PF, MMD, and UPND) were involved in protracted violent campaign practices that involved molestation and intimidation of political opponents, seizure of private properties, mass protest, and public disorder, vandalism and hate speech (ibid). The trend of the violence experienced during elections is worrying and may exacerbate ethnic antagonism leading to more large scale and mass atrocities and violence.

The political representation that is cognizant of all segments of society is important in building a cohesive society. However, the political landscape in Zambia is characterized by unequal political representation among ethnic groups or tribal communities. There is a general feeling among the population that the presidency has been dominated by people from one region. This feeling tends to foment ethnic tension among the electorate, especially during the election period. Out of the six Presidents that Zambia has had since independence, only one did not come from the North-Eastern region of the country. This has reinforced the sentiments about one regional-linguistic group dominating the political landscape in Zambia.

Related to this are the perceptions that the appointment of ministers and other senior officials have tended to be skewed in favour of the North-Eastern region. According to the Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence (2019), there is an emerging perception that "people from North-Western, Western and Southern province are not equitably represented in government at the level of cabinet and permanent secretary. The skewed representation of ethnic groups in government has in many instances led to resentments from a cross-section of society. After winning the elections in 2015 for example, president Lungu was accused of appointing his kinsmen into the cabinet. The appointment triggered a wave of violence in various parts of the country where the Nguni people (president Lungu's tribe) were intimidated and harassed

(Habasonda, 2018). The violence leads to the death of at least 6 people and destruction of property (Lusaka Times, 12 October 2018).

#### 2.4 Political violence mitigation strategies

A key challenge for democracies is to ensure that contention is resolved peacefully within the political system (Powell 1982). The political structures that facilitate or impede peaceful resolution make up the political opportunity structure, a set of “consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment or of change in that environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting opponents’ expectations for success or failure” (Gamson and Meyer 1996; summarized in Tarrow 2011, 163). Democratic institutions in and of themselves are not sufficient to ensure peaceful contention, as democracies are no less likely than autocracies to experience internal armed conflict. Yet, political institutions can be central for the form political contention takes. Partially democratic regimes (anocracies) face the highest risk of violent conflict (Regan and Bell 2010). More generally, good governance reduces the risk of civil war onset as well as its recurrence (Hegre and Nygaard 2015; Walter 2014).

On the micro level, survey-based studies of support for violence suggest that it increases with several factors that proxy opportunity (cost) explanations, such as oil endowments, distance to the capital, not owning immobile assets, low income and education, and previous violence (Rustad 2016; Oyefusi 2008; Koos 2018; Miodownik and Nir 2016). However, the political opportunity structure and people’s perceptions of it have received little attention.

The central contribution of this article is to bring the interaction between grievance and perceived political opportunity to the fore in the micro literature. The interaction between grievance and opportunity has been highlighted in macro oriented studies, which show that motivation and opportunity structures are complementary, rather than competing, explanations of armed conflict. The onset (and recurrence) of armed conflict requires a combination of motivation and opportunity (D. E. Cunningham *et al.* 2017; White *et al.* 2015; Bormann and Hammond 2016; Bara 2014). While grievances provide the motivation, the economic and political opportunity structure determines the shape of the contention (K. G. Cunningham 2013) and thus the risk of conflict. When anocracies are found to have a higher onset of civil war, this is arguably because the most repressive regimes are able to contain rebellion, whereas in full democracies, people can work to produce change through regular political channels (Gates *et al.* 2006; Hegre 2014). This argument has a micro level corollary, which has received little attention in the conflict literature: for people motivated by grievance, their perceptions of the political opportunity structure could help determine what form of contention they support. Presumably, violence will be considered more legitimate if peaceful means of influencing politics are seen as inefficient or non-existent. The idea is not new. As early as the 1970s, scholars made similar arguments in studies of individual protest behaviour, mostly in the United States (Eisinger 1973; Muller 1972, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Gurr (1970, 317), for example, acknowledged that “if discontented people have or get constructive means to attain their social and material goals, few will resort to violence.”

In an early empirical example, Ransford (1968) found dissatisfaction among black people to be associated with a higher willingness to use violence in race riots when coupled with a “belief that all channels for social redress are closed” (p. 583).

Subsequent studies coined the term political efficacy (Balch 1974), defined as “the expectation that one’s political activity will be successful” (Shingles 1981, 80). External political efficacy, in turn, is the part of political efficacy that stems from an individual’s evaluation of how the political environment facilitates or hinders successful political action (Shingles 1981), that is, the perceived political opportunity structure.<sup>6</sup> A key finding in a series of survey-based studies of the effect of relative deprivation and political efficacy on protest participation and political violence (Muller 1972, 1977; Muller and Jukam 1983; Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Muller and Opp 1986) was that people resort to contentious participation when other forms of political participation appear blocked, that is, they have low political efficacy.

While theoretically rich, these early empirical studies were mostly based on cross tabulations or very basic regression models. This study therefore represents a better empirical test of the interaction these earlier studies propose. Moreover, to our knowledge, the interaction between grievance and perceived political efficacy has not been tested outside the Western context, nor for group-oriented grievances, nor with recent micro level data. Our survey data allow us to make these extensions, measuring external political efficacy as the extent to which people think that politicians care about their opinion rather than just their vote. We expect the core hypothesis that aggrieved people tend to reject political violence if they believe their discontent can be redressed through regular political channels to travel across these extensions. More specifically, for all our grievance indicators, and across the three contexts, we expect grievances to increase support for violence more among those who believe that politicians do not care much about their opinions.

Electoral violence prevention has been recognized only relatively recently as a distinct subtype of international electoral assistance, by which we mean organized programmes, undertaken or managed by bodies not based in the state in question, that seek to improve electoral integrity. Electoral conflict was for many years understood by assistance providers mainly in terms of “security” and thus treated largely as a policing issue. Yet there has in recent years been increased emphasis on assistance specifically targeted at the use of force during electoral periods.<sup>7</sup> Work undertaken by organizations such as the UNDP, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) to specify the risk factors for electoral violence paved the way for the development of a range of EVP techniques that have been fielded either as stand-alone projects or integrated into existing electoral assistance programming by practitioners working in this field. This change has been partly a matter of practice and partly a matter of the language used to describe EVP activities; in recent years EVP has become a mainstream component of electoral assistance in many contexts, and electoral assistance providers have begun to talk regularly of

“electoral risk”, recognizing that violence poses a fundamental threat to electoral conduct.

For the purposes of this analysis, EVP will be defined as any type of electoral assistance activity that aims to prevent or mitigate some form of electoral violence. In theory, EVP can be (and is) undertaken by a variety of actors, both domestic and international (including transnational). In this study, we confine ourselves to consideration of EVP activities carried out during the post-Cold War period. We also restrict our analysis to forms of EVP whose documentation is in the public realm or can be freely accessed; we therefore do not include preventive diplomacy, although we recognize that this can be a fruitful strategy under certain circumstances, for example in endemically violent environments where post-electoral agreements can be negotiated.

The insights of previous literature allow us to outline a working theoretical understanding of the causes of electoral violence. Violence affects elections in all regions of the world, but it is particularly prevalent in three regions: sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia, and there was an increase in the number of violent elections coinciding with the post-Cold War liberalizations that took place in many countries that had not previously held competitive electoral contests. We also know that violence is more likely if major group’s experience or fear exclusion from political decision-making due to ethnic discrimination, electoral fraud or other deviations from democratic norms. The perceived risk of exclusion raises the stakes of elections and makes groups more willing to resort to violence. It follows that the risk of violence at elections can be lowered by increasing political inclusion through, among other things, improving electoral conduct and also by altering perceptions of likely exclusion and of the intentions of actors in the electoral process. Building the capacity of electoral institutions and transforming popular attitudes about the electoral context are therefore both potentially viable means of addressing electoral violence.

As noted above, there is within the recent literature on electoral assistance a debate as to the relative merits of, on the one hand, capacity building forms of assistance such as training and institution-building activities designed to build the capacity of emerging democracies and semi-democratic states to hold credible elections, and, on the other hand, attitude-transformation strategies that aim to shape the preferences of relevant actors. It is worth pausing to examine these arguments in greater detail.

In the incipient phase of democratization in Africa in the late 1980s, political and electoral violence was caused by the determination of ruling parties under siege from emerging opposition parties to hang onto power. In this fragile era of democratization, dominant parties accustomed to occupying the political space hardly countenanced the power and legitimacy of opposition forces. Violence often occurred during the elections, particularly as competing parties sought to mobilize constituencies using all available means. Facing intense pressure from new and untested political parties, some of the ruling parties resorted to political violence aimed at subverting the electoral process and outcomes. They also deployed partisan state institutions, particularly the military, paramilitary, and police forces against opposition groups. Political and electoral violence organized by ruling parties included forceful dispersals of political rallies, beating, assault, arbitrary detention of

leaders and followers, torture, murder, and wanton destruction of property. Furthermore, blatant manipulation of the electoral process, including vote buying, intimidation of voters, and rigging and destruction of ballot boxes became part of the repertoire of violence for parties determined to deny their opponents the opportunity to take power. Similarly, opposition parties and groups, invoking the language of fairness and seeking to undo years of authoritarianism, also engaged in forms of violence such as violent street demonstrate. Ions, arson, and destruction of property, to counter state-instigated violence.

Furthermore, The AU has put in place various organs and structures whose mandates include the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts including election-related disputes. Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy apply to situations where conflict is still in its embryonic stage and measures are taken to contain its escalation. Conflict management applies when a conflict has already occurred and is beginning to escalate, but measures are put in place to reduce the intensity of violence associated with such conflict. Conflict resolution applies where a conflict situation is transformed into peacebuilding through, for instance, post conflict reconstruction and development programs. It is important to appreciate these three dimensions of dealing with conflict because election-related conflicts are not only confined to polling day or the voting stage of the electoral process. Election related conflicts may occur in all the phases of the election cycle, namely (a) pre-voting stage, (b) voting stage, and (c) post voting stage. This suggests that any strategy that aims at effectively dealing with electoral conflicts should be more long term than short term, and should be more systematically planned than reactive or ad hoc. It is imperative that the AU invests adequate resources in dealing with pre-election root causes of conflict so that disputes are dealt with well in advance of elections, while also positioning itself strategically to pre-empt conflicts during and after the elections. In addition, The AU framework and approach to election-related conflicts is five-pronged:

- (a) Early warning and preventive diplomacy;
- (b) Election observation and monitoring;
- (c) Postelection mediation;
- (d) Technical and governance assistance; and
- (e) Post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD).

A prominent scholar of the subject at hand, Schirch (2004) contended that Conflict Management involves implementing strategies to limit the negative and increase the positive aspects of conflict at a level equal to or higher than where the conflict is taking place. Schirch’s submission seems to stem from Sandole (1999) who submitted that Conflict Management should not be misunderstood to be aiming at eliminating all conflict or avoiding conflict in totality but largely to minimise its negative impacts. From the works of Sandole (1999) and Schirch (2004), we can deduce that Conflict Management is a process that involves various styles which include;

1. Integrating: This involves opening up, creating dialogue, and exploring.
2. Obliging: An aspect that tries to find the same interests of the parties, while trying to minimize the true feeling of the conflict, to satisfy the other party.
3. Dominating [confrontation]: This is a coercive way of managing conflict in which one party forces their own way on the other party concerned.

4. Mediation: It is an attempt to help parties in a disagreement to hear one another, to minimise the harm that can come from disagreement.

5. Avoiding: This entails ignoring the problem in hopes that it will go away on its own.

6. Compromising: This is the willingness by one or both parties to the conflict to make concessions for a mutual agreement (Zartman, 1997).

However, recent policies on electoral violence in many emerging democracies mainly concentrated on guidelines on how to manage or prevent it without looking at different management strategies that could be taken up by different actors. Hogland and Jastart (2010) argued that the management of electoral conflicts needs different strategies that can be taken up by different actors. They contended that the presence of monitors can be instrumental in managing electoral violence through naming and shaming mechanisms and by creating awareness of tensions build up, mediation can be carried out in high tension situation to solve an ongoing election-related dispute, the legal framework and institutional design provides the basis of combating impunity and for creating conditions discouraging violence, law enforcement highlights the deterring function of security forces and voter-focused strategies emphasise the importance of long-term prevention through the cultivation of democratic norms and tolerance. The biggest problem that most young democracies face is implementation of programmes. They have nice policies and programmes on paper that are never implemented. Lack of political will in most cases had failed the management strategies of electoral violence in most young democracies. To make matters worse, it appeared management strategies were rarely evaluated to determine their effectiveness and hence, this study.

An integrated approach in the management of electoral conflicts requires reframing elections and conflict by looking at the electoral cycle and conflict cycle. The electoral cycle allows for an expanded view of all electoral processes and related programming that incorporates the social and political context before, during and after elections. This approach extends to such activities as analysing election results, formation of government, preparation of reforms and procedures for the next set of elections and supporting education and advocacy activities related to elections and election reforms (Kammerud, 2012). An electoral cycle perspective helps to create an awareness of the broad variety of stakeholders that can be perpetrators or targets of electoral violence. In this respect, the media has an important role to give accurate information about elections. Where the media becomes a mouthpiece of the government or is simply irresponsible, it can fuel mistrust in the electoral process and destabilize it. On the other hand, conflict cycle is a source of common conflict programming responses. This approach helps to situate visible violence as a part of a longer process. Essentially, electoral conflict has its roots in each of the cycle and the most efficient responses to the electoral conflict will be rooted in both cycles.

Most approaches in the management of electoral conflict focus on electoral cycle alone. This may not be sufficient. An understanding of the connection and overlap between the conflict cycle and the electoral cycle is critical and will help EMBs to develop strategies that would address electoral conflict more explicitly, consistently and effectively. Essentially, electoral conflict can be better understood when

placed within conflict cycle, and better addressed when stakeholders look at what conflict programming would be most relevant. However, it appears the approach in conflict management in Zambia has not been sufficient enough to address electoral conflict. Hence, this study to establish how effective CMCs have managed electoral conflicts.

However, a focus on violence around the electoral cycle has the advantage of being better suited to identifying all instances of electoral violence. According Alston (2010) <sup>[3]</sup>, found that 11 percent of fatalities occurred on Election Day, with 46 percent occurring in the pre-election period and 43 percent in the post – election period. These findings illustrated how a focus on Election Day violence was likely to miss the majority of violent incidences that occurred in the three months before and after elections.

In the Zambian perspective, the Electoral Act no. 24 of 1996 provides for the composition of an independent Electoral Commission and its operations. The Electoral Act number 12 of 2006 gives power to the ECZ to set up Conflict Management Committees to resolve electoral conflicts. It is in this regard that the ECZ established CMCs at national and district level. These committees are mandated to manage and resolve electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner, with a view to achieving peaceful elections and mutual resolutions through mediation of conflicts that arise in the electoral process through the enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct which regulates the media, polling agents, political parties, monitors, observers and candidates during elections. Whether this is happening, is what this study will establish.

Furthermore, the CMCs attend to complaints based on alleged bias by electoral officers and have powers to advise the conflicting parties to report the matter to the police where a crime has been committed during elections, advise the conflicting parties in an election conflict and to revoke any accreditation of any election monitor and observer. The committees may impose punishments that the ECZ determines by statutory instruments (Code 2006, 17(1)). The fact that electoral conflicts have continued raises a lot of unanswered questions regarding the manner in which CMCs have managed electoral conflicts in Zambia. Hence, this study to evaluate how the CMCs manage electoral conflicts in Zambia.

Essentially, Section 6 of the Electoral Code of Conduct (2006) restricts behaviour that might fuel violence or disrupt the right to freedom of campaigning. These behaviours include among others, bans on violent behaviour or inflammatory speech, the carrying or display of arms, making false defamatory or inflammatory allegations, disrupting campaign meetings, defacing campaign materials, vote buying, bribery among others. The procedure for conflict resolution is that any member of the general public can make a complaint in writing and addressed to the area Town Clerk/Council Secretary or to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. The committee chairperson will then convene a meeting to the dispute within twenty four (24) hours from the date of receipt of the complaint. The members would choose a lead mediator to spearhead the mediation. Then the members of the parties to the dispute would be invited to attend the mediation session. The mediator would then assist the parties to find an agreement solution. The agreed solution is reduced in writing and signed by all parties. The committees largely apply the Electoral Code of Conduct when resolving disputes. Any

person not satisfied with the mediation by the District Committee may appeal to the National Committee or to the Electoral Commission. However, it appears the CMCs are facing serious challenges and have failed to meet the expectations of some stakeholders as evidenced in the frequent and intense electoral violence witnessed in Zambia. Kimer (2012) reported on the infamous violent incidence during the 2001 Chawama byelection in Lusaka in which political parties orchestrated a bloody violence that sent dozens of people to the hospital with machete wounds. Other Incidents of electoral conflict and violence in Lusaka were recorded in Lilanda, Kanyama and at the Civic Center (Nakatindi hall) as recent as 2011. Furthermore, police in Mufumbwe recorded a total of six (6) casualties from an incidence of electoral violence in which a UPND cadre lost his eye after severe beatings and four (4) MMD cadres sustained deep cuts after being beaten in retaliation. In Rufunsa, one person died while two (2) others were injured when political rivalry erupted during a Local Government by-election on November 8th, 2012 (Lusaka Times, 2012). Whether the Electoral Code of Conduct is effectively enforced and adhered to, is what this study wants to establish as it evaluates the effectiveness of the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

Officials from the Jimmy Carter Centre Foundation (2006) who came to monitor Zambia's elections in 2006 equally had their own views concerning the capacity of the CMCs of the ECZ. The report by the Carter Centre noted that CMCs had unresolved disputes with political parties, and that most of the conflicts between political parties needed effective mechanisms to be managed. This included creating a legal mandate for CMCs and providing for necessary enforcement mechanisms. They observed that the absence of a legal framework makes these committees toothless in the sense that enforcement of the decisions passed was not there. Therefore, this rendered the committees incapable especially that the committees could not nullify election results, disqualify the candidature of any person or impose a fine or imprisonment, could not usurp the role of election officers during elections and could not order the recount of votes in case of a dispute over election results. Without addressing the foregoing, it was unlikely that CMCs would be able to manage electoral conflict and violence in Zambia. This observation gives a call to establish whether a legal framework to the mandate of CMCs would make them effective in the management of electoral conflicts.

Suffice to state that the foregoing is not a task to be borne entirely by the ECZ alone, other stakeholders such as political parties, law enforcement agencies, CSOs and the general populace need to take an active role in a quest for peace before, during and after elections. There seems to be information gap among political players and stakeholders and within CMCs as regards to the effective management of electoral conflict. Hence, this study to establish this information gap and make CMCs effective.

### 2.5 Personal critique

From the review of various literature in this study, it was clear that conflict management was an essential ingredient in a democratic dispensation. Therefore, the state was expected to provide an enabling environment for peace building by strengthening all legal instruments through legislation. The strengthening of legal instruments would enable CMCs to discharge their function effectively and

efficiently. It is important to realise that every person in the nation needs peace for personal and national development. Leaving stakeholders out of the conflict management brackets, either as active participants or beneficiaries, risked plunging the nation into anarchy. However, most scholars engaged in this study like Lopez (2000), Kelly (2012) and others have only written about the causes of electoral conflicts but little has been written on the effective way to manage electoral conflicts. This is the gap identified which this study tried to fill. Thus, giving a call to evaluate the effectiveness of conflict management committee in the management of electoral conflicts in Lusaka district.

### 2.6 Gap

Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) brings together Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and key stakeholders such as political parties, civic and media groups, national purveyors of justice, EMBs, the Police and Military authorities to identify, monitor and mitigate election related violence. It involves conflict mapping, conflict monitoring and reporting, advising on and supporting mitigation strategies, training on conflict management and rapid response, civil society capacity building and network building. Election Violence Risk Assessment (EVRA) focusses on assessing risk factors related to electoral violence such as the risk of political violence, the risk of confessional violence and the risk of electoral violence.

When greater co-ordination is present, conflict risks can be identified earlier and managed better, or avoided altogether. Conflict analysis can be integrated into risk assessments throughout the electoral cycle, with great benefit to security planning and stakeholder decision-making process. Since conflict management requires a coordinated action among stakeholders, communication between the CMCs and stakeholders themselves is cardinal to its management. Whether CMCs in Zambia have developed or adopted conflict mapping tools, is what this study will establish.

Electoral violence has a devastating effect on democracy. From the standpoint of democratic politics, violence and insecurity may influence the results of elections in many ways. Actors may use threats and coercion to prevent other electorates from registering to vote and discourage them from exercising their right to vote. Party candidates may abandon the electoral process due to threats and killings or may act against measures taken to conduct elections (UNDP, 2009). From a conflict management point of view, violence has an adverse effect on the society. It will polarize the voting public along conflict margins and in the worst case could lead to an outbreak of violent conflict. Electoral violence has specific targets and these include electoral partakers such as electorates, candidates, election officers, election observers and media groups, electoral materials such as ballot boxes, campaign stuffs, registration data, polling results, electoral facilities such as voting and tallying stations and electoral events such as campaign meetings, demonstrations and voting stations. Radical or fanatic groups may also get the opportunity to assume state power through violence (ibid). All such conflicts require particular measures to be put in place. However, conflicts may still be there even with such measures. This study intends to establish how effective the CMCs in Zambia have performed.

Unfortunately, it seems the concept of electoral violence and

its management is poorly understood by some electoral stakeholders and is insufficiently interdicted at the national, regional, continental and at international levels despite policy commitment, legal instruments, election monitoring and repeated denunciation. In this study, these are some of the issues which have been taken into account so that the views of all stakeholders are considered if the CMCs were to be effective in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1 Overview

The aim of this Chapter is to provide the details of all the procedures used in this Study. The Chapter is divided into five sections: Section one presents research design used, Section two presents Study Area, Section three presents the Sampling Techniques used to determine cases to be involved in the study. Section four presents Data Collection Methods and Section five presents Data Analysis Techniques.

#### 3.2 Research Design

A research design is a plan of how to conduct a study. It articulates what data is required, what methods are going to be used to collect and analyse data, and how everything will answer the research questions (Muzumara, 1998). In this study, a qualitative descriptive research design was used. A descriptive research refers to research studies that have their main objective the accurate portrayal of the characteristics of persons, situations or groups (Hiatt, 1986). This approach is used to describe variables rather than to test a predicted relationship between variables. The descriptive approach in data collection gives the ability to collect accurate data on and provide a clear picture of the phenomenon under study (Hillman, 2005). The essence of a qualitative descriptive research design is first to state the status quo, then formulating important principles of knowledge and later provides solutions to the problem. Essentially, this design was appropriate because it gave an accurate and authentic description of the lessons and experiences of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

#### 3.3 Target Population

Polit and Hungler (1999) defined a study population as the totality of all subjects that conform to a set of specifications, comprising the entire group of persons that are of interest to the researcher and to whom the research results can be generalised. In a related manner, Salant and Dillman (1994) described the population in a study as a group of experimental data or persons. With the definitions given, the study population was the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) secretariat (Legal department), Police Stations, households, Churches and ward counsellors.

#### 3.4 Sample Size

Sampling is the process of selecting a number of individuals or objectives from the population such that the selected group contains elements representative of the characteristics found in the entire group (Mungenda and Mungenda, 2003). The study will use probability sampling method to create a sampling frame, stratified sampling where different leadership levels of the group included in the investigation. Stratified random sampling will be suitable in this case because the population to be sampled will be divided into

homogeneous groups based on the consideration a researcher will fairly generalize the results to the population from which they will be chosen. According to Bernard (1977) a sample is a subset of the population. A simple random sample of the total target 100 will be chosen from the population under study. The aim of the stratified sampling is to achieve an even representation of the subgroups of the population in the selected sample (Mungenda and Mungenda).

#### 3.5 Sampling Procedure

Webster (1985) defined a sample as a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole population. A sample is a subset of the population. Sidhu (2012: 253) defines sampling as "the process of selecting sample from the population." In this study, purposive sampling technique was used to identify respondents from the targeted population. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), purposive sampling involves targeting a group of people believed to be reliable for the study. From the researcher's category of respondents, the ECZ, Police, Households, Ward Counsellor's, and Churches based in Lusaka. The ECZ in particular provided useful information on the actual situation on the ground while at the same time outlined the government's position on electoral conflict and violence. At least respondents were targeted from each of the organisations, mainly the Public Relations Officer, Executive Director or any other individual assigned with the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the organisation. This was to ensure that only information relevant to the study was collected thereby saving both the researcher's and respondents' time.

#### 3.6 Data Collection Instruments

Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to the research, using methods such as interviews, participant observation, focus group discussion, narratives and case histories (Hiatt, 1986). Interviews were used to gather data from the respondents. To maintain originality, the voice recorder was employed in some cases and content later transcribed so as to identify the critical junctions. Closed ended questions were employed to get precise answers to the questions. In addition, unstructured open ended questions were used to encourage elaboration and further discussion.

Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. Primary data was collected from data held by various libraries, institutional reports, the internet, media and newspaper reports were also used with a view to capture recent updates of electoral conflict and violence in the country. Electronic media articles, journals, research reports, conference proceedings, magazines and books also constituted an important source of secondary data. It is important to note that secondary data was mainly a complement to primary data collected from the field.

##### 3.6.1 Data Collection procedure

The term data collection refers to gathering specific information aimed at proving or refuting some facts" (Kombo and Tromp, 2006:99). It involves collection of views on the attitudes and characters of the people about the phenomenon. Data collection is important in research as it allows for the dissemination of accurate information based on empirical evidence of the phenomenon. Data collection is

the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to the research, using methods such as interviews, participant observation, focus group discussion, narratives and case histories (Hiatt, 1986).

In this study, information was collected using the structured interview guide. This was because the study was qualitative and all respondent were required to respond to similar questions. A pilot study was done and helped to test the feasibility of the study techniques and to perfect the interview guide. During the administration of the interview guide, all responses were written down. Apart from writing down the responses, the interview was also recorded.

### 3.7 Data Analysis

According to LeCompte and Schensul (1999), data analysis is the process a researcher uses to reduce data to a story and its interpretation. Therefore, data analysis is a mechanism for reducing and organising data to produce findings that require interpretation. Data from tape recorders, interviews were transcribed having read text files and listened to the tape recorders thoroughly for a general understanding. Common themes were then identified and clustered to categorise the data. Relevant information was labelled and grouped according to category. Furthermore, the data was then reduced to its essence and representative and most striking quotes were identified. Codes related to the objectives were identified and a thematic analysis was done. Throughout this process of categorising pattern, similarities and contrasting viewpoints were highlighted and critically interpreted on the basis of the theoretical framework.

### 3.8 Presentation of Data

To present data, charts and graphs were generated using the Microsoft word and Stata to generate emerging themes which were interpreted and used for discussion in the light of the objectives of the study. Stata is a cross-platform software application for analysing text and spreadsheet data (analysing qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research).

### 3.9 Ethical Considerations

Furrow (2004: 43) <sup>[20]</sup> defined ethics as ‘a morality or a position of doing what is right both morally and legally.’ To start with, permission was sort from the authorities to carry out this study as shown in appendix 3. It is important to protect participants who willingly present themselves for the purpose of advancing understanding in research. Therefore, a strict set of guidelines and code of conduct was adopted and adhered to. Confidentiality was an important aspect in this study and hence, all the names of the respondents were not mentioned.

The researcher ensured that participant's consent to participate in the research was voluntary by making them sign a consent form, free of any coercion or promises of benefits as a result of participation. Since the study was to evaluate the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia, the researcher ensured that the participants received a full disclosure of the nature of the study, expected benefits to the participants and society with an extended opportunity to ask

questions, including the fact that they could choose to withdraw their participation even in the middle of the research.

### 3.10 Limitations of the Study

This study was conducted in Zambia, particularly in Lusaka. As such, the findings from the Lusaka conflict management committees may not be generalized to other CMCs across the country. To this effect, similar studies will need to be conducted in other CMCs outside Lusaka. The main practical constraint in this study was that it was difficult to collect data from political parties because at the time of data collection, political parties were busy mobilizing their parties in readiness for the 2016 General Elections and Referendum.

## 4. Findings

This chapter presents the findings on the evaluation of the management of electoral conflicts in Lusaka. Interviews were conducted in Lusaka district with 5 key electoral stakeholders mainly the staff of different organisation in churches, police services, electoral commission, ward counsellors and households. Qualitative data from 12 interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis using the Stata software to generate emerging themes which were interpreted and used for discussion in the light of the objectives of the study. Stata is a cross-platform software application for analysing text and spreadsheet data (analysing qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research). Emerging themes were also reported in quantitative form through the use of pie charts and graphs. Some excerpts of the interviews were transcribed verbatim and reported directly in the report. These research questions were:

1. To determine the participation levels of citizens especially youths in politics.
2. To ascertain the causes of and effects of political violence on voters.
3. To establish the role of government in mitigating political violence

The finding are arranged in two categories the first category is for institutions, and these include the following: ECZ, Police, and households. The second category of the finding are based on household responses in reference to the two different questionnaire.

## 4.1 Demographics and Geographic

### 4.1.1 Province

Province	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Lusaka	60	100.00	100.00
Total	60	100.00	


Data was collected from Lusaka, the above table is the representation of 60 responses that were received from organisation, leaving the remaining 40% to the households which are represented in the second category.

**4.1.2 District**

tab district			
District	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Kafue	15	25.00	25.00
Chilanga	15	25.00	50.00
Chongwe	15	25.00	75.00
Lusaka	15	25.00	100.00
Total	60	100.00	

The above table is the representation of all the staffs in institutions that participated in the study, according to the table above, all the data that was collected from staff ranged in Lusaka district in the different districts.


The table below is a graph representing different and equal composition of statics of the districts where data was collected among and within the Lusaka.



**4.1.3 Level of education**

Level of education attained	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Primary	1	1.72	1.72
Secondary	12	20.69	22.41
Tertiary	45	77.59	100.00
Total	58	100.00	


The above is the representation of education levels of all the participants and therefore according to the findings above, from the 60 list only 1.72% of the population attended primary school as the highest level of education, were as the highest population attended tertiary as their highest levels of education with about 77.59% of the total population and lastly only 12 attended secondary school which were represented by 20.69% of the entire population leaving. Therefore the above findings have been presented in the graph below.



**4.1.4 Participation levels**

How is the participation of citizens in politics?			
	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
High	54	90.00	90.00
Low	6	10.00	100.00
Total	60	100.00	

The above table is the representation of participation levels in the different areas, the question to this above finding was (How is the participation level of citizens in politics) and therefore the answers are presented below in the table. In addition to the findings, the graph below presents the results indicating percentage in intervals.



Therefore, citizen show so much interests in the elections and other electoral activities. The graph shows answers which were given and the lower interval represents non-partisan citizens were as the higher represents the partisan citizens.

**4.1.5 Political violence attitude and knowledge**

What do you understand by political violence	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Are fights between two or more politic..	2	4.44	4.44
Arguments and fights between two or ..	1	2.22	6.67
Is an intentional political act that ..	2	4.44	11.11
Is the political act that results in ..	1	2.22	13.33
It is the misunderstanding between or..	1	2.22	15.56
Misunderstanding of different politica..	1	2.22	17.78
Political is violence peretuated by p..	1	2.22	20.00
Political violence involves bad actio..	2	4.44	24.44
Political violence is about physical ..	1	2.22	26.67
Theft cases during elections	1	2.22	28.89
Violence are fights between people fr..	2	4.44	33.33
Violence are fights initited by cader..	1	2.22	35.56
Violence is a presentation of physica..	1	2.22	37.78
fights between political parties in o..	22	48.89	86.67
it is the deliberate use of power and..	1	2.22	88.89
it is the use of force by a political..	4	8.89	97.78
political violence are fights exerted..	1	2.22	100.00
Total	45	100.00	

The table above is the representation of the answers that were given by all the organisational members after the question (What do you understand by political violence) the represents show positive results and therefore, this is an affirmation that the population that were targeted indeed is right and packed with knowledge and understanding of political sphere in Zambia.

In addition to this findings, political violence was

discovered and defined as an intentional and physical use of power and unhuman activities to other people, especially people from other political parties for political gains, means and reasons.

**4.1.6 What do you think are the causes of political violence?**

What do you think are the causes of political violence?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Beliefs, Tradition, Poverty, etc	1	2.17	2.17
Beliefs, poverty, economic status	4	8.70	10.87
Economic conditions, Poverty, Beliefs..	1	2.17	13.04
Economic conditions, poverty etc.	2	4.35	17.39
Fight for power, opposed views, aims	1	2.17	19.57
Ideologies, Religious beliefs, Econom..	2	4.35	23.91
Lack of empowerment	1	2.17	26.09
Lack of jobs especially for the youths	2	4.35	30.43
Lack of jobs, money, wanting more cha..	3	6.52	36.96
Lack of money, job etc	3	6.52	43.48
Lack of support from the government	1	2.17	45.65
Poverty	1	2.17	47.83
Poverty, Beliefs, Education etc	21	45.65	93.48
Poverty, beliefs, education, lack of ..	1	2.17	95.65
Poverty, lack of money	1	2.17	97.83
Rigged elections, beliefs, values	1	2.17	100.00
Total	46	100.00	

The above table is the representation of the possible answers that were given after the question (What do you think are the causes of political violence?).

In addition to this, the table below outline all the answers that were given in the three different institutions of the police, church and the electoral commission of Zambia.

Lack of education	Lack of government support	Opposed aims
Lack of money	Political promises	Lack of youth empowerment
Lack of Jobs	Demands for change	Rigged election
Poverty	Fight for power	Beliefs
Ideologies	Traditional perspectives	Corruption
Lack of empowerment	Economic status	
Economic conditions	Opposed view	

**4.1.7 What do you think should be done to mitigate political violence?**

What do you think should be done in order to mitigate political violence?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
By discouraging cardelism	1	2.63	2.63
Change policies and deployment of mo..	1	2.63	5.26
Change the policies by the Lusaka com..	1	2.63	7.89
Control of masses,	1	2.63	10.53
Deploy more man power for peace and j..	5	13.16	23.68
Deployment of more police officers	1	2.63	26.32
Deployment of more police officers an..	1	2.63	28.95
Deployment of more police officers an..	2	5.26	34.21
Deployment of officers in orde to pro..	1	2.63	36.84
Employ more police and soldiers	1	2.63	39.47
Employ more security officers in orde..	1	2.63	42.11
Employing more police officers	1	2.63	44.74
Ensuring that caderlism is abolished,..	1	2.63	47.37
Implement good policies by the commit..	1	2.63	50.00
Implement good policies that guarantee..	1	2.63	52.63
Lack of jobs, Money etc.	1	2.63	55.26
More patrols and ensuring that caderl..	1	2.63	57.89
Need for conscous, fair election,	1	2.63	60.53
Stop caderlism	12	31.58	92.11
change of the voting system and also ..	1	2.63	94.74
deployment of many more police office..	1	2.63	97.37
deployment of more police officers in..	1	2.63	100.00
Total	38	100.00	

The above is the representation of all the answers that were give after the question (What do you think should be done in order to mitigate political violence). In addition, In order to respond to research question one which sought to establish how the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees manage electoral conflicts in Lusaka. Therefore according to the finding above, All the respondents interviewed in this study acknowledged the fact that the Electoral Act No. 12 grants the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) powers to establish conflict management committee at national and all the districts to manage and resolve electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner, hence, the establishment of these committees in 2006.

Furthermore, the findings established that the conflict management committee had a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and that they were accountable to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. From the responses, it was clear that the management strategy used by the conflict management committee to resolve electoral disputes was mediation. In addition to this, the police, also had view together with other churches that were interviewed and therefore the following is the representation all the answers that were given in the study.

Implement good policies that guarantees and favours the safety of whole participants	Stop cadrelism
Change the policies by the Lusaka committee in order to create timely and prudent free system of elections.	Employ more security officers in order to overpower the vast cadres
Deploy more man power for peace and justice	Employing more police officers
change of the voting system and also advocate for free and fair election	Need for conscous, fair election,
Deployment of more police officers and soldiers to ensure peace and order	More patrols and ensuring that caderlism is abolished in Zambia
Deploy more man power for peace and justice	Promote peace among citizens
Change policies and deployment of more officers	Deployment of officers in order to promote peace and increase order among different communities
Ensuring that cadres is abolished, deployment of more police officers and soldiers	Promote and support love
Control Masses	


**4.1.8 Political violence in areas**

How are the cases of political violence in your area?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Bad	40	66.67	66.67
Normal	20	33.33	100.00
Total	60	100.00	

The above is the table with a representation of all the answers that were given with levels of political violence in different neighbourhood around Lusaka. According to the answers that were given, about 65% of the answers represented (Bad) which is an interpretation that violence

cases are high. Were as 33.33% is the presentation of the remaining (Normal).


The graph below shows the above findings in intervals.



**4.1.9 Have you ever decided not to participate in elections due to political violence tension**

Have you ever decided not to participate in elections due to violence?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	51	85.00	85.00
Yes	9	15.00	100.00
Total	60	100.00	

The above table was generated from the responses after the question (have you ever decided not participate in elections due political violence. The answers have as well been presented in intervals below.



According to the above interval that has been presented, citizens around Lusaka do participate in political affairs regardless of political violence around and other factors that might deter people from the privilege of participating in elections that might cause voter apathy.

**4.2 Role of the Government in the Mitigation Process**


What do you think is the role of the government in political violence mitigation?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Deploy more police officer especially ..	2	5.71	5.71
Deploy more police officers in order ..	1	2.86	8.57
Employ more police officers especiall..	1	2.86	11.43
Employ more police officer	1	2.86	14.29
Employ more police officers	1	2.86	17.14
Employ more polivce officers	1	2.86	20.00
Enforcemnet of law and order	1	2.86	22.86
Recruit more police officers especial..	3	8.57	31.43
Security during election	1	2.86	34.29
Stop carderlism	1	2.86	37.14
Stop carderlism	16	45.71	82.86
The role of the government is to prom..	1	2.86	85.71
To deploy more police officer in orde..	1	2.86	88.57
To promote free and fair elections th..	1	2.86	91.43
the role of the dgovernment is to mak..	1	2.86	94.29
the role of the goernment I to promot..	1	2.86	97.14
the role of the government is to prom..	1	2.86	100.00
Total	35	100.00	

The above table represents the different answers that were provided after the question (What is the role of the government in the mitigation process of political violence?) Therefore, the table below represent all the answer that were given graphically.

The role of the government is to promote peace and order through the use of possible means that cannot inflict people rights in the administration of order.	the role of the government is to make sure that caderlism is fully controlled in in order to not interfere with the election process
the role of the government is to promote order and increase patrols so that the administration of all electoral process can be carried out in an orderly manner	Stop caderlism
Provide security for all especially during election	To deploy more police officer in order to promote peace
Maintain law and order	Employ more police officer
The role of the government I to promote peace by ensuring that more man power is utilized especially during elections in order to not disturb the electoral processes	Deploy more police officers in order to promote order and peace
To promote free and fair elections that are not violent by means of deploying more police officers	Enforcement of law and order.

**4.2.1 Has violence distorted peace in Lusaka**


Do you think political violence has distorted peace in Zambia?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Yes	60	100.00	100.00
Total	60	100.00	



According to the observation of the answers that were provide after the question, political violence has surely distorted the peace in Lusaka.

**4.2.2 Peace and Order**

Do you think government services manages to strike peace and order during the el	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	15	24.59	26.23
Yes	45	73.77	100.00
Total	61	100.00	




According to the observations above, political violence is one factor that has contributed to the unbalanced management of politics which causes hostility among other members, therefore, the answers of the study has indicated YES to have the highest mark representing lack of peace were a small amount of space has represented only a small sector with NO.

**Household Responses**

**4.2.3 District Composition**

District	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Kafue	10	25.00	25.00
Chilanga	10	25.00	50.00
Chongwe	10	25.00	75.00
Lusaka	10	25.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

The finding represents Kafue, Chilanga, Chongwe and Lusaka as the main targeted areas were data was collected from among different households. The findings show an equal distribution of households 10 which ranges to 25% of the population adding to 100 from the 60% population of the institutions were data was collected from, therefore a mini graph has been presented below to significantly present equal distributions from different districts.




According to the methodology that was used for the study, 10 people were targeted from each district that was selected to participate, and therefore the distributions amounted to 10, which completed a total of 40 households from each district adding up to 60% of the entire targeted institutions.

**4.2.4 Constituency's composition**

Age group	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	9	22.50	22.50
2	19	47.50	70.00
3	12	30.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

The above table represents the age groups of all the participants in different households. In addition, the graph below shows details of age ranges from 1 to 3 and their representations.




The graph above shows a gradual graphical representation of all the participants' age group, and according the results showed, the age group 47.50% represents age group between 26years and 35years old as highest participants in the study, were as 30% represents the age between 36 years of old and above. According to the interpretation of the results, the age between 26 and 35 are actively participants of political affairs and other activities inclined with the electoral process in Lusaka province.

**4.2.5 Household level of education**

Level of education	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Primary	1	2.50	2.50
Secondary	14	35.00	37.50
Tertiary	25	62.50	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

The figure in the table above represents different levels of education for all the participants among different districts within Lusaka province, therefore. The pie chart below presents ranges and figures.



The results shows that 63% of the total population covers tertiary level, meaning the highest participants of all the households were extremely educated and this proves the targeted households were right for the study. In addition to this, about 35% of the households were represented to have secondary school as their highest level of education. And lastly only a 2% of all the households attended primary school and furthered.

**4.2.6 Political Violence Attitude and Knowledge by Households**

Do you know what political violence is?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Yes	40	100.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

The figures below represents the answers that were given after the question (Do you know what political violence is?) and according to the results given, the targeted population showed 100% sure of what political violence is.

what do you think political violence is?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
	1	3.03	3.03
	1	3.03	6.06
Is the political act that results in ..	1	3.03	9.09
Misunderstanding of different politica..	1	3.03	12.12
Political violence involves bad actio..	2	6.06	18.18
Political violence is about physical ..	1	3.03	21.21
The use physical power on other bases..	1	3.03	24.24
Theft cases during elections	1	3.03	27.27
Violence are fights between people fr..	2	6.06	33.33
Violence are fights initiated by cader..	1	3.03	36.36
Violence is a presentation of physica..	1	3.03	39.39
are fights between two or more people..	1	3.03	42.42
fights between political parties in o..	9	27.27	69.70
it is the use of force by a political..	2	6.06	75.76
political violence are fights between..	6	18.18	93.94
political violence are fights exerted..	1	3.03	96.97
optical violence involves abuse and p..	1	3.03	100.00
Total	33	100.00	

The table above is the tabulation representing the answers that were given by different households after the question (What do you think Political Violence is?). Therefore in order to give a clear view of the answers that were given in this study, a table has been generated showing all the different answers that were given:

Answers:


Violence are fights between people from different political parties	Political violence involves abuse and physical demonstration of power on other people from different party
The use of physical power on other based on different views which are sound different from other peoples for political reasons	it is the use of force by a political group with a political purpose
political violence are fights between two or more political parties with different political view	political violence are fights exerted on other
Theft cases during elections	Violence are fights between people from different political parties
Misunderstanding of different political parties that results in theft, fights etc.	Political violence is about physical clashes of political parties
Political violence involves bad actions such as physical attacks that purposely done for political reasons	fights between political parties in order to achieve goals

**4.2.7 Political Cases Satiations**

How are the cases of political violence in your area.	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Bad	26	65.00	65.00
Normal	12	30.00	95.00
Not sure	2	5.00	100.00
Total	40	100.00	

The above table show the answers that were given by the households after being asked the question (How are the political violence cases in your area?).

Therefore the graphs below represents the figures in a very graphical manner as presented



The results shows that political violence cases are high and therefore this causes apathy among other citizens.

**4.2.8 Causes of Political Violence by Households**

what do you think are the causes of political violence	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Bad economic conditions, lack of jobs..	1	2.94	2.94
Beliefs	1	2.94	5.88
Beliefs, ideologies, values etc	1	2.94	8.82
Caderlism, corruption etc.	1	2.94	11.76
Caders	1	2.94	14.71
Caders, Lack of jobs	1	2.94	17.65
Caders, Lack of jobs, money etc	1	2.94	20.59
Caders, lack of money, lack of Job op..	1	2.94	23.53
Caders, people complain about caders ..	1	2.94	26.47
Corrption between party leaders, lack..	1	2.94	29.41
Corruption	1	2.94	32.35
Corruption and caderlism	1	2.94	35.29
Corruption between party leader,	1	2.94	38.24
Corruption, caderlism, lack of money ..	1	2.94	41.18
Ideologies, corruption, insufficient ..	1	2.94	44.12
Lack of educaation, oportunitiesn,mo..	1	2.94	47.06
Lack of job opportunities, Lack of mo..	1	2.94	50.00
Lack of jobs	2	5.88	55.88
Lack of jobs, money, beliefs, ideolog..	2	5.88	61.76
Lack of money	2	5.88	67.65
Lack of money	1	2.94	70.59
Lack of money, Education, jobs school..	2	5.88	76.47
Lack of money, Jobs, education etc	1	2.94	79.41
Lack of money, food, jobs etc.	1	2.94	82.35
Lack of money, jobs, education etc	1	2.94	85.29
Perspective about other parties, cultu..	1	2.94	88.24
Too many caders,	1	2.94	91.18
Wanting too much change of the govern..	1	2.94	94.12
lack of money	1	2.94	97.06
lack of money, jobs, education etc	1	2.94	100.00
Total	34	100.00	

The table below are the different answers that were given after the question (What do you think are the causes of political violence?).

Therefore the graph below shows are the answers below in a clear format view.

Lack of money	Ideologies	Poverty
Beliefs	Lack of education	Too much freedom
Perspective about other parties,	cultural beliefs	Cadres
Corruption by party leaders	Lack of government empowerment	Lack of jobs
Bad economic conditions	Wanting too much change of the government	Insufficient circulation of money
Wrong motives of change	Fake promises by parties	Lack of money, jobs, education etc.

The above table depict many answers that were given by the households. According to the finding lack of jobs is of the reasons that was common same as lack of empowerment, wanting government change so much etc.

**4.2.9 What should be done to mitigate political violence?**

what do you think should be done in order to mitigate political violence?	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Employ more police officers	3	10.00	10.00
List jobs to the youth and stop cader..	1	3.33	13.33
Provide jobs for the youths	1	3.33	16.67
Provide jobs to the youths	3	10.00	26.67
Provide more jobs to the youths and s..	5	16.67	43.33
Send more soldies on the street espec..	3	10.00	53.33
Stop caderlism nd provide jobs	3	10.00	63.33
The government should stop caderlism ..	2	6.67	70.00
Use more police officers and soldiers..	2	6.67	76.67
Use of forces police ans soldiers	2	6.67	83.33
educte the masses about anti-caderlis..	1	3.33	86.67
increase on patrols and provide jobs ..	1	3.33	90.00
put n end to caderlism	1	3.33	93.33
send oders out of their stations and ..	1	3.33	96.67
what do you think should be done in o..	1	3.33	100.00
Total	30	100.00	

The table show many answers that were given after the question (what should be done in order to mitigate political violence?).

However as the targeted population were right for the study, the answers are arranged and presented with clarity and full view below.

Deploy more police officer and soldiers.	Change policies and choose perfect ones in order to suit our political system.	Stop cadrelism
Provide opportunities for the youths as well as putting an end to caderlism	The government should put an end to caderlism, corruption and provide opportunities especially for the youths	Send more services on street especially during elections.
First the government should provide jobs for the youth to stop caderlism and then recruit more manpower for peace	The police together with the soldiers should make sure that they bring peace by controlling caderlism	Employ more police officers and the soldiers in order to provide peace and security for every human being especially during elections.

The above answers are the different responses that were given by different households from different districts that participate.

**5. Conclusions and Recommendedetions**

**5.1 Overview**

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings presented in the previous chapter. It is organized based on the following subtitles arising from the research objectives: to determine the participation levels of citizens especially youths in politics: to ascertain the causes of and effects of political violence on voters: to establish the role of government in mitigating political violence. Therefore, the

conclusion and recommendation of the studiers are as follows.

### **5.2 Political Participation level**

According to the findings that have been presented through the study, the political participation of Lusaka citizens are high, and this sets a good turnout for the leadership of the nation as a whole with a lot positivity, if a huge amount is capable of participating in political affairs then the response in the development of the nation will at all cost turn out good due to the interest that are being portrait by a huge amount of citizens, in addition a huge number of youths participate in the political affairs of the nation.

The results of the study shows a huge number of youths with a high participation score of about 47.5% with the age line of between 26-35Years old. Therefore on the hand too much participation in the political affairs especially by the youth's shows desperation and insecurities such as lack of jobs, wishing for change of government, negative economic conditions etc. This is one of the factors that contribute to political violence, high views of political affairs with an intention of winning while trying to compete in views with other political parties opens doors for violence, apathy, and other activities that are definitely inhumane and crimes. Therefore in order to reduce political violence rates, there should be a balance between numbers of political rallies and other political activities on the other hand, the government of Zambia should provide a consensus forum were other party members or political party leaders can meet and agree the importance of the elections and also try to negotiate the ant-violent measure within party members so that the actions of any part can be ruled by the a governmental institutions like the Drug Enforcement commission etc.

### **5.3 Level of Education**

According to the finding of the study, the education levels of the targeted population was okay due to the turnout in the participation level, language, interest etc. the findings shows the study to have higher qualification and to have attended tertiary and secondary school while about 2.5% of the total population could only attend primary schools. Therefore the level of education for the study that affects especially the development of any country should be proceeded and important and cardinal deal that has to be concentrated on. Violence in most cases in causes by illiterate people, such as cadres and other people from communities such as loafers, street kids and other citizens with different political views especially if education levels is shallow.

In addition, Violence related to electoral processes often begins way ahead of elections. In some places, politicians are always potential targets of political violence. Citizens at large may feel constrained to openly and freely voice political views, engage in public debates, and organize themselves politically. In addition to restrictions of political rights, the consequences of such an insecure environment include difficulties in holding politicians accountable.

Electoral violence needs to be continuously addressed. Conventionally, there is a focus on national and general elections. For instance, electoral violence monitoring and citizen's and party education programmes are concentrated on the period ahead of such elections. However, by-elections are sometimes even more prone to violence than the general elections, and violence can also take place between elections. Therefore, to prevent and manage

seriously the causes and consequences of violence, a policy for electoral violence management – especially monitoring and voter-centred strategies – needs to be carried out on a long-term basis and continue between general elections.

### **5.3.1 Practitioners and policymakers on electoral violence management should:**

- Carry out the groundwork for preventing violence during interim periods.
- Support political party development, citizen education and media training.
- Continuously monitor volatile areas during and especially around any by-elections.
- Allocate adequate resources for maintaining monitoring capacity also in between elections.

### **5.4 Political Violence knowledge and attitude**

Political violence has been shown to have 100% positivity with responses in the study, therefore an affirmation has been made and therefore it is important for the government to introduce educative programs in order for the public to understand the implication of some of the electoral matters. In addition, electoral violence needs to be continuously addressed. Conventionally, there is a focus on national and general elections. For instance, electoral violence monitoring and citizen's and party education programmes are concentrated on the period ahead of such elections. However, by-elections are sometimes even more prone to violence than the general elections, and violence can also take place between elections. Therefore, to prevent and manage seriously the causes and consequences of violence, a policy for electoral violence management – especially monitoring and voter-centred strategies needs to be carried out on a long-term basis and continue between general elections. Therefore, the electoral management and the government committees that deals with violence should build and implement the following:

1. Carry out the groundwork for preventing violence during interim periods.
2. Support political party development, citizen education and media training.
3. Continuously monitor volatile areas during and especially around any by-elections.
4. Allocate adequate resources for maintaining monitoring capacity also in between elections.

### **5.5 Causes of political violence**

Political violence is caused by many factors such as bad economic conditions, lack of governmental support, cultural beliefs, and different perspectives of other tradition etc. Political violence is a huge phenomenon that mostly caused by lack understanding of different views of other political parties and especially wishes to change the government, political violence come into play if the member of a particular party wishes to overpower other parties with force demonstrate physicality on others to present fear. However, a more comprehensive approach to deal with political violence is required. Respected civil society organisations and traditional or clan leaders, need to be involved in building confidence and encouraging respect and tolerance. Such networks are also important for identifying potential areas of tension and individual trouble makers. The judiciary needs to function effectively in collaboration with the security apparatus in order to combat impunity. A policy on electoral security, thus, must be planned and carried out in

collaboration with a multiplicity of actors.

Elections are key elements of democratic processes. They provide for transparent and peaceful change of government and distribution of power. For this reason, a strong emphasis on democratisation as a means to durable peace emerged among international policy circles in the early 1990s. The notion of supporting peacebuilding in tandem with democratisation developed as a consequence of the recognition that political repression and discrimination often is the very reason groups took to arms in the first place. Hence, democratisation does not only open up for manifestations of political rights, but is also seen as a response to addressing the root causes of conflict. Support to strengthen institutional capacity to promote democratic norms and to ensure democratic rule of law is now seen as crucial for peacebuilding. Elections and democracy promotion have thus become central strategies to build peace in countries shattered by violent conflict.

### **5.6 What needs be done to mitigate political violence?**

The multiplicity of actors involved in prevention and management of electoral violence requires great coordination and role division among local and international actors and among international actors. The prevalence of involving different actors in electoral security and conflict management means that there is a risk of overlap. It is unfortunately no guarantee against some areas being neglected. Such gaps are often due to a lack of coordination in the planning and division of tasks and areas of importance for violence management. There are several positive examples where electoral monitoring has been coordinated among international, domestic agencies and hundreds of civil society organizations to successfully monitor an election. If an independent electoral commission has capacity and legitimacy, such an agency is particularly suited for such coordinating activities. However, the lack of sufficient coordination remains a challenge in many situations of electoral violence.

There is also a risk that different measures and activities undertaken for electoral security may undermine each other. For instance, the deployment of security forces may be necessary in an election, resulting in reinforcements arriving in areas in which they have no prior knowledge about the local context. While this may increase the capacity of the security forces to act in a more neutral and independent manner, it might have the drawback of undermining existing networks of contacts between for instance monitoring agencies in the area and local police. For this reason, it is important that initiatives to promote security take into account existing networks of knowledge and capacities, and are carried out in collaboration with other actors working in the same or related area.

Therefore policy makers should put the following in action in order to archive violence free elections.

1. Plan electoral violence management in coordination with other peacebuilding initiatives to avoid undermining other actors' activities.
2. Encourage international violence monitors and peace missions to access information on local peacebuilding initiatives to assess further needs for conflict management before and during an activity, event or mission.

3. In cases where civil society networks are well-developed, support such networks to coordinate the different tasks.
4. Support an independent electoral agency to assess and evaluate different capacities among actors for specific tasks.

### **5.7 Role of the government in mitigating political violence**

When politicians and political activists are targeted by violence, the consequence may be that certain political campaigns do not reach all areas in each electoral district and in the country. This constrains the right to freedom of information and is a hindrance to a free political choice. When voters are targeted during registration or around elections, the consequences may be that citizens refrain from voting, or vote for a certain political party out of fear, rather than as a free choice. When electoral violence takes place, adequate support is vital for the development of a well-functioning democratic society and for durable peace. Strategies to prevent and manage electoral violence mainly focus on the perpetrators of violence, and the perspectives of the victims of such violence are often neglected. A united approach to support the victims of violence is important so that those affected can cope with the consequences of violence. Strategies directed towards the victims of electoral violence can also prevent violence from negatively affecting the attitudes towards democratic politics, a necessary condition for sustainable peace.

#### **5.7.1 Practitioners and policymakers of electoral violence management should:**

- Include in their analysis an assessment of how victims are affected by electoral violence and how their different needs (material, physical and psychological) can be addressed.
- Develop a diversified strategy to accommodate different target groups to prevent severe individual as well as political consequences of electoral violence.
- Allocate adequate resources to develop a policy and strategies to address the consequences of electoral violence, and to implement and evaluate such policy.

## **6. Dedication**

This project is dedicated to the Finden Family, more especially to **Mr. Sveinung Finden** for both moral and financial support during my research process and my Education journey. I would also like to dedicate to family for their constant encouragement, further; I would like also to dedicate it to my almighty God for his favour, strength and good health given to me during my research work. I also wish to dedicate this to community for allowing me to exercise different leadership portfolios and allowing me to inspire many young children through my project **Africa On The Ball**.

## **7. Acknowledgements**

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them and give me this rare opportunity to carry out this research work.

Lastly, I thank my Creator **the Almighty God** for his impartation of knowledge and determination in me to carry out this research successfully regardless the challenges. I remain obedient to my God.

### 8. List of Abbreviations

IMF	International Monitoring Fund
GNP	Gross National Product
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNPF	United Nations Population Fund
CMC	Conflict Management Committees
IPDC	International Program for the Development of Communication

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