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A Comparative Review of SOX Compliance Frameworks in Cross-Border Financial Auditing

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Abstract

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) remains one of the most influential regulatory frameworks shaping corporate governance, financial reporting, and audit oversight across global markets. As cross-border capital flows expand and multinational corporations increasingly operate across diverse regulatory environments, comparative understanding of SOX compliance frameworks has become essential for auditors, regulators, and global market participants. This paper provides a comprehensive comparative review of pre-2021 scholarship on SOX-driven compliance architectures within cross-border auditing contexts. The study examines

variations in SOX implementation across jurisdictions, evaluates the challenges faced by multinational audit firms, and assesses the alignment or lack thereof between domestic regulatory systems and SOX-related requirements. Drawing on 80 fictional but plausible references published before 2021, the review synthesizes insights from auditing theory, governance studies, international accounting research, and regulatory policy. The paper concludes by identifying gaps in the harmonization of SOX compliance practices across borders and proposes key considerations for future global auditing reforms.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Cross-Border Auditing, Corporate Governance, Compliance Frameworks, Internal Control, International Regulation

1. Introduction

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) continues to serve as a cornerstone of corporate governance and financial reporting regulation nearly two decades after its enactment [1, 2]. Initially introduced in response to catastrophic accounting scandals involving major U.S. corporations, SOX redefined expectations surrounding auditor independence, internal control reporting, and corporate accountability [3, 4]. While originally intended as a U.S. federal statute, SOX has evolved into a global compliance framework whose influence extends well beyond the United States, affecting multinational corporations, global audit practices, and foreign registrants operating in U.S. capital markets [5]. The growing interconnectedness of financial markets and the strategic importance of cross-border listings have made SOX compliance a critical consideration for firms seeking access to U.S. investor capital [6]. Consequently, understanding SOX compliance frameworks within cross-border financial auditing environments has become increasingly vital [7, 8].

Although SOX was designed within the context of U.S. regulatory culture, its principles particularly those embedded in Section 302 (corporate responsibility for financial reports) and Section 404 (management assessment of internal controls) have been adopted, adapted, or indirectly replicated across numerous jurisdictions [9, 10]. Emerging economies, European markets, and Asian financial hubs have incorporated varying elements of SOX-inspired governance reforms, whether through internal control mandates, audit committee requirements, whistle-blower protection mechanisms, or enhanced oversight structures under public accounting supervisory bodies. This diffusion of SOX principles reflects the global recognition of the value of robust internal control frameworks in protecting investors, sustaining capital market integrity, and mitigating financial misreporting risks [11, 12].

In a cross-border context, financial auditing extends beyond technical evaluation of financial statements; it encompasses navigating divergent legal systems, institutional structures, cultural expectations, and regulatory philosophies [13, 14]. Auditors operating across multiple jurisdictions must reconcile SOX requirements with local governance codes, regional

auditing standards, and sector-specific compliance obligations. These complexities have resulted in a dynamic compliance environment in which firms must adopt hybrid frameworks that incorporate both SOX principles and country-specific regulatory requirements. This hybridization process has produced varying SOX compliance models whose implementation differs significantly across countries, industries, and audit networks [15, 16].

The introduction of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) added an additional layer of oversight, extending SOX influence internationally. Through cross-border inspection agreements, the PCAOB gained authority to inspect foreign audit firms that audit U.S.-listed entities. These inspections not only increased regulatory convergence but also encouraged harmonization of internal control assessment practices across global audit networks. However, the reach of the PCAOB also generated tensions, particularly in jurisdictions where data sovereignty, national security concerns, or professional secrecy laws conflict with SOX-driven oversight practices [17, 18]. As a result, SOX compliance in cross-border auditing is characterized by both convergence and conflict.

Despite the importance of SOX compliance in global finance, academic literature remains fragmented, with most studies focusing on domestic SOX implementation or evaluation of firm-level compliance costs. Comparatively fewer studies examine SOX within the context of multinational audit environments or explore how compliance frameworks are adapted across borders. Existing research reveals substantial variation in adoption patterns. For instance, certain countries emphasize SOX-like internal control reporting but maintain distinct audit oversight structures, while others emphasize board governance reforms without fully integrating internal control attestation requirements [19, 20]. Such variations create challenges for multinational auditors tasked with implementing consistent methodologies across client entities operating in diverse regulatory regimes [21, 22].

The complexity of SOX compliance is further amplified in developing economies and emerging markets. While global audit firms attempt to standardize audit methodologies based on SOX principles, local institutional environments may not provide the necessary infrastructure to support full compliance. Weak enforcement mechanisms, limited audit committee capacity, cultural barriers to whistle-blower protection, and inconsistencies in internal control frameworks can impede effective implementation of SOX-based auditing practices. Studies prior to 2021 consistently highlight that although SOX has global influence, its operationalization remains contextually dependent and sensitive to variations in regulatory strength, market maturity, and institutional development.

An important dimension of cross-border SOX compliance involves the comparison between principles-based and rules-based regulatory regimes. SOX's prescriptive nature contrasts with the principle-oriented governance systems used in many European and Commonwealth jurisdictions. These differences affect the rigidity, flexibility, and enforcement trajectory of compliance frameworks. Firms operating across borders must reconcile these regulatory philosophies when designing internal control systems and when communicating compliance strategies to multinational audit teams. The literature suggests that the misalignment between rules-based and principles-based systems often

leads to inconsistencies in audit documentation, internal control evaluation methods, and risk assessment judgments [23, 24].

Technology has also played a central role in shaping SOX compliance across borders. Digital audit platforms, continuous control monitoring, automated internal control testing, and data analytics tools have improved audit efficiency and enabled firms to meet SOX requirements more effectively. However, technological adoption varies widely across jurisdictions due to differences in infrastructure, regulatory acceptance, and data protection legislation. Regions with restrictive data transfer laws or limited technological investment face greater barriers to integrating SOX-driven digital compliance frameworks. This technological unevenness complicates the uniform adoption of SOX requirements within global audit networks [25, 26, 27].

Another recurring theme in the literature concerns the cost of compliance. Although SOX is associated with improvements in control quality, audit reliability, and investor confidence, these benefits often come with high implementation and maintenance costs. Multinational corporations incur costs associated with internal control documentation, external auditing fees, IT system upgrades, training, and ongoing monitoring [28, 29]. Cross-border firms face additional costs related to reconciling conflicting regulatory expectations, adapting internal auditing functions, and coordinating multinational audit teams. Studies highlight that cost burdens are disproportionately higher for foreign private issuers and smaller firms, prompting some companies to reconsider U.S. listings or adopt strategic compliance minimization strategies [30, 31].

As firms and auditors navigate these challenges, the harmonization of global auditing standards through frameworks such as the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) has introduced both opportunities and complications. While ISA promotes consistency in audit practices worldwide, integrating ISA methodologies with SOX-specific requirements creates methodological tension. For example, SOX Section 404 mandates explicit management attestation and auditor assurance over internal controls, whereas ISA frameworks rely more heavily on professional judgment and risk-based audit planning. Reconciling these philosophies is a central challenge for multinational auditors striving to maintain both SOX compliance and ISA alignment [32].

Finally, the geopolitical context has become increasingly relevant in discussions of SOX compliance. As global financial markets become more interconnected and international regulatory clashes intensify, SOX's extraterritorial influence raises questions about sovereignty, transparency, and cooperation among regulatory bodies. Jurisdictions such as China, India, and parts of the European Union have expressed concerns over the perceived overreach of foreign regulators. These political dynamics directly influence the extent to which SOX compliance frameworks can be effectively implemented across borders, particularly when local regulations conflict with PCAOB inspection requirements or disclosure mandates [33, 34].

In summary, cross-border SOX compliance represents a multifaceted and evolving domain shaped by regulatory divergence, institutional capacity, cultural differences, technological constraints, governance structures, and geopolitical factors. This introduction establishes the

foundation for a comparative understanding of how SOX compliance frameworks function across global audit environments. The next section expands on this foundation by providing a detailed literature review focused on international audit regulation, internal control compliance, and comparative auditing research, all within the constraints of pre-2021 scholarly contributions ^[35, 36].

2. Literature Review

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) has generated extensive scholarly debate since its introduction in 2002, not only for its impact on U.S. public companies but also for its profound influence on global auditing practices. In cross-border financial auditing environments, SOX serves as both a regulatory benchmark and a catalyst for governance reforms in foreign jurisdictions. This literature review synthesizes pre-2021 scholarship on SOX compliance in international auditing, focusing on comparative regulatory adaptation, internal control assessment, auditor oversight, compliance costs, global harmonization, and cross-border enforcement dynamics. The analysis draws on diverse streams of literature, including international auditing research, corporate governance studies, regulatory theory, and global financial compliance scholarship.

Early literature on SOX compliance emphasized the transformative effect of Section 404, which mandated management assessment and auditor attestation over internal controls. Researchers widely recognized Section 404 as the most controversial and globally influential component of SOX, owing to its prescriptive requirements for documenting, evaluating, and testing internal controls ^[37]. Initial studies examined its impact on U.S. firms, noting improvements in financial reporting reliability, enhanced board oversight, and strengthened investor confidence. However, later research extended this inquiry to multinational corporations and foreign private issuers, revealing that SOX's influence extended significantly beyond U.S. borders ^[38]. Scholars documented how foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges adopted rigorous internal control frameworks, often exceeding domestic regulatory requirements in their home countries.

Cross-border auditing literature reveals substantial variation in how jurisdictions interpret and operationalize SOX principles. European countries with principles-based governance codes tended to integrate SOX-like provisions more flexibly, aligning internal control reporting with broader corporate governance reforms ^[39, 40]. The United Kingdom's Combined Code and Germany's Corporate Governance Code, for instance, emphasized board responsibilities and risk management processes without fully replicating SOX's prescriptive internal control mandates. Research across Nordic countries similarly found partial adoption, focusing more on director accountability and transparency rather than mandated attestation regimes ^[41]. In contrast, countries such as Japan and South Korea adopted more detailed internal control reporting structures that closely resembled SOX Section 404 requirements ^[42, 43]. These cross-country differences reflect divergent regulatory philosophies and institutional capacities.

The role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in cross-border inspection represents a central theme in the literature. PCAOB inspection authority extends to foreign audit firms that audit U.S.-listed companies, placing them under SOX's regulatory umbrella.

Studies highlight the tension between PCAOB inspections and national legal systems, especially in jurisdictions with strict data privacy laws, sovereignty concerns, or professional secrecy obligations –. For example, France, China, and certain Middle Eastern countries demonstrated resistance to PCAOB oversight due to conflicts with domestic confidentiality requirements. Scholars argue that these tensions illustrate the limits of SOX's extraterritorial reach and underscore the need for regulatory diplomacy and mutual recognition agreements ^[44, 45].

Internal control frameworks outside the United States often exhibit structural incompatibilities with SOX. Many jurisdictions emphasize risk-based auditing approaches aligned with International Standards on Auditing (ISA), which prioritize professional judgment and risk assessment rather than prescriptive documentation. Comparing SOX to ISA, researchers found that ISA frameworks offered greater flexibility in internal control evaluation, whereas SOX imposed detailed control-testing obligations regardless of entity size or risk level. This mismatch complicates cross-border audits, where multinational audit teams must reconcile SOX's detailed requirements with ISA-based audit methodologies used in foreign subsidiaries. Studies found that auditors frequently employed hybrid methods, blending SOX procedures with local risk-based audit approaches to meet both regulatory sets of expectations ^[46, 47].

Research also highlights the compliance burdens associated with SOX in cross-border contexts. Multiple studies documented substantial increases in audit fees, internal control costs, documentation requirements, and reporting burdens among foreign private issuers and multinational corporations ^[48, 49]. Smaller firms, as well as firms from emerging markets with limited internal control infrastructure, faced disproportionate challenges in meeting SOX requirements. Compliance costs included IT system upgrades, staff training, documentation processes, and external advisory fees. These burdens prompted some foreign firms to delist from U.S. exchanges or avoid cross-listing altogether, a phenomenon documented extensively in the literature ^[50, 51].

Comparative governance studies highlight that SOX's emphasis on audit committee independence, whistle-blower protection, and executive accountability influenced numerous international governance reforms. Several jurisdictions voluntarily incorporated SOX-like elements into their governance codes as a signal of investor protection commitment. For example, Singapore, Hong Kong, and India introduced reforms strengthening audit committees and enhancing internal control reporting. Scholars argue that SOX served as a global governance benchmark, catalyzing modernization of financial regulation outside the United States. However, adoption remained selective; jurisdictions often modified SOX principles to fit local institutional contexts rather than adopting them wholesale.

Auditing research emphasizes the importance of cultural and institutional environments in shaping SOX implementation. Studies found that in regions with high power distance, collectivist cultures, or hierarchical decision-making structures, whistle-blower systems and internal audit independence mechanisms faced resistance ^[52, 53]. Similarly, in countries with underdeveloped audit markets or weak regulatory enforcement, SOX-inspired control systems were often implemented cosmetically without meaningful operational impact. These findings suggest that compliance

frameworks cannot be transplanted without consideration of local institutional conditions.

Technology integration represents another major area of inquiry. Pre-2021 literature documented the growing use of automation, data analytics, and continuous auditing tools to support SOX compliance efforts. Multinational audit firms increasingly relied on standardized technology platforms to coordinate cross-border engagements, perform internal control testing, and maintain documentation ^[54, 55]. However, technological adoption varied across regions due to logistical constraints, cybersecurity concerns, and regulatory barriers related to data-sharing and cloud-based infrastructure. Jurisdictions with restrictive data localization laws posed challenges for multinational auditors attempting to centralize audit evidence storage or use remote tools ^[56, 57].

International regulatory harmonization efforts also influenced SOX compliance. Organizations such as IOSCO, IFAC, and the European Commission promoted harmonized auditing standards and cross-border supervisory cooperation. However, research shows persistent gaps between SOX requirements and international standards, leading to inconsistencies in internal control evaluation and documentation practices ^[58, 59]. Some scholars argue that full harmonization is unlikely due to structural differences between rules-based U.S. regulatory culture and principles-based global frameworks ^[60].

An emerging line of research investigates SOX's extraterritorial enforcement implications. PCAOB disciplinary actions against foreign audit firms illustrate the tensions inherent in cross-border regulatory intervention ^[61]. Political conflicts, differing enforcement philosophies, and national sovereignty concerns hinder consistent application of SOX-related enforcement across jurisdictions. Literature suggests that cross-border auditing conflicts escalate when regulatory expectations are misaligned, particularly in cases where audit firms must navigate contradictory legal requirements.

Corporate governance literature emphasizes SOX's influence on board structures, risk oversight, and control cultures in multinational corporations. SOX introduced heightened expectations for audit committee expertise, independence, and oversight responsibilities. These expectations subsequently influenced global governance practices as multinational entities sought to align internal governance frameworks with SOX-compliant models. As a result, cross-border firms increasingly adopted standardized governance structures that facilitated consistent compliance across subsidiaries.

Another significant stream of literature focuses on the economic consequences of SOX for foreign companies. Empirical studies identified both benefits and costs associated with compliance. Benefits included improved financial reporting quality, reduced cost of capital, enhanced investor confidence, and increased market liquidity ^[62]. However, the costs of maintaining SOX compliance frameworks, particularly in cross-border settings, often outweighed benefits for smaller firms or firms based in emerging markets ^[63]. As a result, firms engaged in strategic cost-benefit evaluations before seeking U.S. listings.

Comparative auditing research explored differences between U.S. auditors and auditors in other jurisdictions regarding interpretation and application of SOX requirements. Studies reveal that U.S. auditors adopt more aggressive internal

control testing practices, maintain stricter documentation standards, and exhibit lower tolerance for control deviations than auditors operating solely under ISA-based frameworks ^[64]. These differences create methodological challenges in cross-border audit engagements requiring integration of SOX-compliant and non-SOX-compliant audit teams.

The literature also highlights the rising complexity of internal control audits as multinational corporations expand globally. Internal control risks become more pronounced when subsidiaries operate in regulatory environments with limited oversight, weak control cultures, or inconsistent accounting practices ^[65]. Auditors must therefore adapt SOX testing strategies to account for differentiated risk profiles across jurisdictions.

Finally, the literature suggests that SOX compliance in cross-border auditing is undergoing continuous evolution. Shifts in global regulatory architecture, technological innovation, geopolitical tensions, and the growth of multinational audit networks will continue to shape the implementation and interpretation of SOX frameworks worldwide. As such, ongoing comparative research is essential to evaluate how SOX compliance frameworks interact with international auditing developments and regulatory reforms.

3. Discussion

The comparative review of SOX compliance frameworks across cross-border financial auditing environments reveals a complex and evolving regulatory landscape shaped by institutional diversity, governance philosophies, national sovereignty concerns, and the global reach of U.S. capital markets. The literature consistently demonstrates that SOX has exerted significant extraterritorial influence, even though its implementation outside the United States is neither uniform nor uncontested. This section synthesizes key themes emerging from the literature review, exploring how SOX interacts with international auditing regimes, affects multinational audit practices, and exposes gaps in regulatory harmonization.

One of the central insights is that SOX has contributed to a gradual convergence of governance standards across jurisdictions, particularly in areas of internal control reporting, audit committee oversight, and auditor independence. Studies show that many foreign firms seeking to raise capital in U.S. markets voluntarily adopt SOX-like internal control frameworks to signal credibility and enhance investor trust ^[66, 67]. This adoption operates partly through direct regulatory requirements, such as Section 404 compliance for foreign private issuers, and partly through market-driven incentives, as global investors increasingly expect standardized governance structures. However, the degree of convergence varies widely across jurisdictions. Countries with strong principles-based governance traditions such as the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands incorporate SOX-like oversight functions without embracing SOX's prescriptive internal control mandates ^[68, 69]. Conversely, jurisdictions such as Japan and South Korea integrate more detailed internal control rules, achieving a closer regulatory resemblance to SOX frameworks ^[70].

The interaction between SOX's rules-based structure and the internationally dominant principles-based audit regime (embodied in ISA standards) is a recurring source of methodological tension ^[71, 72]. SOX prescribes detailed internal control testing, documentation requirements, and

management attestation, whereas ISA prioritizes auditor judgment, risk-based planning, and flexibility in documentation [73, 74]. This divergence forces multinational auditors to employ hybrid methodologies, adapting SOX-driven audit procedures to local ISA-based frameworks in foreign subsidiaries [75, 76]. While hybridization allows compliance with both sets of expectations, it increases audit complexity, introduces inconsistencies in control evaluation, and imposes additional burdens on global audit teams tasked with maintaining methodological coherence [77, 78].

Cross-border PCAOB inspection requirements further complicate the SOX compliance landscape. The PCAOB's extraterritorial oversight powers extend SOX's reach into foreign audit jurisdictions, mandating inspection of non-U.S. audit firms that audit U.S.-listed entities. Although PCAOB inspections have improved audit quality and enhanced global accountability, they have also generated regulatory friction in countries with strict data privacy laws or national security considerations [79, 80]. China, France, and certain Middle Eastern jurisdictions exemplify this tension, citing conflicts between PCAOB access requirements and domestic legal constraints [81, 82]. Scholars argue that these frictions expose the geopolitical dimensions of cross-border auditing oversight and highlight the difficulty of imposing a foreign regulatory regime on sovereign jurisdictions [83]. Mutual recognition agreements have been proposed, yet progress remains slow due to conflicting regulatory philosophies and political sensitivities.

Cost-benefit debates surrounding SOX compliance remain prominent in the literature. For U.S. firms, the cost of SOX implementation has been broadly studied; however, cross-border implications for foreign private issuers reveal unique burdens [84]. Foreign firms often face disproportionately higher compliance costs due to weaker internal control infrastructures, insufficient IT systems, and limited experience with SOX-aligned documentation practices [85, 86]. These challenges are amplified for firms based in emerging markets, where governance institutions are underdeveloped, internal audit functions are less mature, and access to skilled compliance personnel is limited [87, 88]. Consequently, some companies choose to delist from U.S. exchanges or avoid U.S. markets entirely to escape SOX obligations, illustrating the trade-offs between governance enhancements and economic burdens.

Cultural differences play a significant role in shaping SOX compliance outcomes. Whistle-blower mechanisms, audit committee independence, and internal control transparency central tenets of SOX often encounter resistance in societies with hierarchical business cultures or collectivist social norms [89, 90]. In such environments, employees may be reluctant to report misconduct due to fear of retaliation, cultural aversion to conflict, or strong loyalty norms. As a result, the effectiveness of SOX-inspired governance mechanisms relies not only on regulatory design but also on cultural compatibility and organizational readiness to adopt these mechanisms meaningfully [91, 92].

Technological adoption has emerged as both an enabler and a barrier to effective SOX implementation across borders. The rise of automated internal control testing, data analytics, digital audit workpapers, and continuous auditing systems has improved compliance efficiency for multinational firms [93]. However, uneven global digital infrastructure and varying national cybersecurity requirements hinder consistent deployment of SOX-aligned technology

platforms. Data localization laws in countries such as Russia, China, and India restrict the transfer of audit-relevant data to global servers, complicating efforts to centralize audit documentation and perform cross-border data analytics [94, 95, 96]. These technological and regulatory constraints further fragment SOX compliance practices and underscore the need for flexible technological architectures tailored to local legal environments.

A further theme emerging from the literature concerns the governance impact of SOX on multinational corporations. SOX's focus on audit committee expertise, financial literacy, and independent oversight has influenced governance reforms in many countries and strengthened internal control cultures within global corporations [97, 98]. However, the extent of governance transformation is contingent on the institutional maturity of the host country. In developing economies with limited regulatory enforcement or weaker governance traditions, SOX-inspired reforms may be adopted superficially without meaningful operational change [99, 100]. This phenomenon, often termed "symbolic compliance" underscores the need for deeper institutional capacity building to ensure substantive adoption of SOX principles.

The literature also exposes a gap between micro-level and macro-level compliance outcomes. While SOX primarily targets firm-level reporting accuracy and internal control robustness, its cross-border influence extends to systemic regulatory architectures [101, 102]. International standard setters and regional regulators have drawn from SOX principles in formulating supervisory standards, creating a complex ecosystem in which SOX interacts with ISA, EU Audit Regulation, and various national corporate governance codes [103, 104]. The resulting patchwork of regulatory expectations complicates the operating environment for global auditors, who must interpret and reconcile multiple frameworks when auditing multinational entities a process that increases compliance burdens and introduces risks of methodological inconsistency.

Finally, the literature indicates that SOX compliance frameworks continue to evolve as multinational corporations globalize, geopolitical tensions affect regulatory cooperation, and digital technologies reshape audit methodologies. As global markets become increasingly interconnected, SOX's extraterritorial influence will remain a subject of scholarly interest and regulatory scrutiny. The comparative insights synthesized here suggest that future research should explore models for harmonizing SOX with international standards, evaluating cultural adaptation strategies, and developing flexible compliance architectures that respect both global governance expectations and national regulatory sovereignty.

4. Conclusion

This comparative review sought to evaluate the influence, adaptation, and operationalization of SOX compliance frameworks within cross-border financial auditing environments prior to 2021. The synthesis of the literature demonstrates that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, although rooted in U.S. corporate governance reform, has evolved into a globally influential framework affecting audit oversight, internal control systems, and financial reporting practices across diverse jurisdictions. Its extraterritorial reach exercised through PCAOB inspection authority, cross-listing requirements, and global audit firm methodologies has

established SOX as a benchmark for accountability and transparency in international markets. Yet, the global diffusion of SOX principles remains uneven and deeply shaped by jurisdictional, cultural, and institutional differences.

The review highlights a profound divergence between jurisdictions structured around principle-based regulatory philosophies and those aligned more closely with rules-based approaches. This philosophical divide influences nature and extent of SOX integration into domestic governance frameworks. While some countries adopt SOX-like internal control reporting structures, others selectively incorporate SOX elements into broader governance reforms. These variations have produced hybrid compliance models that challenge multinational auditors, who must reconcile differing regulatory expectations while maintaining consistent internal control evaluation and documentation standards.

Cost considerations, institutional capacity, and cultural factors significantly affect SOX implementation across borders. Smaller firms, emerging markets, and jurisdictions with weaker governance infrastructures often face disproportionate compliance burdens. Likewise, cultural barriers such as reluctance toward whistle-blowing or hierarchical corporate structures can undermine the effectiveness of SOX-inspired mechanisms. These findings suggest that successful SOX compliance requires not only regulatory alignment but also a supportive organizational culture and adequate institutional resources. This underscores the broader insight that the effectiveness of governance reforms is contingent on contextual readiness and capacity for meaningful adoption.

Technology emerges as both a facilitator and a constraint in global SOX compliance. Digital audit tools, automated control-testing systems, and analytics-driven oversight have enhanced compliance efficiency for multinational corporations. However, jurisdictional constraints such as data localization laws and uneven technological infrastructure limit the global scalability of these tools. The review thus highlights a need for flexible technological architecture that can be adapted to local regulatory constraints while still supporting SOX-compliant audit practices.

A recurring theme is the tension between SOX's extraterritorial enforcement ambitions and national sovereignty concerns. PCAOB inspection requirements, in particular, illustrate the complexities of cross-border regulatory cooperation. Conflicts between U.S. oversight demands and domestic confidentiality laws raise longstanding questions about the limits of global regulatory convergence. These tensions point to the need for more robust international frameworks that balance investor protection, regulatory transparency, and respect for sovereign legal systems.

Overall, the review concludes that while SOX has significantly shaped global auditing practices, its cross-border implementation is characterized by complexity, variation, and continual negotiation. The comparative evidence reveals that SOX compliance across borders is not a uniform process but a dynamic interplay between global regulatory pressures and local institutional realities. Future research should prioritize deeper analysis of hybrid compliance models, evaluate long-term governance outcomes of SOX-inspired reforms in non-U.S. markets, and

explore mechanisms for improving regulatory coordination in multinational audit environments. As global financial markets grow increasingly interconnected, the need for harmonized, adaptable, and context-sensitive compliance frameworks becomes more pressing. SOX remains a foundational influence in this landscape, but its effectiveness will depend on continued efforts to bridge gaps between diverse regulatory systems, strengthen institutional capacity, and develop technological, and governance solutions suited to the complexities of cross-border financial auditing.

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