



Received: 13-10-2025
Accepted: 23-11-2025

International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Studies

ISSN: 2583-049X

The Impact of Patronage-Based Appointments on Administrative Capacity in Mongolia

¹ Dr. Otgonbayar Nyamaa, ² Dr. Odmaa Dangaasuren, ³ Dr. Byambachuluun Tseden, ⁴ Dr. Undrakh Davaadorj

¹ Department of Economics and Management, School of Humanities, Etugen University, Mongolia

¹ Department of Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mongolian University of Science and Technology, Mongolia

² Prof., Department of Social Sciences, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mongolian University of Science and Technology, Mongolia

³ Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, Western Regional School, NUM, Mongolia

⁴ Prof., Department of Political Science, School of Political Science, International Relations and Public Administration, National University of Mongolia, Mongolia

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.62225/2583049X.2025.5.6.5305>

Corresponding Author: **Dr. Otgonbayar Nyamaa**

Abstract

Political patronage—the allocation of government positions and resources based on political loyalty rather than merit—remains a persistent challenge for public administration worldwide. In the case of Mongolia, the civil service has been significantly influenced by patronage networks since the democratic transition in 1990, affecting institutional performance, social trust, and citizen engagement. This study examines the patterns, underlying causes, and consequences of political patronage in the Mongolian civil service through an analysis of official records, policy documents, and interviews with key stakeholders. Findings indicate that patronage-based appointments, particularly at

senior levels, undermine professional norms, create instability within bureaucratic structures, weaken policy continuity, and erode public confidence in state institutions. On a societal level, such practices reinforce perceptions of inequality, restrict equitable access to public services, and contribute to growing public cynicism toward governance. Despite ongoing reforms aimed at fostering merit-based recruitment and enhancing transparency, entrenched informal networks and sustained political pressures continue to impede the professionalization of the Mongolian civil service.

Keywords: Civil Service, Public Service, Political Patronage, Public Appointment, Power

Introduction

Within the contemporary political science literature, the concept of political patronage occupies a position of notable academic importance. Scholars argue that political patronage permeates multiple dimensions of social life (Volynčik, 2016) ^[22]. For example, within the spheres of administration and governance, the particularistic interests of individual politicians and officials may supersede the broader aims and objectives of the state, thereby reshaping the processes involved in the formulation and implementation of legislation, policies, and decisions. From an economic standpoint, political patronage facilitates the concentration and redistribution of state resources among restricted groups or networks demonstrating allegiance to the incumbent political party or governing entity.

On both intellectual and moral levels, the emergence of political patronage can erode the ethics and standards of public service, ultimately leading to a moral decline. However, on the other hand, researchers (Grindle, 2012) ^[7] emphasize that political patronage can also have a positive impact on the stability of the political system by strengthening the implementation of public policy, building trust between politicians, and ensuring consistency and coordination in their actions.

Among foreign and Mongolian researchers, there is no consensus on the definition of political patronage, its dimensions, and its effect on the political system. Although numerous articles and monographs have been published on this topic in foreign

countries, there is a notable scarcity of research concerning political patronage in the civil service of Mongolia—its causes, consequences, and possible limitations. Research in this area remains limited and is much needed.

This article examines political patronage appointments in the country's civil service, their causes, current situation, and some possible solutions. The authors divide it into four sections: conceptual framework and key views, methodology, research findings, and conclusions.

Theoretical Framework

For the effective study of any phenomenon or process, it is essential to define the concept representing it clearly. In the context of political organization, Aristotle stated, "Man is by nature a political animal... Man is by nature inclined to live in a society." (Aristotle & Lord, 2013, p. 37) ^[1]. From the emergence of society, humans have consistently pursued more advanced forms of governance, such as monarchy, dictatorship, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and even disorganized masses. Evolution of these types in governance was also discussed by Plato (Plato, 2019) ^[16]. Despite these changes, a persistent pattern in social relations is the tendency to defend and promote like-minded individuals to positions of power and then rely on their authority to achieve shared goals. Although the concept of patronage emerged relatively recently, the phenomenon it describes has existed since the earliest periods of human history.

Aristotle placed great importance on governing issues and believed that trust and friendship played a significant role in effective leadership. Although he did not use the concept of patronage appointments himself, he emphasised that this

process could be employed in governance to build trust and foster friendship. However, since the well-being of society depends on the active participation of each member, he also argued that equal opportunities and conditions should be provided for everyone. In other words, Aristotle's understanding of patronage appointments is inherently contradictory (Aristotle & Lord, 2013) ^[1]. In his work *The Prince*, Machiavelli emphasised the significant dependence of political governance on patronage appointments. Above all, he believed that political power should be consolidated by any means necessary. In this context, he formulated the principle that the end justifies the means and that efficiency of governance is more important than morality. The great thinker also noted that, for a ruler to retain power and ensure effective governance, it is fundamental to surround oneself with loyal and trustworthy people, even if they lack knowledge or skill (Machiavelli & Bull, 2003, pp. 24–28) ^[11]. Hobbes emphasised the importance of patronage appointments in maintaining political stability. He believed that rulers or political leaders preserve power by involving loyal and trustworthy associates in governance. In his 1651 work *Leviathan*, Hobbes wrote that "wealth and the power of office are rewards granted by the supreme authority to encourage loyalty and service" (Hobbes, 2011, p. 151) ^[8]. The concept of patronage developed into an independent field of academic research relatively late, specifically during the 1950s and 1960s. First introduced in anthropological research (Volynčik, 2016, p. 8) ^[22], it was later expanded to explain political phenomena and processes. Researchers also define it in different ways, as shown below.

Table 1: Definitions of political patronage

S. No	Scholars	Definition	Key Emphasis
1	Kopecký & Scherlis (2008) ^[10]	"Political patronage is the power of political parties to make appointments in the public and semi-public sector."	Party-based power; institutionalized appointment.
2	Kopecký, Mair & Spirova (2012) ^[9]	Patronage is the distribution of state jobs and resources by political parties, central to understanding party-state linkages.	Party-state nexus; patron-client exchange.
3	Grindle (2012) ^[7]	Patronage is a mechanism through which political leaders consolidate support and govern, often undermining bureaucratic neutrality.	Governance tool; undermining bureaucracy.
4	Geddes (1994)	Patronage refers to the distribution of public jobs and resources by politicians to secure political loyalty.	Exchange of jobs for loyalty; clientelism.
5	Piattoni (2001)	Defines patronage as part of clientelism: selective distribution of state resources in return for electoral or political support.	Clientelism; reciprocity; political support.
6	Bearfield (2009)	"Patronage is the distribution of jobs or benefits based on partisan or personal considerations, rather than merit."	Non-merit appointments; partisanship.
7	Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen (2016)	Patronage appointments are political interventions into the civil service that undermine meritocracy and professionalism.	Civil service integrity; erosion of the merit system.
8	Schuster (2016)	Patronage is the politicization of public sector appointments that compromises bureaucratic capacity.	Politicization; administrative capacity loss.
9	Erdmann & Engel (2007)	Patronage is a broader form of neo-patrimonialism, where state resources are allocated for personal or political loyalty.	Neo-patrimonialism; resource distribution.
10	Siaroff (2009)	Patronage is a form of political control whereby ruling elites reward followers with offices and resources.	Elite control; political reward system.
11	O'Dwyer (2006)	Patronage is the practice of discretionary allocation of public sector jobs to secure political advantage.	Discretion: political advantage.
12	Peters, Kim, & Yesilkagit (2023)	Defines patronage appointments as discretionary appointments to civil service positions, whether legally legitimate or not, based on political considerations.	Political discretion; legality not determinant.
13	Tuguldur (2023)	Political patronage can be defined as the practice through which political actors allocate civil service positions to loyal supporters and party affiliates, often prioritizing loyalty over meritocratic criteria.	Party-based power; Exchange of jobs for loyalty; non-merit appointments; partisanship

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 23) ^[12]

In recent years, comparative studies on grouping regions and countries have also been conducted more intensively, rather than focusing on a single state. One of the first major analyses in this field was the study of Leonardo D. Arriola's study, titled *Patronage and Political Stability in Africa*, which examined cases from approximately 40 African countries between 1970 and 2000 (Arriola, 2009) [2].

The researcher concluded that conflicts, disputes, coups, and political patronage relationships are all closely linked in African countries (Arriola, 2009) [2]. Frequent changes to the structure and composition of governments affect these relationships and contribute to political instability. A government's structure is shaped by factors such as the total population, ethnic structure, resource distribution, and the nature of the political regime. Therefore, arbitrary changes can lead to adverse political consequences, such as instability and coups. For example, the number of uprisings and coups increased sharply during the 1970s when the structure and composition of governments in African countries were unstable. Conversely, during the 1980s, when efforts were made to increase the number of government ministers while maintaining stability, the number of uprisings, protests, and coups declined. Regarding this, Arriola wrote: 'In Africa, political instability is explained as a process of maintaining control over

administrative power.' Leaders seek support by redistributing state resources regionally, while striving to maintain their positions. Every act of redistributing or acquiring state resources sparks new struggles for control over the state" (Arriola, 2009, p. 1339) [2].

Between 1960 and 1999, Africa experienced approximately 180 changes in political leadership, 101 of which were the result of uprisings, protests, or coups. Such events occurred in 41 of the region's 48 countries, with coups being successful in 30 of them. Between 1990 and 2000, 40 the following incidents occurred: 15 were democratically elected, while the remaining 25 were the result of coups. In countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Senegal, the effective use of political patronage in social practices became essential for ensuring regime stability (Arriola, 2009, p. 1343) [2].

Political patronage is associated with socio-economic and political underdevelopment. In this sense, Petr Kopecký and Gerardo Scherlis have cautioned against the traditional view held by scholars that political patronage tends to diminish as a result of development in Europe and America (Kopecký & Scherlis, 2008) [10]. According to these scholars, political patronage in European countries is not decreasing, but rather showing an increasing trend, which can be seen more clearly in the following table (Table 2).

Table 2: Political patronage in European countries

S. No	Country	Patronage Level	Dominant Motivation	Common Selection Criteria	Notable Observations
1	Austria	Moderate	Political control	Loyalty, competence	Patronage is prevalent in central ministries
2	Denmark	Low	Political control		Strong civil service traditions
3	Germany	High	Rewarding supporters		Patronage in federal ministries
4	Iceland	Moderate	Political control		Patronage in central ministries
5	Ireland	High	Rewarding supporters		
6	Netherlands	Moderate	Political control		
7	Portugal	High	Rewarding supporters		
8	Spain	High	Rewarding supporters		Strong civil service traditions
9	Italy	High	Rewarding supporters		
10	France	Moderate	Political control		
11	United Kingdom	Low	Political control		

Source: (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012) [9]

In 2012, Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair, and Maria Spirova published a study titled 'Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies', expanding the results of their research. This work significantly advanced the study of political patronage in Europe. First and foremost, the authors defined political patronage as "the right of parties to appoint people to positions in state institutions" (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012, p. 8) [9]. These scholars examined political patronage in the civil services of 15 democratic European countries using an expert survey. A total of 641 experts took part in the study. The findings challenged the traditional view that patronage is only common in less developed countries and absent in highly developed ones. The research demonstrated that political patronage remains stable to a certain extent, even in highly developed European countries. Although the average value is relatively low (0.34), it can be concluded that political patronage is a stable phenomenon in these countries. The lowest level of political patronage was found in the United Kingdom (0.09), while the highest was observed in Greece (0.62) (Kopecký *et al.*, 2012, p. 367) [9].

In Central and Latin American countries, political patronage is often associated with corruption and civil service

inefficiency. Guy B. Peters, Francisco Panizza, and Conrado Ricardo Ramos Larrabure jointly published a study on this topic in 2022 titled *The Politics of Patronage Appointments in Latin American Central Administrations*. Patronage is widespread in the central public administrations (CPAs) in such Latin American countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, particularly among the top and mid-level administrative hierarchy. It is less prevalent at lower levels. Top positions (such as ministerial advisers and directors) almost universally rely on discretionary appointments ('positions of trust'). Executive officeholders (such as presidents and ministers) have the most real power over patronage appointments, although there is a variation in how much presidents delegate versus how centrally involved they are (F. E. Panizza *et al.*, 2023) [13].

Another major study on political patronage focuses on Asian countries. In 2023, the research titled "Political Patronage in Asian Bureaucracies" was published by Guy B. Peters, Colin Knox, and Byung Seob Kim (Peters *et al.*, 2023) [15]. The study features several notable points as:

1. While previous research on Latin American and European countries has consistently used the term 'party

- patronage', studies of Asian countries tend to use 'political patronage' or 'patronage appointments'.
- Unlike in previous studies, this study defines political patronage as 'the right of political actors to make appointments to non-elective public administration positions at their discretion, regardless of the legality of the decision'. This definition acknowledges that patronage appointments are not solely made through political parties.
 - In many Asian countries, the term 'patronage appointments' is rarely used because it is often considered to be synonymous with corruption. Consequently, terms such as 'political appointments' or 'politically motivated appointments' are more commonly used.
 - Patronage appointments are not necessarily considered to be inherently political. In Kazakhstan and the

Philippines, for instance, powerful families view them as a form of social obligation or reciprocity. In Kazakhstan, there is even a saying: 'If one person gets a high post, forty people close to them will secure good positions'.

- The study finds that the extent of patronage appointments in Asian countries is influenced by the following five factors: (1) political parties and party systems; (2) social structure; (3) the characteristics of the political regime; (4) the level of development; and (5) the career paths chosen by political actors.

The research covers a total of 11 Asian countries, and the findings suggest that patronage appointments are most prevalent in Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and India, and least prevalent in Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Peters *et al.*, 2023) ^[15]. The following table presents political patronage in Asian countries (Table 3).

Table 3: Political patronage in Asian countries

S. No	Country	Who Controls Patronage	Where It Is Most Common	Basis of Appointment	Impact on Civil Service
1	Mongolia	Party leaders, ruling coalitions, parliamentary factions	Senior administration, diplomatic service, state-owned enterprises	Factional loyalty, personal networks, political trust > merit	High turnover after elections, weak meritocracy, and politicization
2	Japan	Cabinet/Prime Minister's Office (limited scope)	Top ministerial advisors, cabinet secretaries	Professional reputation + limited political trust	Strong merit-based bureaucracy, patronage limited to the political layer
3	Singapore	Prime Minister's Office, ruling party (PAP)	Top administrative & political liaison posts	Technocratic competence + political reliability	Highly professional bureaucracy, minimal politicization
4	South Korea	President, ministers	Senior appointments, advisory roles	Political loyalty + exam merit	Bureaucracy is largely meritocratic, but politicization spikes with regime changes
5	Philippines	President, coalition partners	Mid- and high-level posts, local bureaucracies	Clientelism, coalition-building, rewards for supporters	Instability, weak institutional memory, and high turnover
6	Indonesia	President, ministries, coalition parties	Senior positions, SOEs, regional offices	Party loyalty, coalition balancing	Politicized bureaucracy, uneven reform outcomes
7	India	Central & state governments	Transfers, promotions, senior appointments	Merit (via exams) + political interference	Strong entry system, but politicization undermines autonomy
8	Kazakhstan	President, ruling elites	Senior & regional posts	Clan ties, loyalty to leadership, and regional balance	Highly personalized patronage reforms have a limited effect
9	Vietnam	Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)	All levels	Party loyalty + technical expertise	Cadre system balances politics with merit; loyalty dominates
10	China	Communist Party (CCP)	All levels (cadre system)	Party loyalty, ideological conformity, performance	Strong party control, partial meritocracy, and little bureaucratic autonomy
11	Taiwan	Ruling party (KMT or DPP), local factions	Senior administration, advisory posts, state-owned enterprises	Party loyalty, factional ties, and personal trust	Professionalized civil service overall, but top levels remain politicized

Source: (Peters *et al.*, 2023, pp. 321–326) ^[15]

Additionally, it is worth noting that the term 'patronage' has not yet achieved terminological consistency in modern political science. Various terms, such as 'patronage', 'political patronage', 'party patronage', and 'patron-client relations', are often used interchangeably with similar meanings (Zaremba, 2016) ^[25]. Let us now examine each of these concepts in detail.

Firstly, the term 'patronage' tends to be used in a broader context, being primarily understood to mean sponsorship or support. For example, one might speak of patronage for the elderly, children, women, or socially vulnerable groups. However, because of the broadness and generality of the term, it is considered unsuitable for use in this specific

research context.

Secondly, this study focuses on relationships in which not only ruling political parties, but also individual politicians, can act as patrons. Therefore, using the narrower term 'party patronage' may limit the scope of the phenomenon under investigation and could make it difficult to analyse the concept fully within all its possible dimensions.

Thirdly, the term 'patron-client relations' does not fully capture the specific type of relationship present in the civil service. This is because, alongside the relationships addressed in this study, there are many other informal types of relationships, such as clientelism and its various forms, including protectionism, nepotism, paternalism, favouritism,

and corruption, which also embody the two-sided nature of patron–client relations. Therefore, the concept of patron–client relations is considered unsuitable for the main focus and objectives of this research.

In this article, the researchers deliberately employ the term 'political patronage' for several conceptual and analytical reasons. First, the process is initiated and implemented by a political actor. Second, at least one participation in the patron–client relationship invariably constitutes a political entity. Third, the term encompasses a broad spectrum of political actors, thereby allowing for a more comprehensive analytical framework. Fourth, the process inherently serves specific political objectives and interests when enacted. Based on the nature of the issue under study and the theoretical and methodological foundations, therefore, the term 'political patronage' is deemed the most appropriate for use in the research.

We define political patronage as a two-sided patron–client relationship, whereby political actors appoint party members or supporters to civil service positions that require knowledge, skills, qualifications, and experience, using loyalty as the primary criterion. These actors also dismiss civil servants from such positions on the same basis, regardless of whether these actions comply with legal requirements. (Tserendash & Nyamaa, 2024, p. 100) ^[20].

Research Methodology

Scholars, in addition to drawing upon the theoretical insights of classical thinkers, have also expanded the research framework by elaborating on terminology, definitions, methodological approaches, and measurement indicators.

First, with respect to terminology, the emphasis is placed on *political patronage* rather than *party patronage*. This distinction is based on several considerations:

1. The phenomenon originates from and is implemented at the initiative of political actors;
2. One party to the relationship is invariably a political actor;
3. Political actors, in addition to political parties, may include individual politicians, cross-party groups and factions, as well as Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Cabinet Ministers;
4. The process serves to advance specific political interests.

Second, political patronage—whether or not it conforms to legal norms—is conceptualized as a bilateral *patron–client* relationship. In this process, political actors appoint party members and supporters to state positions that require professional knowledge, expertise, and experience, with loyalty serving as the principal criterion. Conversely, the same criterion guides the dismissal or removal of public officials from such positions (Davaadorj & Nyamaa, 2024) ^[5].

Third, secondary data and a questionnaire study.

Fourth, in terms of measurement, the analysis was extended to include how the causes, consequences, and potential solutions of political patronage can be understood and evaluated.

In previous studies, the causes of political patronage were typically linked to two main factors: exerting control over public policy and decision-making, and rewarding voters who had supported the incumbent party. In contrast, the present study expands the study by incorporating three additional factors: intra-party factional and group conflicts

within the ruling party, control over state resources, and securing financial support for political activities.

As for consequences, political patronage is primarily understood as being political in nature. Thus, the conceptual framework of the study is defined as follows: patronage, both in its causes and consequences, is inherently political, while the possibilities for addressing it directly depend on the actions of political parties, individual politicians, cross-party groups and factions, and officeholders such as presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet ministers.

Based on this conceptual framework, the following hypotheses were formulated:

H¹: Political patronage persists as a defining characteristic of the Mongolian civil service.

H²: Political patronage in the Mongolian civil service originates largely from entrenched party policies and organizational practices.

H³: Addressing political patronage in the civil service requires the establishment of a hybrid system that balances patronage and merit-based principles.

To test these hypotheses, a quantitative survey was conducted among civil servants. As of January 2024, the total number of public servants in Mongolia was 226,496, of whom 9.56% (21,639 individuals) were administrative civil servants (Civil Service Council, 2024, p. 7) ^[3].

Given the limitations of time, financial, and human resources, it was not feasible to survey the population level. Therefore, to achieve conclusions comparable to those of a full population study while minimizing resource use, a cluster sampling method was employed to determine an optimal sample size.

In applying cluster sampling, the study relied on four categories of indicators—economic capacity, governance efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure—used annually by the Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Center (EPCRC) in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2024) ^[6] in its provincial competitiveness rankings. Based on these rankings, the 21 provinces were categorized into three distinct clusters: top-performing, middle-level-performing, and low-performing. From the top performing cluster, Darkhan-Uul province (95.12) was selected, Tuv province (63.78) represented the intermediate-performing cluster, and Dundgovi province (34.93) was drawn from the low-performing-cluster (see Table 4).

Table 4: Provinces and Administrative Civil Servants

S. No	Provinces	Administrative Civil Servants
Top Cluster		
1	Darkhan-Uul	466
Middle-level cluster		
2	Tuv	777
Low cluster		
3	Dundgovi	414

Source: (EPCRC & Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2024) ^[6]

A total of **1,657 administrative civil servants** were employed from three of provinces randomly selected for the survey (Civil Service Council, 2024) ^[3]. The sample size was calculated using **Taro Yamane's formula**, under the condition of a 95% confidence interval with a 5% margin of error (Yamane, 1973, p. 886) ^[24].

- N= Population size
- n= Sample size

- e = Margin of error ($e=0.05$)

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2} = \frac{1657}{1+1657(0.05)^2} = 322.2168$$

Thus, the **sample size** was rounded to **322 administrative civil servants**. Primary data for the survey was collected from civil servants in the selected provinces using the **simple random sampling method**. Details are presented in the following table (Table 5).

Table 5: Administrative Civil Servants in the Second-Stage Sample

S. No	Name of Province	Total Administrative Civil Servants	Sampled Civil Servants	Proportion (%)
1	Darkhan-Uul	466	91	28.3
2	Tuv	777	151	46.9
3	Dundgovi	414	80	24.8
	Total	1657	322	100.0

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 87) ^[12]

The survey was conducted between July 13th and August 20th, 2024, targeting administrative civil servants across the three selected provinces. Of the 322 respondents, 290 provided complete and usable responses, yielding a response rate of 90%.

The final sample -of 290 administrative civil servants, comprised 33.5% male and 66.5% female participants.

Regarding age distribution, 14.9% were under 24 years old, 18.7% were 25–34 years old, 31% were 35–44 years old, 28.2% were 45–55 years old, and 7.2% were 56 years or older.

In terms of educational attainment, 11.7% had completed secondary education, 14.9% had vocational or technical education, and 73.4% held a tertiary degree.

Considering years of service, 21.7% had up to 5 years of experience, 29.3% had up to 10 years, 26.9% had up to 15 years, 14.8% had up to 20 years, and 7.3% had more than 20 years of service.

For data analysis, both descriptive statistics (such as distribution and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (factor analysis, reliability analysis, and correlation analysis to test hypotheses) were employed.

To ensure that the variables used in the study and their indicators present reliable and valid research outcomes, verification and factor analyses were conducted. Based on the above table, the **Cronbach's Alpha coefficients** for the variables, which indicate reliability and internal consistency, all exceeded **0.7**, suggesting that further correlation analyses could be appropriately conducted.

Within the scope of secondary sources, the study reviewed, synthesized, and comparatively analyzed not only state legislation and policy documents but also scholarly works, conference papers, and journal articles written in the relevant field. To save costs and time, to gather a broader range of data, and to enable comparison with questionnaire survey results, the study utilized annual reports published by the Civil Service Council as well.

During the data collection process, the following challenges were identified and considered as constraints:

1. **Terminology and conceptualization:** The study shows that there remains a diverse range of perspectives among researchers regarding the definition,

understanding, and measurement of political patronage in Mongolia. This has historically posed a significant challenge to understanding and studying the phenomenon. Accordingly, within the scope of the study, efforts were made to define, compare, analyze, and synthesize the relevant terminology and concepts.

2. **Limited comprehensive studies:** There are relatively few research works that holistically examine political patronage in Mongolia, including its causes, consequences, and potential solutions.
3. **Scarcity of specialized researchers:** There are relatively few scholars in Mongolia who specialize in political patronage and have produced research on the topic so far. This posed a notable challenge for designing the survey and contextualizing the study.
4. **Limited prior survey experience:** In Mongolia, there has been limited experience in collecting data on political patronage through surveys, which created challenges in developing questionnaires, guidelines, and the overall data collection process.
5. **Administrative and contextual challenges:** Data collection was further complicated by political influence within the civil service, lack of available information, bureaucratic hurdles, and suboptimal allocation of authority and some responsibilities among civil servants.

Research Results and Discussions

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, policies of reform and transformation encompassing all spheres of social life were implemented, resulting in the adoption of a new Constitution in January 1992 and the Civil Service Law in December 1994. Although the direction of separating politics from the civil service was established, there was no consensus on how and by what means this policy goal should be ensured. While the conceptual framework was relatively clear, implementation at the practical level proved insufficient (World Bank, 2020) ^[23].

According to the recommendations of the World Bank, no more than five percent of a country's total civil servants should be appointed through patronage; exceeding this threshold not only undermines the professionalism and stability of the civil service but also exposes it to politicization, thereby impeding national development (Damdinsuren *et al.*, 2023, p. 121) ^[4].

Based on the official records of the Civil Service Council for the five years between 2019 and 2024, the situation regarding unlawful appointments, as well as the related complaints, disputes, and resolutions, is as follows.

Table 6: Disputes and resolutions related to civil service appointments, 2019–2024

S. No		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Total
1	Organizations audited	14	6	375	58	267	482	1202
2	Civil servants audited	512	377	5277	1012	4927	8483	20596
3	Illegal appointments	149	32	1112	175	291	241	2000
4	Share of Illegal appointments (%)	29.1%	8.48%	21%	17.2%	5.9%	2.8%	9.7%

Source: (Civil Service Council, 2024) ^[3]

In summary, between 2019 and 2024, among 20,596 civil servants across 1,202 organizations, 2,000 appointments were found to violate the law. In other words, approximately

one in ten civil servants (9.7%) became a victim of political patronage. Of the related cases, 1,423 decisions were made by the appointing authorities, 209 decisions were annulled by the Civil Service Council, and 45 decisions were suspended. Furthermore, an audit of 1,883 permanent civil

servants across 16 ministries found that 168 appointments violated legal regulations (Civil Service Council, 2024) ^[3]. In addition, this can also be observed from the number of civil servants who were dismissed or relieved from civil service.

Table 7: Dismissed or relieved civil servants, 2017–2023

S. No		2017	2018	2019	2022	2023
1	Dismissed or relieved civil servants	10871	32627	44256	39364	27204
2	Share (%)	15.50%	16.88%	22.30%	17.50%	12.1%

Source: (Civil Service Council, 2024) ^[3]

In 2007, 5.20% of the total civil service was affected, rising to 9.32% in 2012, 11.52% in 2013, 13.09% in 2014, 13.35% in 2015, 14.23% in 2016, 15.50% in 2017, 16.88% in 2018, 22.30% in 2019, and 17.50% in 2022 (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 110) ^[12]. These figures indicate that the structure and

composition of Mongolia's civil service have been largely unstable. Survey results further confirm this instability. The results identifying the prevalence of patronage appointments in the civil service and their impact on operational quality and the selection process of civil servants are as follows.

Table 8: Results Defining Patronage Appointments in the Civil Service

S. No	Question	Not at all		Slightly		Moderately		Considerably		Very much	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
1	Patronage appointments are practiced in civil service	13	4.5	9	3.1	25	8.6	21	7.2	222	76.6
2	Patronage appointments negatively affect the quality of public sector performance.	24	8.3	0	0	22	7.6	21	7.2	223	76.9
3	Patronage appointments negatively affect the recruitment and selection process of civil servants.	13	4.5	0	0	23	7.9	44	15.2	210	72.4

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 123) ^[12]

According to the table, 95.5 percent of the total participants acknowledged that patronage appointments are made to a certain extent within civil service institutions. Furthermore, 91.7 percent recognized that such practices negatively affect the quality of operations, while 95.5 percent agreed that they

hurt the recruitment process of civil servants. An analysis of the relationship between patronage appointments and the professionalism as well as stability of civil service reveals the following results.

Table 9: Pearson Correlation Analysis

Variables	Patronage appointments are made in civil service institutions	Patronage appointments negatively affect the professionalism of the civil service	Patronage appointments negatively affect the stability of the civil service
Patronage appointments are made in civil service institutions	1.000		
Patronage appointments negatively affect the professionalism of the civil service	.835	1.000	
Patronage appointments negatively affect the stability of the civil service	.896	.824	1.000

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 125) ^[12]

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis indicate a strong positive correlation between the perception that patronage appointments occur in public institutions and the belief that such appointments negatively affect both the professionalism ($r = .835$) and the stability ($r = .896$) of the civil service. This suggests that as perceptions of patronage

increase, concerns about reduced professionalism and instability within the civil service also rise.

The following table demonstrates the correlation between civil servant turnover, election years, and the exercise of governmental authority.


Table 10: Implementation of Government Mandates, 1992-2024

№	Election Year	Winning Party or Coalition	Prime Minister	Period in Office	Duration / Implementation of Mandate
1	1992	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)	P. Jasrai	1992.07.01-1996.07.19	4 years
2	1996	Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), Democratic Union Coalition	M. Enkhsaikhan	1996.07.19-1998.04.23	1 year 9 months
			Ts. Elbegdorj	1998.04.23-1998.12.09	8 months
			J. Narantsatsralt	1998.12.09-1999.07.22	8 months
			R. Amarjargal	1999.07.30-2000.07.26	1 year
3	2000	MPRP	N. Enkhbayar	2000.07.26-2004.08.20	4 years 1 month
4	2004	MPRP and Motherland–Democracy Coalition	Ts. Elbegdorj	2004.08.20-2006.01.13	1 year 5 months
			M. Enkhbold	2006.01.26-2007.11.07	1 year 10 months
			S. Bayar	2007.11.22-2008.09.11	9 months
5	2008	MPRP	S. Bayar	2008.09.11-2009.10.29	1 year 11 months
			S. Batbold	2009.10.29-2012.08.10	2 years 10 months
6	2012	Democratic Party (DP), Justice Coalition, Civil Will–Green Party	N. Altankhuyag	2012.08.10-2014.11.05	2 years 2 months
			Ch. Saikhanbileg	2014.11.21-2016.07.08	1 year 7 months
7	2016	Mongolian People's Party (MPP)	J. Erdenebat	2016.07.08-2017.10.04	1 year 3 months
			U. Khurelsukh	2017.10.04-2020.07.07	2 years 9 months
8	2020	Mongolian People's Party (MPP)	U. Khurelsukh	2020.07.07-2021.01.20	6 months
			L. Oyun-Erdene	2021.01.27-2024.07.05	3 years 6 months
9	2024	MPP, DP, National HUN Party, Civil Will–Green Party, National Coalition	L. Oyun-Erdene	2024.07.05 – 2025.06.03	11 months
10	2025	MPP, HUN Party	G. Zandanshatar	Since 2025.06.13	3 months

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 142) ^[12]

An analysis of the data indicates that the average lifespan of a government in Mongolia is approximately one year and eight months. When the mobility of civil servants is examined in relation to the implementation of governmental mandates, it becomes apparent that election years exert a significant influence on public sector stability. Moreover, even in periods when a single party holds a parliamentary majority or governs independently, the turnover rate among civil servants remains relatively high. This trend suggests that appointments and dismissals within the public service are not solely determined by institutional or performance-based criteria, but are also shaped by the internal balance of power among factions within the ruling party and by the influence of individual politicians. For example, during the period of governance by the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) from 2016 to 2023, the total number of civil servants increased from 188,974 to 226,496—an expansion of 37,522 positions—while the turnover rate rose from 14.23% to 17.50%. In 2019, 22.30% of all civil servants experienced job transitions, representing the highest rate of administrative mobility ever recorded in the history of Mongolia's public service.

The following table (or figure) illustrates the changes in the age distribution of civil servants during the past five years.



Source: (Civil Service Council, 2024, p. 7) ^[3]

Fig 1: Age Distribution of Civil Servants, 2019–2023

The above illustration suggests that civil servants in Mongolia tend to be relatively young. This trend may be attributed, on the one hand, to the mobility and turnover within the civil service, and on the other hand, to instances of unlawful dismissals and replacements. To further elucidate this phenomenon, the table presents changes in the composition of civil servants over the past five years.

Table 11: Dynamics of Public Servants, 2019-2023

S. No	Year	Population	Civil Servants	Percentage of Population (%)
1	2019	3319168	198463	6.22
2	2020	3253283	205011	6.30
3	2021	3312275	208864	6.30
4	2022	3368632	225205	6.68
5	2023	3504741	226496	6.46

Source: (Civil Service Council, 2024) ^[3]

As observed from the table, the public servants have shown a consistent upward trend. In summary, approximately one in every five public servants in Mongolia experiences annual mobility or turnover, indicating instability, while about one in ten is subject to illegal dismissals or replacements, reflecting a lack of professionalization within the workforce.

It can be argued that five main factors have contributed to the emergence of political patronage within the civil service of Mongolia.

The ruling parties' efforts to reward loyal members, supporters, and close associates

Political patronage in Mongolia can be understood as the policy and practice by which the ruling party rewards its members, supporters, and close associates. Since the early 1990s, Mongolia has undergone a transition to a democratic political system. This process established a multi-party system and ended the period of single-party dominance, which had previously monopolized state power. As of today,

37 political parties were registered by the Supreme Court of Mongolia. However, only a relatively small number of parties participate meaningfully in decision-making at the level of government. For instance, in the nine parliamentary elections held since 1992, two major parties—the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP)—have consistently secured an absolute majority and formed governments (The General Election Commission of Mongolia, 2022b; The General Election Commission of Mongolia, 2022a) ^[19, 18]. Within this context, policies and practices designed to reward and incentivize members and supporters who actively contribute to election campaigns and party activities have become an important feature of both parties.

The primary avenue for such rewards has been appointments to civil service. Consequently, many senior government positions have become characterized as “patronage posts,” primarily intended to reward loyal party members, supporters, and close political associates. However, loyalty to the ruling party does not automatically guarantee appointment to civil service. According to Damdinsuren, Dierkes, and Luguusharav note, “While loyalty to the party is important, factional and group dynamics within the party play a critical role in the distribution of positions” (Damdinsuren *et al.*, 2023) ^[4]. In other words, in addition to party loyalty, allegiance to particular factions or social groups can, in some cases, serve as a prerequisite for obtaining a government post. This observation highlights the need to examine the role of intra-party factional and group competition as an additional factor influencing political appointments.

Factional and Group Relations within the Ruling Party

Another major factor contributing to the manifestation of political patronage in appointments within Mongolia's civil service is the competition between factions and groups within the ruling party. For example, within the Democratic Party, the “Golden Star” faction—which included former members of the Mongolian Social Democratic Party such as N. Altankhuyag, Ch. Saikhanbileg and S. Bayartsogt exerted a strong influence on the appointment process. Similarly, within the Mongolian People's Party, the “City” faction, including M. Enkhbold and Ts. Batbayar has historically played a significant role in personnel decisions (Radchenko & Jargalsaikhan, 2017) ^[17]. Since 2016, the MPP has secured a parliamentary majority in two consecutive elections and formed governments. During the party's tenure in power, turnover, mobility, and unlawful dismissals and replacements in the civil service have not decreased; in fact, they have persisted or increased. This suggests a strong connection between intra-party factional and group dynamics and appointments within the civil service.

In addition to internal party factions, cross-party interest groups also exert influence over appointments. For instance, organizations such as the Mongolian Equestrian Sports and Horse Breeders' Association and the Local Council have been identified as actors impacting the appointment process (Damdinsuren *et al.*, 2023, p. 133) ^[4].

Oversight in the Formulation and Implementation of State Policy

Each political party in Mongolia participates in elections with its own program and platform. Voters not only consider these programs and promises when casting their ballots but

also evaluate how effectively the party has implemented its commitments by the end of the electoral term, which informs their subsequent electoral choices. The underlying principle is that parties that successfully fulfill their programs and promises are more likely to achieve victory in the next election.

Although political parties in Mongolia display relatively little differentiation in terms of ideology, beliefs, and positions, they increasingly strive to ensure that their campaign promises and programs are being translated into state policy and effectively implemented through oversight mechanisms. In practice, this involves placing loyal supporters in civil service positions and influencing appointments to maintain control over the formulation and execution of state policy. This process, in turn, creates conditions conducive to the emergence of political patronage within the civil service.

Control over State Resources by Ruling Parties

Regardless of the political system, ruling parties tend to seek both direct and indirect means of excluding other parties from decision-making processes while preserving their power over the long term. In Mongolia, this tendency manifests as efforts to exercise comprehensive control over state resources, using this control to influence public opinion and legitimize their authority. This has been identified as the fourth factor contributing to the emergence of political patronage within the civil service.

Activities to Secure Funding for Party Operations

Although Mongolia is characterized by mass-based political parties, certain distinctive features have emerged. For instance, contributions from party members and supporters, such as membership fees and donations, have declined, creating a need for ruling parties to develop new sources of funding to sustain their activities. According to the 2023 Law on Political Parties, of the 28 parties that submitted financial reports to the General Election Commission, 13 parties did not conduct any financial activity during the reporting period, while 15 parties submitted an “X” report. The total assets of these parties were estimated at MNT 34.2 billion, of which 98.8% (MNT 33.8 billion) were held by the Mongolian People's Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP). Four political parties reported having no cash balances, 11 parties reported cash balances of less than one tugrug, and 20 parties reported having no computers or technical equipment, indicating weak financial resources, uneven distribution, and difficulties in maintaining stable operations. These findings also reflect the generally low level of institutionalization and activity among most parties (Tungakhui & General Election Commission, 2025) ^[21].

Political patronage appointments in Mongolia represent a complex, multifaceted political phenomenon. Patronage exists in some form in virtually every country; even in Singapore, where merit-based principles are strictly upheld, patronage persists to a certain extent.

Addressing political patronage in the civil service requires comprehensive measures that span the entire spectrum of social life, including political, economic, administrative-legal, managerial-organizational, and socio-cultural dimensions.

Political patronage manifests differently across countries. Its causes and consequences also vary considerably (F. Panizza *et al.*, 2019, p. 147) ^[14]. This underscores the need to

examine the reasons, nature, consequences, and distinctive characteristics of patronage appointments within the civil service of Mongolia, drawing on political theory and

conceptual frameworks.

Based on the results of the quantitative analysis, the following patterns emerge.

Table 12: Factors Impacting Patronage Appointments in the Civil Service

S. No	Question	Not at all		Slightly		Moderately		Considerably		Very much	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
1	The legal framework of the civil service affects patronage appointments.	0	0	0	0	31	10.7	34	11.7	225	77.5
2	Ethical standards of civil servants affect patronage appointments	13	4.5	11	3.8	27	9.3	17	5.9	222	76.6
3	Salary and social guarantees affect patronage appointments	13	4.5	9	3.1	23	7.9	23	7.9	222	76.6
4	Political parties' policies to reward members/supporters affect patronage appointments	0	0	4	1.4	49	16.9	15	5.2	222	76.6
5	Parties' strategies to implement promises and programs by monitoring policy formulation and execution affect patronage appointments	0	0	4	1.4	46	15.9	18	6.2	222	76.6
6	Elections and the electoral system affect patronage appointments	0	0	0	0	35	12.1	32	11.0	223	76.9
7	Parties' fundraising activities affect patronage appointments	0	0	0	0	44	15.2	22	7.6	224	77.2
8	Political parties and their organizational structure affect patronage appointments	0	0	0	0	39	13.4	27	9.3	224	77.2
9	Actions of parties and politicians favoring close associates affect patronage appointments	0	0	0	0	37	12.8	29	10.0	224	77.2

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 117) ^[12]

Based on the table, the majority of respondents indicated that political factors significantly influence patronage appointments in the civil service in Mongolia. All nine factors examined in the study were regarded by participants as contributing causes of patronage appointments. In particular, the legal framework of the civil service, parties' fundraising activities of parties - the organizational structure of political parties, and the policies of parties favoring close associates were identified as foundational causes, with the highest proportion of respondents rating these factors as "very much" influential (76.6–77.2%).

The fact that respondents consistently identified all nine factors as causes of patronage appointments suggests, first, an increase in nepotism and the misuse of official positions within state institutions. Second, it may reflect the tendency of political parties and actors to exert control over the policy-making and implementation processes to advance the promises, programs, and objectives they promoted during election campaigns.

The findings further indicate that, alongside political polarization and increasing politicization of the civil service, party strategies aimed at rewarding members and supporters are gaining strength. Even with the relevant laws and legal frameworks in place, the attitudes, positions, and policies of ruling political parties and politicians continue to exert strong and often covert influence over civil service appointments, as acknowledged by the survey respondents.

The results of the correlation analysis reveal that patronage appointments in the civil service are predominantly influenced by the activities of ruling political parties and politicians. Specifically, strong positive correlations were observed between patronage appointments and party policies aimed at rewarding members and supporters ($r = 0.866$), implementing electoral promises and policy programs through monitoring of policy formulation and

execution ($r = 0.863$), fundraising activities ($r = 0.834$), and actions favoring family members and close associates ($r = 0.832$). These findings suggest that party-driven motivations and behaviors play a decisive role in shaping patronage practices within the civil service of the country.

The analysis examining the relationship between patronage appointments and key political actors within Mongolia's civil service yielded the following empirical results.

Table 13: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Political Influences on Patronage Appointments in the Mongolian Civil Service

Variables	Patronage Appointments	Impact of Higher Authorities	Impact of Individual Politicians	Impact of the Ruling Party	Impact of Factions within the Ruling Party
Patronage appointments	1.000				
Impact of Higher Authorities	.959	1.000			
Impact of Individual Politicians	.926	.954	1.000		
Impact of the Ruling Party	.942	.975	.965	1.000	
Impact of Factions within the Ruling Party	.857	.931	.908	.923	1.000

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, p. 123) ^[12]

The results of the Pearson correlation analysis indicate that patronage appointments in the civil service are strongly associated with various forms of political influence. The impact of higher authorities ($r = 0.959$), the ruling political party ($r = 0.942$), and individual politicians ($r = 0.926$) shows particularly high positive correlations with patronage appointments. Additionally, the impact of factions within the ruling party ($r = 0.857$) also demonstrates a strong association. These findings suggest that political actors at multiple levels—both institutional and individual—play a significant and interrelated role in shaping patronage

practices in Mongolia's civil service. The impact of higher authorities and senior officials on patronage appointments in the country's civil service indicates a pervasive politicization of the bureaucracy. Beyond the ruling party and politicians, it is noteworthy that civil servants themselves tend to align along party lines, defend those who

share similar political views, and often justify such actions under the guise of supporting the policies and activities of the ruling party and political leaders.

In response to the question on possible measures to limit patronage appointments in the civil service, the survey participants provided the following answers.

Table 14: Respondents' Perceptions of Possible Measures to Limit Patronage Appointments in the Civil Service

S. No	Question	Not at all		Slightly		Moderately		Considerably		Very much	
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
1	Patronage appointments can be limited by improving the legal framework of the civil service	0	0	5	1.7	21	7.2	42	14.5	222	76.6
2	Patronage appointments can be limited by strengthening accountability mechanisms	0	0	11	3.8	23	7.9	34	12.4	222	76.6
3	Patronage appointments can be limited by fostering consensus among ruling parties and politicians	0	0	0	0	22	7.6	46	15.9	222	76.6
4	Patronage appointments can be limited by enhancing the authority and functions of the Civil Service Council	0	0	11	4.5	21	7.2	34	11.7	222	76.6
5	Patronage appointments can be limited by increasing public and civil society oversight and participation	0	0	8	2.8	19	6.6	41	14.1	222	76.6
6	Patronage appointments can be limited by ensuring transparency in appointment processes	0	0	10	3.4	18	6.2	40	13.8	222	76.6

Source: (Otgonbayar, 2025, pp. 140, 141) ^[12]

Based on the data presented in the table, it can be concluded that the respondents generally believe patronage appointments among Mongolia's civil service could be effectively limited through a combination of institutional and participatory mechanisms. In particular, they emphasized that strengthening the legal framework of the civil service, enhancing the authority and functions of the Civil Service Council, and increasing public and civil society oversight and participation are viable approaches to mitigating the influence of patronage in public sector appointments.

Conclusion

Within the scope of this article, the objective was to examine the current situations of political patronage appointments in Mongolian civil service, identify their underlying causes, and explore potential solutions.

Based on a cluster sampling model, the Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Center (EPCRC) annually conducts a provincial competitiveness study, grouping provinces according to four categories of indicators: economic capacity, governance efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure. Provinces were classified into three tiers: top, middle, and bottom. From these tiers, Darkhan-Uul Province (95.12) was selected from the top tier, Tuv Province (63.78) from the middle tier, and Dundgovi Province (34.93) from the bottom tier. Using a random sampling method, 322 civil servants from these three provinces were surveyed, and 290 usable responses were obtained for our analysis. The response rate was 90%. In addition to collecting quantitative data through a questionnaire survey, an analysis was conducted using the annual activity reports published by the Civil Service Council. The analysis examined six indicators: changes of civil servants, age distribution, year of appointment, voluntary resignations, dismissals, appointment-related disputes and their resolutions, as well as turnover during election years.

The collected data were processed and consolidated using SPSS 26.0 and Excel. Descriptive and inferential statistical

methods were applied during data analysis. The integrated findings of the study are presented as follows: These include:

First, the results of the quantitative survey indicate that among the surveyed civil servants, 95.5% acknowledged that appointments within state institutions are influenced by political patronage, 91.7% recognized its negative impact on the quality of operations on duties, and 95.5% agreed that it adversely affects the selection process of human resources. An analysis of the annual reports published by the Civil Service Council—covering six indicators: changes in the number of civil servants, age distribution, year of appointment, voluntary resignations, dismissals, appointment-related disputes and their resolutions, and turnover during election years—revealed that patronage appointments occur at all levels, showing an increasing trend. It was further determined that, in the current Mongolian civil service, approximately one in five servants experiences annual mobility, indicating instability, while one in ten is subjected to illegal dismissals or replacements, reflecting a lack of professionalization.

Utilizing Pearson's correlation analysis, the study found that the presence of patronage appointments has a significant negative effect on civil service professionalism (.835) and stability (.896). Both quantitative and qualitative findings support the hypothesis formulated as **"H1: Political patronage is present in Mongolian civil service."**

Second, in Mongolia, five main factors influence political patronage appointments within the civil service: the ruling parties' efforts to reward loyal members, supporters, and close associates; oversight of the formulation and implementation of state policy; securing funding for party activities; control over state resources; and competition among factions and groups within the ruling party. The study findings indicate that, in addition to the influence of ruling parties and politicians, civil servants often align along party lines, defend colleagues with shared political orientations, and justify these behaviors by referencing the policies and actions of the ruling party. The observation provides empirical support for the hypothesis **"H2: Political**

patronage in the Mongolian civil service originates largely from entrenched party policies and organizational practices, confirming its validity through the analyses conducted.

Third, appointing certain senior civil servants on a patronage basis by the ruling party or politicians can be justified as their willingness to ensure policy coherence, improve efficiency, and strengthen trust, utilizing such appointments as a pretext for team-building, while conducting unlawful dismissals and replacements at middle and lower levels undermines professionalism and stability within the civil service. Drawing on international experience, we are suggesting limiting this phenomenon by implementing policies that will definitely maintain an appropriate balance between patronage and merit-based principles. The key measures include strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks and establishing mechanisms to insulate the civil service from political interference. Finally, according to our study, it can be concluded that by reinforcing institutional and legal systems, restricting the scope of patronage appointments, depoliticizing state- and locally-owned enterprises, and implementing strict anti-corruption policies, it is feasible to preserve a proper balance between patronage and meritocracy in the civil service.

References

1. Aristotle, Lord C. Aristotle's Politics (Second edition). The University of Chicago Press, 2013.
2. Arriola LR. Patronage and Political Stability in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*. 2009; 42(10):1339-1358. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009332126>
3. Civil Service Council. Civil Service Statistics. Ulaanbaatar: Munkhiin Useg Printing, 2024.
4. Damdinsuren O, Dierkes J, Luguusharav B. Patronage in Mongolia. In B. G. Peters, C. Knox, & B. S. Kim (Eds.). *Political Patronage in Asian Bureaucracies* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press, 2023, 121-153. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009208055.008>
5. Davaadorj U, Nyamaa O. How to understand and translate the concept of political patronage. *Studia Philosophiae Et Juris*. 2024; 48(39):128-135. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.5564/spej.v48i39.3670>
6. EPCRC, Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The Provincial Competitiveness Report of Mongolia 2023. Ulaanbaatar: Munkhiin Useg Printing, 2024.
7. Grindle MS. *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*. Harvard University Press, 2012. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065185>
8. Hobbes T. *Leviathan: Volume one*. Pacific Publishing Studio, 2011.
9. Kopecký P, Mair P, Spirova M. (Eds.). *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies*. Oxford University Press, 2012. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599370.001.0001>
10. Kopecký P, Scherlis G. Party Patronage in Contemporary Europe. *European Review*. 2008; 16(3):355-371. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798708000306>
11. Machiavelli N, Bull GA. *The prince* (Reissued with rev), 2003.
12. Otgonbayar N. *Patronage Appointments in the Civil Service: Causes, Current Situation, and Prospects for Reform*. A Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, School of Political Science, International Relations and Public Administration, National University of Mongolia, 2025.
13. Panizza FE, Peters BG, Larraburu CR. (Eds.). *The Politics of Patronage Appointments in Latin American Central Administrations*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2023. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv35bfdwc>
14. Panizza F, Peters BG, Ramos Larraburu CR. Roles, trust and skills: A typology of patronage appointments. *Public Administration*. 2019; 97(1):147-161. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12560>
15. Peters BG, Knox C, Kim BS. (Eds.). *Political Patronage in Asian Bureaucracies* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press, 2023. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009208055>
16. Plato. *The republic*. Black & White Classics, 2019.
17. Radchenko S, Jargalsaikhan M. Mongolia in the 2016-17 Electoral Cycle. *Asian Survey*. 2017; 57(6):1032-1057. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.6.1032>
18. The General Election Commission of Mongolia. *Results of the Parliamentary Elections of Mongolia*. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Printing, 2022a.
19. The General Election Commission of Mongolia. *Results of the Presidential Elections of Mongolia (1993-2021)*. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Printing, 2022b.
20. Tserendash B, Nyamaa O. On the standardization and use of the term "political patronage." *Mongolian Journal of Applied Linguistics*. 2024; 9(1):93-104. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.5564/mjal.v9i1.3851>
21. Tungakhui, General Election Commission. *Transparency of political party financing: Digital exhibition of data visualizations*, 2025.
22. Volynčik NA. (Ed.). *Patron-klientskie otnošenija v istorii i sovremennosti: Chrestomatija*. ROSSPEN, 2016.
23. World Bank. *Towards a High-Performing Civil Service: Reform Progress and Challenges*. Ulaanbaatar: Munkhiin Useg Printing, 2020.
24. Yamane T. *Statistics: An introductory analysis* (3 ed., 5. print). Harper and Row, 1973.
25. Zarembo A. Conceptualization of Party Patronage. *Public Policy and Administration*. 2016; 15(3):458-472. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.15.3.16617>