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The Impact of Local Vigilante Groups in Combating Crime and Insurgency in Suleja Local Government Area, Niger State, Nigeria

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Abstract

This study revealed the positive and negative impact of local vigilante in its quest to assist the security agencies in the business of securing lives and properties. With this, measures can be put in place in order to enhance the viability of the outfit in providing adequate security and avoid colossal damages from its members. Knowing the impact of the outfit is also resourceful in building the relationship between traditional rulers and the outfit, which will serve as a vital implement for fight against insurgency, because the role of traditional rulers cannot be undermined in the fight against insurgency. With the findings members of vigilante outfit know if they have been working in accordance to their mission, goals and objectives. It helps the outfit in improving on its weaknesses and build strongly on its strength. Local vigilantes have made considerable impact in Suleja, considering the attestation of community dwellers that the presence of local vigilante scares away criminals. The credit by several respondents that they have knowledge of incidents were vigilantes counter criminal operations or made arrest over offence is another indication that the outfit have been making positive input in its capacity to foster peace and security of the people of Suleja

LGA. Another credit to the impact of local vigilante is the fact that they are more prompt in answering to distress call than the police. Inhabitants of Suleja LGA believe that the local vigilante is faster in attending to their situations compare to the police. Credits mentioned above is corresponding with the assertion of the Commandant SECSC that the SECSC have achieved greatly in reducing crime rate and creating a peaceful and conducive society for businesses to flourish in Suleja. Most importantly, this study serves as a tool to guide the ongoing debate on the bill for establishing the Vigilante Group of Nigeria as one of the government security agency. A deep knowledge on the role, method of operation and capabilities of the members of this group, revealed the advantages and disadvantages of making the outfit another formal security agency. local vigilante outfit in Suleja LGA, have considerably made positive impact, there is therefore need to look critically into this outfit in tackling crime in Suleja LGA, Niger state and Nigeria at large. Lapses of the outfit could be corrected and the outfit could be used as crime and insurgency keeps increasing.

Keywords: Insurgency, Relationship, Vigilante Group, Traditional Rulers, Peace and Communities

1. Introduction

Security refers to the activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc; it could also be viewed as the department of a large company or organization that deals with the protection of its buildings, equipment and staff. Furthermore, it refers to the state of feeling happy and safe from danger or worry (Hornby, 2006:1320) ^[9].

Security is often said to be everybody's business. Since peace is desirable by everybody, it should also be worked for by every individual. Before the human civilization, people living in a group were also saddled with the responsibility of protecting their territory even as they go on with their daily activities. Though in primitive societies there were no formal formations, but the people have a way of protecting their enclaves. But as societies begin to take a define structure, so also the security business became formalized. However, even with the formal security organizations, as formidable as they may appear the lives and properties of people are never fully secured, thus, people tend to device personal and private means to ensure safety and peace. In view of sustaining peace and security in human societies, formally some people are given responsibility to maintain law and order by formal authorities while some either for love to serve or for the need to serve willingly or compulsorily they group themselves or take it upon individually, whether with resources or no resources, with support or no support, with little or no training, recognized or not recognized legal or not legal to defend their territories, less privileged or the vulnerable amidst

them. They just want to contribute for safety and peace. To some, it does not matter whether they are been applauded or paid, they just feel satisfied being part of the peace deal, while some may be compelled or paid to contribute, this is how the local vigilante came up in various societies. In Nigeria failure to adequately provide protection by those empowered by law to carry out such duties, communities, neighbourhood or localities device means of helping themselves by employing people-most times untrained to keep vigilance especially at nights or in their absence. These particular set of people are referred to as vigilante, popularly known as *yan banger* in the north and most parts of the middle belt of Nigeria. With time and continuous need for support to the formally established security outfits, this local groups begin to organize themselves in larger numbers within communities, to wards, local government, up to state level and today it has a national body known as Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) that is not just seeking for federal government recognition, but to be formally established as a federal government security agency.

The Vigilante Group of Nigeria is a voluntary security operative that assists in the maintenance of law and order, her roles includes reducing criminal acts, protecting lives and properties, assisting in accident or any other occurrence of natural disasters, arresting and handing over suspected criminals to the police, providing intelligent information to the police and other security agencies.

According to Akinadewo (2015:4), the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) was established with over five million officers and men in the six geo-political zones of the country in 2008. However, in her constitution it is stated that Vigilante Group of Nigeria was registered with Corporate Affairs Commission on the 18th of February, 1999 under Decree No. I of 1990 Part C of the Corporate Affairs Commission, RC No. 11834 as a Community Policing entity to compliment and supplement the effort of the Nigeria Police Force and all other security agencies in the prevention of crime and protection of lives and properties in all ruralities across the country. The motto of the organisation is "say no to crime". The mission of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria as stated in her official website is to protect and serve the citizens of Nigeria in an effective and efficient manner through the wise use and management of all resources and to ensure the safety and security for each person in our community.

The group is a non-governmental organization founded about 20 years ago, it was registered by cooperate affairs commission, with the headquarter in Kaduna and zonal offices across the entire country, the aim of the group is to maintain outmost security in the country, the organization pullout all stop to curb up crime must especially in this current security upsurge, it is out to protect people, property and maintain law and order, breed peace and prosperity in our dear country, we have our members in the nook and crannies of the country. Whenever vehicle(s) broke down or any related valuables the organization make sure they are secure, it also provide security at all route around rural areas across the country. I escoris people whom fear social treat to their home. It deploys securities in any social gathering. It have about four hundred (400) members in each of the 774 local government of the country, before recruiting any member it makes Sure he/her must go through rigid scrutiny patterning his/her background, orientation, rationality, and other formal criterion, it also

team up with various government paramilitary to champion security (The National Headquarters of Vigilante Group of Nigeria, 2017:1)^[10].

In effort to attain professionalism and improve productivity in the outfit, News Agency of Nigeria, on June 10, 2016 reported that no fewer than 1000 members of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) in Lagos had one-week training on intelligence gathering to enhance community policing in the state. The training took place at Ikeja Police College between June 19 to June 24 2017, and it was conducted by the Nigeria Police. Similarly, the group has organized training in Adamawa, Jos, Edo, Abuja, Kano, Maiduguri, Nasarawa and other parts of the country in other to biff up her members in their fight against crime and insurgency. Such trainings are mostly handled by the police and Nigeria Army.

A bill for an act to establish the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) charged with the responsibilities among others; provide community policing, maintenance of law and order and community service for Nigerians and for related matters Sponsored by Hon. Abbas Tajudeen, have scaled through first and second reading. Part I - of the bill state the establishment and governing board of the group, part I- functions of the group, etc., part II - command structure part, IV uniforms, equipments and ranks, part V - financial provisions, part VI- discipline and part VII - legal proceedings.

Thisdaylive.com report has it that, in the course of a public hearing by the House of Representatives Committee on Police Affairs last January 2017, the Speaker, Hon. Yakubu Dogara raised some serious issues about the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) that is seeking official recognition from the federal government: "Is this a branch of the police force or yet another security service being established by law? It is also pertinent for the committee to find out whether the legal framework sought to be established merely gives authority to an existing organisation by licensing them or whether a general framework is being legislated upon for government to operationalise at its discretion," said Dogara.

The report also states that, apparently uncom forttable with the whole concept, Dogara added that if community policing was the main reason for the bil, could that not be operationalised within the purview of the police? "Is vigilante services not part of the social activities by various towns and communities in Nigeria and a residual matter within the authority of state governments? In View of the existence of new security organisations such as Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and even the Peace Corps of Nigeria that is being proposed, do we still need another at the national level? Do we have the resources to set up yet another security organisation instead of properly funding the existing ones and increasing mandate where necessary?

However, the idea has gained the support of some prominent Nigerian leaders such as the Emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Ibrahim Sulu-Gambari, and former president Olusegun Obasanjo among others, who urge the house for quick passage of the bill for the statutory establishment of Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN).

The impact of the group in fighting against terrorism in Nigeria cannot be underestimated as the group proved itself in the fight against Boko Haram. There is need to acknowledge, including in national media, the effort vigilantes make. According to the International Crisis Group

vigilante groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad play a major role in the fight against Boko Haram but their presence raises concerns. They make military operations less blunt and more effective and have reconnected these states somewhat with many of their local communities, but they have also committed abuses and become involved in the war economy.

Despite the promising value of local vigilante in Nigeria, some observers have noted that in the longer term, vigilantes may become political foot soldiers, turn to organised crime or feed communal violence. Therefore, it calls for a serious concern on the side of the government to create a medium to control the group beforehand.

According to Mosadomi (2013:1-2) ^[6], Niger State Government has legalised the setting up of vigilante groups in all the 25 local government areas of the state, with a warning that they must not carry arms and should not be seen as a replacement for regular police in their areas of operation. Governor Aliyu, who spoke at the passing out ceremony of 300 members of the vigilante group floated by Chanchaga Local Government Area of the state, on 8 July, 2013. It also announced the proscription of any group or individual carrying dangerous weapons under the guise of security. He noted that such people would not only be arrested, but prosecuted according to the laws of the land. Mosadomi also noted that the governor also directed all the 774 Ward Development Committees in the state to train their members on intelligence gathering in order to wage war fight crime in their areas. Chairman of Chanchaga local government area, Alhaji Mohammed Salau, in his speech, said the step to float the security outfit became necessary, to complement the efforts of the regular security personnel towards fighting crime in the society. The state government presented Hilux vehicles to the newly formed vigilante group to assist in their movement. In Suleja one of the Local Government Area (LGA) of Niger state, the presence of vigilante is always noticed around the major market, trying to keep vigilance. At night they are visible both on patrol and at duty posts within neighbourhood and various communities under Suleja Local Government Area. Suleja, formerly Abuja, town and traditional emirate, Niger state, central Nigeria (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica 2017:1) ^[7] is one of the Local Government Area in Niger State. The capital of the LGA is Suleja town formerly Abuja and traditional emirate in Niger state, central Nigeria. The town is situated on the Iku River, a minor tributary of the Niger at the foot of the Abuchi Hills, and lies at the intersection of several roads. The emirate's wooded savanna area of about 1,150 square miles (2,980 square km) originally included four small Koro chiefdoms that paid tribute to the Hausa kingdom of Zazzau. The LGA is headed by an executive chairman elected by the people of the LGA (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica). Suleja LGA is made up of ten (10) wards, which are Bagama A, Bagama B, Hushimi A, Hushimi B, Iku South 1, Iku South 11, Kurmin Sarki, Magajiya, Maje and Wambai. This geographical location, constitute the area of this research. In a report, Agbo (2010:2) ^[1], noted that Vigilante groups operating in Suleja, one of the satellite towns in the suburbs of the Federal Capital Territory have commended the Emir of Suleja, His Royal Highness (HRH) Mallam Mohammed Awwal Ibrahim for supporting the efforts of the various vigilante groups operating within the emirate in complementing the efforts of police to curb crime. The

general purpose of this study is to ascertain the importance and role played by various local vigilante groups in combating crime and insurgency in Nigeria with kin focus on Suleja Local Government Area (Suleja LGA) of Niger state, Nigeria.

2. Methodology

2.1 Research design

Social Survey research design was adopted in this study. Survey method is employed to ensure effective investigation and collection of data in order to present the findings or result in a clear manner for easy understanding and comprehensive analysis. This technique ensures clear link for others who may want to undertake study in this area or similar areas of study (Rabo, 2015:19) ^[14].

Survey research is a method in which a population or a portion thereof is questioned in order to reveal specific facts about it (Tischler, 1999; cited in Daudu, 2014:47) ^[4].

2.2 Population of the study

Inhabitants of Suleja LGA and local vigilante members within this LGA constituted the population of the study. According to a report by citypopulation.de the population development of Suleja by 1991, 2006 census and 2011 projection, is as follow:

Population Census	Population Census	Population Projection
1991-11-26	2006-03-21	2011-03-21
151,300	215,075	254,930

Source: National Population Commission of Nigeria (Brinkhoff, 2017).

Explanation: The 2011 population projection assumes the same rate of growth for all LGAs within a state. The undercount of the 1991 census is estimated to be about 25 million.

Further Population Figures:

Males Females 47.9% 52.1%

Gender Persons

Males 112,030

Females 103,045

Source: (Brinkhoff, 2017:2-4)

2.3 Sampling and Sample Size

With the population density of Suleja LGA, it is impossible for the researcher to involve the entire inhabitants of the LGA; therefore, a sample size of one hundred and fifty (150) was selected to represent the whole.

Considering the distribution of people in the area of study, cluster/area sampling technique was employed to reach out to the sample size. The reason for adopting this technique is that it offers the chance to take multi stage samples in each level. This makes the technique more suitable for this study, since the population distribution is within a geographical area demarcated in form of wards which make up the Local Government Area. Thus, randomly, three (3) out of ten (10) wards were selected, wards selected are Bagama A Hushimi B and Wambai. With the aid of quota system, fifty (50) were apportioned to each ward. The fifty (50) respondents were drawn by simple random sampling technique.

2.4 Data Collection Instrument and Validation

Though the researcher interviewed some individuals to

gather information about local vigilante outfit in Suleja LGA, the basic instrument that was used to elicit primary data for analysis of the sample respondents is a semi structured questionnaire, while secondary data were sourced from various literatures reviewed.


These instruments are acceptable standard base on the fact that it offers greater chance to elicit much information in survey research. Very importantly, a semi structured questionnaire, helped the researcher to guide the respondents to work within the area of interest in gathering information. The instrument also offers a better chance for both quantitative and qualitative measure. With the help of secondary data acquired from other people's work, it offers the avenue to compare findings from the result gotten at the end of the study.

2.5 Techniques of Data Analysis

Frequency tables and percentages were used to represent data generated from the field and discussion was based on the outcomes as obtained.

3. Results

3.1 Presentation and Analysis of Data




Source: Field Survey August 2017

Fig 1: Organogram of Suleja Emirate Civil Security Corps

Fig 1 above is a representation of the Suleja local vigilante outfit known as Suleja Emirate Civil Security Corps (SECSSC). The SECSC comprises of Gurara, Suleja and Tata Local Government Area, which are known by the formation of the outfit as Commands and are headed each

by a Commandant. The three Commands is headed by a Chairman, who as at the time of this report is Alhaji Adamu.



Source: Field Survey, August 2017

Fig 2: Organogram of Suleja LGA Command of Suleja Emirate Civil Security Corps

Fig 2 above shows the formation of SECSC in Suleja LGA. As stated earlier, it is headed by a Commandant who is answerable to the Chairman incharge of Gurara, Suleja and Tafa LGA Each of the Unit, which is made up of a ward is headed by a Unit Commandant the Note Commandant of Suleja SECSC as at the time of this report is Muhammad. It is important to note that the Commandant and the Chairman did not disclose their other names to the researcher A total of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents were sampled, the researcher ensured a hundred percent (100%) response of 150 questionnaires, because questionnaires that could not be retrieved were replaced immediately. Therefore the researcher did not count on questionnaires that were not retrieved as depicted on the table below.

Table 1: Summary of number of sample studied

Option	Response	Percentage
Number of respondents studied	150	100
Number of questionnaires not retrieved	0	0
Total	150	100

The questionnaire was divided into two sections, part A and B. Part A gathered information regarding respondents' bio data while Part B with the aid of questions carrying yes, no and no idea options and open-ended questions consist of respondents opinions on impact of local vigilante outfit in Suleja Local Government Area. The results of findings are represented in table 2 and 3 below.

Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics

Part A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents							
S. No	Characteristics	Frequencies and percentages of respondents					Remark
1	Age distribution in years	Below 20: 21(14%)	21-30: 57(38%)	31-40: 42(28%)	41-50: 19(13%)	51 Above: 11(7%)	21-30 years Dominant
2	Sex	Male: 97(65%)		Female: 53(35%)		Male sex Dominants	
3	Educational Status	Primary: 15(10%)	Secondary: 79(53%)	Tertiary: 44(29%)	Others: 12(8%)		Secondary Dominants
4	Residential Status	Landlord: 32(21%)	Tenant: 97(65%)	Others: 21(14%)			Tenants Dominants

Source: Field Survey, August 2017

Table 3: Opinions of respondents

Part B: Opinions of Respondents					
	Question	Yes	No	No Idea	Remark
5	Do you have vigilante in your area or close to your area?	124(83%)	17(11%)	9(6%)	"Yes" Dominant view
6	Are vigilante effective in preventing crime and maintaining peace?	66(44%)	58(39%)	26(17%)	"Yes" Dominant view
7	Do you think you need vigilante in your area?	114(76%)	2(1%)	34(23%)	"Yes" Dominant view
8	Does the presence of vigilante scare away criminals?	122(81%)	7(5%)	21(14%)	"Yes" Dominant view
9	Are you aware of any incident where vigilantes repel criminal operation or made arrest over an offence?	81(54%)	61(41%)	8(5%)	"No" Dominant view
10	Do you think vigilantes are quick and effective in responding to incident of crime compare to police	118(79%)	3(2%)	29(19%)	"Yes" Dominant view
11	Do vigilantes have sufficient information about criminals in their localities?	58(39%)	27(18%)	65(43%)	"Yes" Dominant view
12	Do vigilantes work with other (especially government) security agencies?	62(41%)	25(17%)	63(42%)	"Yes" Dominant view
13	Do vigilantes work with people of their localities?	81(54%)	11(7%)	58(59%)	"Yes" Dominant view
14	Are traditional rulers and other community leaders involved in matters concerning local vigilantes?	78(52%)	53(35%)	19(13%)	"Yes" Dominant view
15	Are vigilantes well equipped?	8(5%)	109(73%)	33(22%)	"No" Dominant view
16	Will vigilante perform better if they are well armed?	96(64%)	3(2%)	51(34%)	"Yes" Dominant view
17	Are vigilantes well trained?	4(3%)	110(73%)	36(24%)	"No" Dominant view
18	Will vigilante perform better it given more and better training?	107(71%)	1(1%)	42(28%)	"Yes" Dominant view
19	Are vigilantes educated?	14(9%)	61(41%)	75(50%)	"No" Dominant view
20	Do you think their level of education affect their performance?	111(74%)	10(7%)	29(19%)	"Yes" Dominant view
21	Does vigilante pose a threat to you, your community or the society (local government, state or country) at large?	54(36%)	65(43%)	31(21%)	"No" Dominant view

Source: Field Survey, August 2017

Data from table 2 above, section A which presents information on bio data of respondents shows that 21 of the respondents representing 14% are below the age of 20 years, 57 making 38% are between 21 to 30 years age bracket, while 42 representing 28% are within 31 to 40 years, 19 making 13% fall within 41 to 50 years and 11 with 7% constituting those from 51 years and above. By the data above and brief remark on question 1, those within age bracket 21 to 30 are the largest out of the sample and respondents within 51 years and above constitute minority of the sample.

Data collected on sex of respondents above shows that 97 with 65% are male respondents while 53 making up 35% are female. The educational status reveals that who possess minimum of First School Leaving Certificate (primary school education) were 15 which is 10%, those with SSCE (secondary education) were 79 with 53%, and tertiary 44 respondents made up 29% while those with other form of education were 12 making 8% of all. Residential status of respondents revealed that 32 making 21% are landlords, 97 representing 65% indicate tenants which constituted the largest option on question 4, 21 making 14% ticked others, which means they are either wards or relatives, or people squatting with landlords or tenants etc.

Part B of table 2 which focused on opinions of respondent on the impact of local vigilante outfit in Suleja shows that, 124 with 83% agreed that they have vigilante in their communities or close to their localities, while 17 with 11%

ticked negative and 9 making 6% have no idea. On the view on the effectiveness of vigilante in preventing crime and maintaining peace 66 taking 44% of the sample indicated yes, 58 with 39% took the stand of no and 26 of 17% show no idea. On the question, which sort to know if respondents need vigilante in their communities exposed that 114 constituting 76% need vigilante, 2 making 1% do not need vigilante and 34 with 23% have no either weather they need vigilante in their communities.

On the opinions of respondents whether the presence of vigilante scare away criminals, it shows that 112 of 8T%% accepted that the presence of vigilante surely make criminals stay away from an area or community, while 7 of 5% disagreed 21 with 14% have no idea. 81 of 54% concur that they are either aware of incident where vigilantes prevented or handled criminal operation or made arrest over an offence. The view on quick and effective response in incidents of crime between the police and vigilante, 118 forming 79% credited the vigilante to police, while 3 of 2% discredited the vigilante, 29 of 19% have no opinion on this. Out of the 150 respondents, 58 constituting 39% attested that vigilantes have sufficient information about criminals in their localities, 27 forming 18% attested that vigilante do not have sufficient information about criminals in their localities, 65 of 43% showed no idea as to whether vigilante have much information on criminals in their own localities. On the question whether local vigilantes work with other formal security agencies, 62 representing 41% of the sample

is yes, 25 making 17% is no and 63 with 42% is no idea. Also 81 taking 54% accepted that vigilantes work with people of their localities, 11 of 7% disagreed to that, 58 taking 39% have no idea.

Consequently, 78 with 52% attested that traditional rulers and other community leaders are involved in issues concerning vigilante, 53 summing 35% disputed and 19 of 13% took the stand of no idea. Data above also shows that 8 making 5% of the respondents agreed that vigilantes are well equipped, 109 making 73%, refused that vigilantes are well equipped, 33 indicated no idea. 96 having 64% concur that vigilantes will perform better if well-armed, 3 summing 2% disregard that view and 51 of 34% no idea.

On training, only 4 rounding 3% accepted that vigilantes are well trained, 110 which made 73% do not agreed to that, 42 with 28% have no idea. While 107 with 71% agreed that local vigilantes will perform better if given more and better training, 1 of 1% do not agree and 42 with 28% no idea. 14 with 9% accepted that vigilantes are educated, 61 forming 41% disapprove that, 75 with 50% had no idea. On the other hand, 111 of 74% accepted that their level of education affects their performance, 10 of 7% disapproved that view and 29 of 19% no idea.

Furthermore, results from table 2 above, presented that which shows that 54 of the sample making 36% indicated yes as to the view whether vigilante pose a threat to their community and the larger society, it also revealed that 65 which made up 43% chose no to that view where 31 making the remaining 21% stood on no idea

4. Discussion

during this study with the Commandant of Suleja Emirate Civil Security Corps, in which the Chairman, Secretary, some members of the outfit and some inhabitants of Suleja were present at the Command office the Commandant firstly stated that Suleja has the highest record of crime in Niger state due to high population density and commercial activities, he then proceeded with brief history of vigilante in Suleja. Vigilante is as old as the emirate itself; the formation became more organized and formidable between year 2000 and 2001 due to some cogent factors such as increase in crime rate and conflict during the installation of the present emir.

Suleja is a blessed land that welcomes strangers from every part of the country and the world. It is a very high commercial centre with high population concentration. The loving nature of the indigenous people of Suleja and the high commercial activities in the emirate invites people from all walks of life which led to over population, which in turn led to many illegal and dangerous activities.

The increase in population brought in life styles that were not common to the indigenous people. Young people began to indulge in drug abuse which leads them to breaking laws and order in the society. Crime increased tremendously that the formal security agencies such as the police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency could no longer curtail brake down of laws and order. Lives and properties were no longer safe. At a point in time within year 2000 and 2001, armed robbery was so high and dreadful, situations were about thirty or more armed robbers will attack communities, snatch properties from dwellers, rape women and sometimes kill people became regular in Suleja.

In 2001 the threat and insecurity aggravated with the crises on the issue of installation of the emir of Suleja. Considering

the high level of insecurity, the emir, HRH Mallam Mohammed Awwal Ibrahim decided to empower the vigilante group to compliment the effort of the police and encourage community policing in curbing insecurity.

According to the Commandant SECSC Suleja Command and some of the vigilante members who spoke with the researcher, the emir has been the one who shoulders the responsibility of funding the outfit, this statement is in support of the report of Agbo in chapter one where the group applauded the emir. They however noted few instances when the local government chairman and some few individuals supported. Vigilante members stated that they are the ones who buy their uniforms and other kits and they do the job out of passion without or with little pay.

The staff strength of SECSC is over one thousand (1000), as stated by the commandant. The outfit works hand in hand with the police, army, NSCDC, NDLEA, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Custom Service and others within Suleja. They work in virtually every institution and segment of Suleja except hotels. Their main source of information is from community leaders and inhabitants of Suleja.

The outfit has no limitation in age for its recruitment; it welcomes individuals in as much they have the strength and zeal to work. Individuals who indicate interest to join SECSC undergoes thorough screening, he/she must be free from criminal record, there must be a community leader's attestation, guarantor to ensure he/she has no questionable character and he/she must not be idle. That is he/she must have what he/she does for a living a legal and reasonable job. SECSC is been trained by the police, military and through workshop with other security agencies. Training of the outfit is basically on the job training.

Suleja Emirate Civil Security Corps is not having any leadership conflict, its major challenges is lack of support from the government and other institutions including individuals, ungrateful attitude by community members such as non-cooperation, rendering insult on vigilante members as illiterates, idle people and apportioning blame to vigilante in incidence involving vigilante and lawless people etc. As the Command of SECSC Suleja Command rounded up his comment during the interview with the researcher he noted that the SECSC have achieved greatly in reducing crime rate and creating a peaceful and conducive society for businesses to flourish in Suleja, which he attributed to the relentless effort of the emir and the men and women who voluntarily devote their time to serve in the outfit.

The above overview of the interview with the Commandant and other members of SECSC Suleja command, offers a bright insight on the formation of local vigilante outfit in Suleja LGA. The information has a very close relationship with the findings from respondents as analysed above and will be discussed below.

Data from questionnaire presented and analysed above depicts that a very large number of the populace has knowledge on local vigilante outfit and may be employing their services. It also showed that people may not be perfectly satisfied with their services because of their level of effectiveness, probably due to factors hoped to be improved, but they are still needed by people to keep watch over their lives and properties.

Local vigilantes have made considerable impact in Suleja, considering the attestation of community dwellers that the presence of local vigilante scares away criminals. The credit

by several respondents that they have knowledge of incidents where vigilantes counter criminal operations or made arrest over offence is another indication that the outfit have been making positive input in its capacity to foster peace and security of the people of Suleja LGA.

5. Conclusion

Local vigilante outfit in Suleja LGA, have considerably made positive impact, there is therefore need to look critically into this outfit in tackling crime in Suleja LGA, Niger state and Nigeria at large. Lapses of the outfit could be corrected and the outfit could be used as crime and insurgency keeps increasing.

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